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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF CITY 
GOVERNMENTS IN ARGENTINA AND MEXICO, 1980-2010  
by  
Heidi Jane M. Smith 
Florida International University, 2012 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Allan Rosenbaum, Major Professor 
This dissertation examines local governments’ efforts to promote economic 
development in Latin America. The research uses a mixed method to explore how cities 
make decisions to innovate, develop, and finance economic development programs. First, 
this study provides a comparative analysis of decentralization policies in Argentina and 
Mexico as a means to gain a better understanding of the degree of autonomy exercised by 
local governments. Then, it analyzes three local governments each within the province of 
Santa Fe, Argentina and the State of Guanajuato, Mexico. The principal hypothesis of this 
dissertation is that if local governments collect more own-source tax revenue, they are more 
likely to promote economic development and thus, in turn, promote growth for their region. 
By examining six cities, three of which are in Santa Fe—Rosario, Santa Fe (capital) 
and Rafaela—and three in Guanajuato—Leon, Guanajuato (capital) and San Miguel de 
Allende, this dissertation provides a better understanding of public finances and tax 
collection efforts of local governments in Latin America. Specific attention is paid to each 
city’s budget authority to raise new revenue and efforts to promote economic development. 
The research also includes a large statistical dataset of Mexico’s 2,454 municipalities and a 
xregression analysis that evaluates local tax efforts on economic growth, controlling for 
population, territorial size, and the professional development. In order to generalize these 
results, the research tests these discoveries by using statistical data gathered from a survey 
administered to Latin American municipal officials.  
The dissertation demonstrates that cities, which experience greater fiscal autonomy 
measured by the collection of more own-source revenue, are better able to stimulate effective 
economic development programs, and ultimately, create jobs within their communities. The 
results are bolstered by a large number of interviews, which were conducted with over 100 
finance specialists, municipal presidents, and local authorities. The dissertation also includes 
an in-depth literature review on fiscal federalism, decentralization, debt financing and local 
development. It concludes with a discussion of the findings of the study and applications for 
the practice of public administration. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Local governments in Latin America are perceived to have low levels of 
autonomy, fiscal capacity, and human resources, which makes it difficult for them to 
deliver public services effectively and efficiently (Cabrero and Carrera 2002; Campbell 
2003; Tulchin and Selee 2004). Arguably, with sufficient capacity, local governments 
could offer economic development programs such as tax incentives or education and 
training programs to help prepare a competitive workforce, which could ultimately boost 
their local economies (Blakely and Bradshaw 2002).  
The purpose of this dissertation is to better understand the capacity of local 
governments in Latin America to support economic development by determining if there 
is a link between the degree of decentralization within a country and its local economic 
development. This study seeks to answer the following questions: What is the 
relationship between decentralization and local economic development? Are more 
fiscally autonomous cities in Latin America better able to promote local economic 
development programs? What incentives do city governments have to increase their 
public revenue streams? How are cities paying for their local economic development 
programs? 
1.2 Research Topic 
Within Latin America, countries started to decentralize by entrusting state 
functions, such as implementing social policies, managing local budgets and contracting 
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out public services to local governments in the early 1980s (Montero and Samuels 2004). 
Coupled with various democratization movements throughout the same period, local 
elections became prevalent (Gibson 2004; Tulchin and Selee 2004). Scholars have 
associated the relationship of decentralization with local governance and democratic 
institution building (Rosenbaum 2009). A case example is Mexico, where 
decentralization has been linked to democratization (Bailey 1990; Cabrero and Carrera 
2002; Gershberg 1995; Ward and Rodriguez 1995).  
Increasingly, local governments have become a unit of analysis for research in the 
region and some academics have separated the decentralization movement into political, 
administrative, and fiscal reforms (Falleti 2010; Tulchin and Selee 2004). For example, 
Falleti (2005) argued that the process of decentralization is of a sequential nature, which 
begins with administrative reforms (devolving authority), then moves to creating a 
political framework (local elections) and, finally, establishes autonomous municipalities 
with the fiscal capacity to manage their own resources. She suggested that this final 
element, setting up decentralized financial reforms, promoting fiscal incentives and 
encouraging revenue systems to emerge from below, has proven to be difficult to 
implement. Recent scholarly and policy attention has focused on the last element, fiscal 
decentralization or the “transfer of expenditure responsibilities and revenue assignments 
to lower levels of government” (Escobar-Lemmon 2001; Gibson 2004; Litvack and 
Seddon 1998; Wiesner 2003). Empirical research has tested the effects of fiscal 
decentralization on economic development with several large-scale quantitative studies 
that found diverse outcomes (Davoodi 1998; De Mello 2001; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and 
Shleifer 1995; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997; Rodden 2004). Scholars explain the 
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wide-ranging results in terms of the variation that exists among definitions and measures 
of such basic concepts as autonomy, fiscal decentralization and own-source revenue 
generation (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002; Rodden 2002; Rodden 2004). The present dissertation 
seeks to facilitate the better understanding of the current theoretical and empirical gaps in 
the literature by providing both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of six cities located 
in Argentina and Mexico and by describing their efforts to initiate innovative approaches 
to public finances and the promotion of economic development programs. 
1.3 Purpose and Objective of the Study 
 The purpose of the study is to analyze how local governments in Latin America 
function, manage, and fund local economic development (LED) programs. It discusses 
the local government’s profile and activity, the contribution of LED to the development 
and growth of large metropolitan and midsize cities and small towns in the region. The 
specific objectives of this dissertation are:  
• to provide a historic and comparative analysis of Argentina and Mexico’s 
decentralization processes; 
• to offer an overview of the role of Latin American local governments within the 
intergovernmental structure; 
• to assess the role of local taxation as an agent of growth for cities in Latin 
America; 
• and to provide a budget analysis of six cities and their effective use of revenues at 
the local level. 
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1.4 Overview of the Research Design 
The research utilizes two basic methodologies: qualitative and quantitative. The 
research provides a comparative analysis of the six cities in Argentina and Mexico. The 
cases were selected in two federalist countries in Latin America: Argentina and Mexico, 
which are undergoing a transition (George and Bennett 2005). Whereas traditionally 
Mexico has been very centralized (governed by a single national political party for over 
70 years), it has increasingly become more decentralized with increasing degrees of 
municipal and states’ rights. Argentina, on the other hand, has been traditionally 
decentralized (empowered by the provincial governments) and recently has become more 
politically and fiscally centralized through various national policies and tax reforms.  
This dissertation includes an analysis of the subnational government reforms that 
affected inter-governmental relations between the national governments and the states. In 
addition, the study reviews recent fiscal reforms with regard to income generation and 
expenditures by the national, regional, and local governments. The timeframe for the 
analysis is from 1980 to 2010, thus incorporating major political and economic 
transformations in both counties’ recent histories including the emergence of democratic 
governance. One goal is to understand how national decentralization policies impact local 
governments. To eliminate the impact of policy variation among state and provincial 
governments, the selected cities are in the same subnational governments—the state of 
Guanajuato in Mexico and the province of Santa Fe in Argentina. The cities include an 
industrialized city, a state capital and a small to mid-size town in each country as a means 
to take into account the impact of variation in size, industrial strength and economic 
activity.  
5 
Each of the six city governments has engaged in a range of measures to increase 
revenue for their local budgets. The research compares different types of interventions in 
terms of encouraging fiscal autonomy and contrasts them as regards the city investments 
in economic development programs. Fiscal autonomy is evaluated as regards both budget 
composition and authority to finance these public programs. First, the independent 
revenue raising capability within the budget is measured. This is the input of local 
revenues such as property taxes, fees, fines and loans totaled and subtracted by inter-
governmental transfers and international or philanthropic aid, which is calculated into a 
variable of Total Own-Source Revenue (TOSR). Next, the fiscal authority of each city, 
such as its ability to raise taxes and fees, issue public debt, re-evaluate property and 
change its tax rate, is examined. This includes a review of each city’s legal frameworks. 
The research further compares the six cities as regards to their efforts to promote 
economic development programs (measured as the dependent variable). The specific 
programs of each city, for example job fairs, training centers, or marketing locally 
produced products are reviewed. The factors that may result in increased economic 
development examined include: inter-governmental relations, political ideology, 
geography (i.e. history and cultural legacy), mayoral leadership, and the professional 
development (i.e. educational level) of the public employees. 
A large-scale quantitative phase of the research further tests the case study results. 
An econometric model is used to evaluate if own-source taxes as a percentage share of 
total revenue helps economic growth measured as gross domestic product (GDP). The 
model uses data obtained from Mexico’s National Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(INEGI) and the Chamber of Deputies’ Public Finance (CEFP) data on municipal income 
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and expenditure data. By using Mexico as a single country case study with 2,454 
municipalities, it provides a useful first quantitative test for Latin America.  
Finally, to cross-reference and generalize the results throughout Latin America, a 
survey was distributed to authorities at a large conference of local governments to test 
these outcomes. The survey sought to determine how well local economic development 
programs work and the autonomy that the local authorities experienced. The sample 
includes cities throughout Latin America with a variety of population sizes and country 
origins. With these data, a multivariable analysis was conducted to better understand the 
perceptions of local authorities regarding the different types of decentralization 
(administrative, political, or fiscal). Specifically, the statistical analysis evaluated the 
relationship of city autonomy and efforts to create economic development programs and 
to the number of job created in each city. 
1.5 Research Questions  
This dissertation analyzes Argentina and Mexico’s commitment to fiscal 
decentralization policies and their efforts at creating more fiscally autonomous local 
governments. It is hypothesized that if a national government has a higher degree of 
commitment to fiscal decentralization policies, the country will be more likely to have 
fiscally autonomous municipalities. Autonomy is measured as a combination of total 
own-source revenue collection and the authority to exercise their local budgets.  
Second, this dissertation examines the relationship between fiscal autonomy and a 
municipalities’ commitment to economic development activities. This examination 
reviews the various city budgets and assesses their use of own-source revenues to invest 
in economic development programs. It is hypothesized that if a municipality is more 
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fiscally autonomous, the city will be more likely to have allocated resources for economic 
development activities. Success is measured in terms of the number of such programs and 
the extent to which budget resources are allocated to them. It is assumed that if the local 
public official has more autonomy and uses it to establish programs that create jobs and 
related economic development programs, then local economies will grow and generate 
wealth for their communities.  
1.6 Significance of the Study   
This study addresses various policy issues. First, although Latin America has seen 
positive steady growth rates in the past decade, it is still the most unequal region of the 
world in terms of income distribution. Birdsall, De La Torre, and Menezes (2007) suggest 
that those inequalities inhibit future prosperity. Policy makers for the past quarter century 
have been searching for solutions to this problem. Decentralization is one such approach, 
but more research is needed to find the correlation between fiscal autonomy and its 
possible effects in improving the economic development of a city.  
Second, scholars currently suggest that national governments in the region 
provide weak incentives for local governments to raise their own revenue (Weingast 
2006; Wiesner 2003). In comparison to other areas of the world, Latin American 
countries generally collect a small percentage of their potential tax revenue. Suggesting a 
system of fiscal federalism, or the balancing of federal dollars with local needs, without 
devolving more fiscal authority to local governments, may be an ineffective approach to 
encourage local governments to tap new revenue streams (Bahl and Wallace 2005). More 
information is needed to understand the current inter-governmental context, with 
particular attention to the allocation of national revenues to subnational governments. 
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Potentially, a city could find new sources of revenue to address social issues and pay for 
economic development programs at the local level. This would develop a new social 
equilibrium for public policies and have a direct impact on what level of government 
these policies should be carried out.  
Third, international lenders are interested in financing loans to sub-national 
governments. For example, trust funds, guarantee funds or municipal bonds could 
provide new financial instruments for cities to invest in economic development programs 
(Campbell 2003). Additional research is needed to understand what types of economic 
development programs cities are establishing and how they are paying for them. This will 
help to better understand the decision-making processes of city officials.  
1.7 Organization of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation is arranged into three sections: 1) theories and methods, 2) 
qualitative analysis and 3) quantitative analysis. Chapter I introduces the problem 
statement, purpose, and significance of the study. The conceptual basis of the study is 
also established. Chapter II reviews literature and research related to the broad topics of 
decentralization and economic development. It describes empirical studies that have been 
conducted and explains why a qualitative assessment of municipal fiscal data is aslo 
necessary. The methodology in the study is presented in chapter III and includes the 
research design, sample selections, data collection tasks and the data analysis procedures. 
Results from the qualitative research effort are presented in chapters IV-VIII and the 
quantitative analysis in chapters IX-X.  
 Chapter IV uses a comparative historical review of the federal experience in each 
country to identify the recent trends towards increased decentralization in Mexico and 
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greater centralization in Argentina. The contribution of overcoming a dictatorship in the 
late 19th century and a civil war (1910-20) meant that Mexico had a difficult time 
consolidating political power and developing as a federation. While Mexico was a 
centralized federation for much of the 20th century, the federal government began to 
decentralize when opposition party members came into power in the 1980s. It was only 
when the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) political machine was thoroughly 
dismantled in 2000 that democracy and decentralization really took root in the country. 
Whereas Mexico’s decentralization reforms have been primarily administrative and 
political, its fiscal policies have concentrated on revenue redistribution through federally 
funded programs. Still the budget process, as a whole, is primarily managed by the 
executive power. 
  Argentina, for most of the 19th century, has been a loosely decentralized 
federation of caudillos, local land owning elites. Research suggests that when Juan 
Domingo Peron first became president in the 1940s, the country started to become more 
centralized (Benton 2001). His policies called for a strong role for the central government 
in order to provide services to urban workers in and around Buenos Aires. His party and 
policies drove Argentina into a spiral of political reforms, military dictatorships, and 
economic crises for most of the 20th century. From 1980-2010, power struggles between 
the provinces and the presidency reflected the emergence of a stronger hand by the 
executive branch of government in managing the country. Argentina’s centralization of 
power can be further traced through examining the recent fiscal reforms developed to 
stabilize its faltering economy, especially after 2001.  
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 Next, chapter V describes the institutional context local governments in Argentina 
and Mexico. The chapter seeks to evaluate how decentralization reforms have affected 
the two regional subnational governments and the six cities as case studies. It is assumed 
that if Argentina becomes more centralized and Mexico more decentralized then local 
budgets will also change as a result. First, the chapter provides a comparison of the legal 
structures for each country. It demonstrates that the Argentine cities have more authority 
to initiate taxes, set rates and bases, and make more budget decisions then their Mexican 
counterparts. Mexico’s local governments have limited authority to manage their budgets 
and are subject to changes made by the state governments.  
 Next, chapter V evaluates the public debt obligations of whether city officials take 
loans from private or publically financed banks such as the World Bank. The public 
finance literature highlights that debt decisions may provide additional fiscal autonomy 
for a city in terms of independent discretion to spend the additional recourses (Feiock, 
Jeong, and Jaehoon 2003; Fukasaku and Hausmann 1998). Arguably, scholars suggest 
that Argentina’s debt defaulted and macro-economic instability after 2001 was largely the 
result of the provinces issuing too much debt. A problem of moral hazard occurred 
because the national government held the risk and bailed out the provinces (De Mello 
2001; Feiock, Jeong, and Jaehoon 2003; Fukasaku and Hausmann 1998; Hernandez-
Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2002). This research study finds that Argentina’s subnational 
governments have more legal authority to take out loans—but the country has recently 
been tightening its rules by requiring the federal treasury to approve these loans. Mexico 
has long centralized its decision-making authority to the federal treasury, but has recently 
changed its laws to allow local governments to take out public debt from the private 
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sector. Laws now require cities to provide two ratings and collateral in the form of 
revenue from future inter-governmental transfers. Both countries recent fiscal reforms 
allow debt capacity for local governments. Yet, Mexican cities have been able to take 
advantage of this benefit and take out more debt. This research found that the wealthier 
cities have better balance sheets to cover larger loans, but they also default more often. 
 Chapter VI and VII use a comparative case study approach to understand the 
effects of fiscal decentralization on creating locally based economic development 
programs. These two chapters evaluate the six cities selected, first Argentina (chapter V) 
and then Mexico (chapter VI), and uses a bottom up approach to see how federal 
decentralization reforms are transforming the local governments, focusing primarily on 
their budgets. In general, federal decentralization or centralization polices have had little 
effect on the authority and decisions that city’s make over their budgets. Rather, in the 
case of Mexico, fiscal decentralization has allowed states more control over resources. In 
Argentina, there has been relatively little influence of the recentralization on the three 
case study’s budgets. This study finds that the expenditure and revenue decisions for the 
case studies are not correlated with the degree of decentralization policies that the 
national governments have undergone.  
 After looking at the cases studies and the legal frameworks, chapter VIII focuses 
on the independent variables to explain why the cities capture more tax revenue and later 
spend it, or not, to improve their local communities. These other factors include the inter-
governmental relations, geography (i.e. history and cultural legacy), mayoral leadership, 
and the professional development (i.e. educational levels) of the public employees. The 
most influential variable in all the cases is the inter-governmental relations that city 
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administrators have with their state-level bureaucracies. This was found positive and 
significant for all cases in both Mexico and Argentina. Local politics within the city and 
across other levels of government is the most important factor for economic development 
to occur within a municipality. This was more fundamental than left or right based 
political ideology, the basic political situation or educational attainment of public 
employees. The political relationship between the local, state and national government 
seemed to be the most dominate factor for a majority of the six case studies. The 
influential variable of local politics is later quantitatively tested in chapter IX by using a 
survey of local authorities across Latin America and found to be positive for increases in 
economic development. 
 In general, the research found in the case studies (chapters VI and VII) that the 
amount that a city devotes to economic development programs is only a small part of the 
overall budget. A programmatic budget of several thousand dollars a year and a few 
dedicated employees does not directly equate to bringing millions of dollars into a local 
economy. Rather, city wealth is more important for its ability to either collect more taxes 
or bring more businesses into the community. A city’s wealth is the precursor for local 
tax collection. Bigger local budgets make spending more possible on local economic 
development programming. 
 Chapter IX builds on the empirical knowledge from previous chapters to perform 
a large-scale N regression to test whether more own source revenue (local tax collection) 
helps economic development, measured as Gross Domestic Product. The statistical 
results found a positive relationship between economic development GDP and local tax 
collection by using municipal data from Mexico, over a span of 20 years. The 
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endogeneity problem of whether tax collection is first necessary to help economic 
development or if economic development helps with local own source revenue collection 
by providing of a greater tax base, is tested. By using quantitative data from Mexico, the 
latter is supported. This statistical test is robust with a high R-squared, but there could be 
several intervening variables omitted from the model. One additional unexpected 
outcome finds public works (as a percentage of TOSR) expenditures are insignificant, but 
negatively correlated with economic development. More money spent on public works 
(as a percent of TOSR) does not translate into increased economic development (rise in 
GDP). This could mean that there is a high dependency by local government officials on 
inter-governmental grants. Furthermore, the fiscal equations for redistributing transfers 
for public works may be incorrect. Further analysis is needed to review how inter-
governmental grants are created and distributed. 
 Finally, chapter X seeks to generalize the findings by using survey data from 
cities across Latin America. A regression model is used to test whether mayors and local 
authorities see decentralization essential for job creation. It demonstrates that mayors and 
local authorities are more concerned about political and 
administrative decentralization than fiscal decentralization. The responses from the 
surveys suggest that financial decisions are determined by the politics of inter-
governmental relations. The results show that local authorities would rather depend on 
higher-level political connections than to collect more taxes. This shows respondents 
have a desire to continue rent-seeking higher-level government officials rather than 
finding independent revenue sources to manage their cities. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Three decades of democratic experimentation in Latin America has been, in part, 
focused on government decentralization. Justified in terms of its ability to create both 
greater effectiveness and efficiency in governance, decentralization has been long 
associated with the empowering of local governments to encourage citizen participation 
in the decision-making process. The early writings of John Stuart Mill and Alexis de 
Tocqueville analyzed decentralization in conjunction with ideas such as representation, 
civil society participation and democratization.  
 Theoretically, decentralization is also a concept described, analyzed and advanced 
by public choice scholars such as Charles Tiebout (1956) and Richard Musgrave (1959). 
These scholars were primarily concerned with the economic priorities of downsizing the 
welfare state and reducing public expenditures, along with balancing budgets, contracting 
out services and delegating responsibilities to lower levels of the bureaucracy or directly 
to the civil society. The theory of public choice suggests that the lowest level of 
government puts forth the best delivery of services, for which the public will have a 
higher willingness to pay for those public goods. These theories have been 
conceptualized for developed countries but have not been tested for developing countries, 
such as those in Latin America.  
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 Since the 1980s, an increasing number of countries in Latin America have 
decentralized by entrusting state functions, such as promoting economic development, to 
local governments (Montero and Samuels 2004; Tulchin and Selee 2004). Initially, 
international financial sector endorsed this development idea (Bonvecchi 2010). A new 
focus on governance shortly followed and became prominent throughout the developing 
world. For example, Ebal and Yilma (2002) cite Dillinger’s 1994 World Bank report, 
which declared that more than 60 developing countries with populations greater than five 
million claimed to have begun to transfer fiscal authority to local governments. Yet, 
skeptics of the idea consider decentralization as contributing more subnational debt by 
abusing soft budget constraints and inflicting moral hazard, therefore enlarging local 
bureaucracies, and ultimately causing macroeconomic instability (Diaz-Cayeros 2006; 
Dillinger and Webb 1999; Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2002; Rodden 2002; 
Rodden 2004; Stein 1999a). Arguably, the process of decentralization is far from 
complete within the region and the question still remains as to whether more fiscal 
decentralization policy can ensure financial stability while promoting economic 
development.  
If the skeptics are wrong, there are several place-based development techniques 
that local governments could apply once they have a certain level of autonomy (Campbell 
2003; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995; Ladd and Yinger 1989; Porter 1990; 
Roberts 2005). This includes developing tax incentive programs, providing education and 
training programs that can attract and/ or help prepare a competitive workforce and/ or 
offer loans or credits to entrepreneurs (Feiock 2004; Feiock, Moon, and Park 2008; 
Feiock, Steinacker, and Park 2009; Kwon, Berry, and Feiock 2009). By creating strong 
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financial systems, cities can encourage investors locally, thereby stimulating economic 
development. The theory suggests that greater autonomy will motivate a more responsive 
local government, which will more effectively shape public policies that contribute to a 
community’s needs. Local economic development theory suggests that this commitment 
and development strategy will assist communities to address the needs of the poor and 
promote growth for their societies (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Besley and Coate 
2002; Blair 1995; Blakely and Bradshaw 2002; de Mello 2008; Feiock and Jae-Hoon 
2001; Feiock, Steinacker, and Park 2009; Feiock and Cable 1992; Kwon, Berry, and 
Feiock 2009; Malizia and Feser 1999; World Bank 2007).  
The present dissertation tests whether the assumptions of the decentralization 
advocates are correct. Are fiscally autonomous cities more likely to promote economic 
development programs? The purpose of chapter II is to better understand the extensive 
literature that explains the relationship between decentralization and economic 
development. This chapter reviews several bodies of literature. First, it describes the 
theories of public choice, fiscal decentralization, and fiscal federalism. Then it provides 
an overview of how the concept of decentralization has been treated by Latin American 
scholars, in particular by dividing decentralization into political, administrative, and 
fiscal reforms. Next an overview of public finance literature is provided to understand 
how tax policy has been established within the region. Then local economic development 
theory is explained. This is followed by a description of empirical studies that have been 
done to test whether fiscal decentralization promotes economic development.  
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2.2 Public Choice Theories of Decentralization 
 This study uses public choice theory to understand why national governments 
would decentralize. Oates’ (1972) original premise derives from traditional neoclassical 
economists such as Charles Tiebout (1956) and Richard Musgrave (1959) who linked 
public choice to theories of federalism. These scholars suggest that fiscal decentralization 
is more efficient by first, allowing local governments to determine the appropriate level 
of service delivery, and second, by creating competition between local governments 
while allowing voters to move from one jurisdiction to another to obtain optimal 
preference of service provision. Oates (1995) added that decentralization plays an 
important role in the efficient production of services leading to more rapid economic 
growth. Fukasaku and de Mello (1999) suggest that decentralizing public service delivery 
will create efficiency gains that will in turn enhance growth (Fukasaku and Mello Jr. 
1999; Fukasaku and De Mello 1998; Fukasaku and Hausmann 1998; Gavin and 
Hausmann 1998; Stein 1998). Peterson’s (1995) functionalist theory suggests that the 
appropriate level of government should manage what is perceived to be the appropriate 
function. Peterson identifies distinctive levels of government that he believes are best 
able to manage the allocation or redistributive of activities. Whereas state and local 
governments allocate developmental funds such as those for infrastructure and roads, 
redistributive funds involve funding social programs to the poor and sick should be 
managed by the national government (Peterson 1995; Peterson 1981). 
Musgrave (1959) argued local governments are equipped to design and administer 
development programs because market forces and political processes discipline them. 
Because city governments are close to citizens’ demands, they are best able to renegotiate 
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the fiscal bargain with taxpayers (Campbell 2003). It is the marginal resident and 
marginal businesses that determine the market value of property in a locality. Local 
governments give citizens a choice in the level and type of basic government services. 
Theory suggests that municipalities are better equipped to facilitate information about 
how to organize public services. Because citizens are likely to eschew income tax and 
rely more heavily on property taxes and user fees to pay for public goods, political 
pressure is minimized at the local level.  
Some skeptics of decentralization argue that national governments should be in 
control of state resources to target development into specific areas of their countries 
(Manor 1999; Prud'homme 1995; Smoke 2005). The main argument suggests that central 
governments can better manage the high fixed costs for building infrastructure, which 
will provide spillovers into other regional areas of the country. Smoke (2005) contends 
that national governments, in particular in developing countries, have better access to 
information and international financial markets to plan targeted development activities. 
Manor (1999) suggests that after World War II, a centrally managed, mixed economy 
was sought to push for centralization in many developing countries.  
In general, countries under communist influences in Latin America began similar 
centralization processes. Beginning in the 1970s, when military took control of national 
governments in their efforts to overthrow leftist sympathizers, several installed 
decentralized governance systems as a way to promote peace while managing the 
government from the capital city or to break unions that would oppose them (Eaton and 
Dickovick 2004). In the 1980s, international economists influenced by neo-liberalism and 
the Washington Consensus, defined by Williamson as engaging in a pro-market 
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economy, viewed decentralization as a way to move from rent-seeking of the State to 
using a marketplace to make decisions in a more pluralistic fashion (Manor 1999; 
Williamson 1990)1.  
Recent writing (Bahl and Johannes 1994; Campbell 2003; De Mello 2000; 
Montero and Samuels 2004; Rodden 2004; Rodriguez 1997; Rondinelli and Shabbir 
Cheema 1981) on fiscal decentralization has suggested that the process of decentralizing 
financial resources in Latin America—either by increasing revenue generation at the 
local level through incentives from the national government or expenditure 
decentralization by increasing transfers from the national government to lower levels of 
government—is incomplete for three reasons. First, some scholars (De Mello 2000; 
Rodden 2004) focused their research on moral hazard, which is the likelihood that 
municipalities borrow more money than they could pay back, forcing the national 
governments to bail them out and jeopardizing the state’s macroeconomic stability. 
Second, Montero and Samuels (2004) and Eaton (2004) researched the problem of 
institutional power—similar to the mal-apportionment in the legislative bodies—creating 
disincentives for politicians to stay local, be faithful to their constituencies, and manage 
their own resources. Lastly, Campbell (2003) adds the public administration perspective. 
He identifies that this is difficult specifically because of weak political will and little 
administrative capacity.  
First, Campbell (2003) suggests that local government have few incentives to 
raise their own revenues because often central governments subsidize programs through 
inter-governmental transfers and non-competitive grants. Second, newly elected mayors 
                                                        
1 Neoliberalism is a market-driven approach to economics, based on neoclassical theories that stress the 
efficiency of private enterprise, liberalized trade and maximizing the role of the private sector. This was 
coined the Washington Consensus by Williamson in 1990. 
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are often viewed as having minimal levels of education and therefore are unable to 
administer large amounts of capital. Third, the political cost of raising taxes is high and 
therefore difficult to reform. For example, in the case of Mexico democratization arrived 
late compared with Argentina. The central government strongly controlled state and 
municipal elections, which were almost totally rigged (Eaton and Dickovick 2004; Eaton 
2002) and “absorbed” the political cost of raising taxes, considerably delaying the 
incentives of state and local governments to build revenue-raising capacities.  
Arguably, the balancing of national priorities and local autonomy is a politically 
challenging task. In theory, to complete the process the central government would need to 
permit and incentivize the new entities the right to tax its population to pay for its own 
public programs. Academics suggest that this final element, setting up decentralized 
financial reforms, promoting fiscal incentives, and encouraging revenue systems to 
emerge from below, has proved to be very difficult to implement (Rondinelli and Shabbir 
Cheema 1981; Taliercio 2004; Falleti 2005). The next section looks at how these reforms 
have occurred in Latin America. 
2.3 Political Decentralization Perspective  
By the early 1980s, Latin American countries started to entrust more state 
functions to local governments. City officials would be responsible for direct public 
services, manage increased budgets and implement health and education programs. This 
was coupled with various democratization movements throughout the same period which 
encouraged the development and spread of local elections (Montero and Samuels 2004). 
Evaluations of decentralization policies increased after scholars saw several countries in 
Latin America return to democracy from authoritarian rule in the 1970s and 1980s 
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(Bradhan and Mookherjee 1998; Escobar-Lemmon 2001; Fukasaku and Hausmann 1998; 
Grindle 2007; Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2002; Litvack and Seddon 1998; 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997; Prud'homme 1995; Rodriguez 1997; Rondinelli and 
Shabbir Cheema 1981). For example, Tulchin and Selee (2004) explain this relationship 
between decentralization and democracy by five conceptual reasons. The decentralization 
process served to improve the relationship between citizens and the state with measures 
to increase accountability, responsiveness, civic engagement, and pluralistic decision 
making, while counterweighing authoritarianism (Tulchin and Selee 2004). Arguably, the 
process could only earn legitimacy if subnational governments had sufficient autonomy 
to set their own priorities and had the capacity to perform the functions they determined 
themselves. Local governments became stronger in the 1990s when international advisors 
suggested certain social policies, in particular education and health care, could be 
implemented more efficiently by the decentralizing the process. Local governments 
became the launching ground for implementation because in theory local administrators 
were able to reach the poor directly (Kaufman and Nelson 2004).  
Researchers have focused their writings on the political system and the lasting 
effects of local politics within the region (Benton 2001; Grindle 2000; Grindle 1996; 
Rodriguez 1997; Selee 2006). For example, subnational establishments became 
strengthened with new authority, which subsequently created a change of power between 
political parties (Benton 2001). The most cited example is Mexico in the 1980s and 
1990s, with the increasing importance of local politics that helped the National Action 
Party (Partido Acción Nacional-PAN) win state elections ending the one party rule of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional-PRI) with 
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PANista Vicente Fox winning the 2000 presidential election (Alesina, Hausmann, 
Hommes, and Stein 1999; Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Merino Huerta 1991; Merino Huerta 
2008; Rodriguez 1997; Tulchin and Selee 2004).  
 Although the decentralization movement began as early as the 1970s among non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), which wanted to decentralize not only to local 
governments but also to provide increase revenues to their organizations. Many human 
rights advocates and grassroots leaders aggressively called for state autonomy and local 
management of public resources. Often these groups received financial aid from 
international development organizations and donors who felt their money was better 
spent assisting local groups (Bates and Daubon 2007; Breslin 1987; Hirschman 1970). 
As a corollary to these decentralization efforts, international financial institutions 
(IFIs) such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
advocated public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the 1980s. These partnerships were 
viewed as the best way to treat the lack of resource problem at the local level, especially 
after several countries enacted austerity measures in their economic policies. The political 
and administrative decentralization processes had taken place in many parts of Latin 
America, but countless fiscal reforms still remained to be made for many countries. Many 
cities and smaller municipalities in the region scrambled to find resources. Agreements 
between NGOs, the county or city governments were matched by national program 
dollars. These social programs, whether they were micro credit, school programs or 
health services, still only enabled aid to reach a small selected portion of the population 
(Tendler 1997). Often these public-private partnerships were matched by international 
dollars, thereby supporting the “private portion” of the agreement because the local 
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government counterparts did not have sufficient funds to match private investment in the 
manner that occurred in the United States. 
 The 1990s literature framed decentralization as creating good governance, active 
decision-making and local control while increasing citizen participation (de la Maza and 
Villar 2005). Civil society groups promoted civic participation, which was adopted by the 
international system as an idea of how to assist the poor (Narayan and Patesch 2002). For 
example, the process of decentralization led to innovations at the local level such as 
participatory budgeting practices, civic round tables, open space debates, and the increase 
use of referendums (de la Maza and Villar 2005; Hirschman 1970; Smith 2009b). 
Although there were laws and ordinances instructing cities to make local development 
plans and implement participatory budgeting, they often lacked sufficient capacity and 
financial autonomy to perform their jobs efficiently.  
2.4 Administrative Decentralization Perspective  
After neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s left severe impacts on the social sectors of 
Latin America, economists developed welfare programs to reach the poorest of the poor 
(Levy 2008a). In the late 1990s, IFIs purposed redistribution programs to be implemented 
at the local level by providing direct subsidies to the beneficiaries. Social programs, 
primarily in health and education, started to spring up across the hemisphere such as 
former-Progreso and now Oportunidades in Mexico, Jefes de Hogar in Argentina, 
Unidos in Peru, and Fame Zero (zero hunger) in Brazil (Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Levy 
2008a).2 Several academics call the devolution of public policies from national ministries 
to local governments referred to as administrative decentralization (Brachet-Marquez 
                                                        
2 Researchers are now calling the new social programs the second-generation reforms of the Washington 
Consensus.  
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2002; Falleti 2010; Gibson 2004; Lora 2008; Rondinelli and Shabbir Cheema 1981; 
Stein, Tommasi, Echebarria, Lora, and Payne 2006). Because the distribution programs 
for health, education and social policies at the local level have emerged, so have 
evaluations to measure their effectiveness (Merino Huerta 2008). 
In the early 2000s, Washington saw a large number of these policy evaluations 
(Andrews 2008; Beck Fenwick 2007; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Levy 2008b; Levy and 
Walton 2009). Many evaluated whether the programs were working and providing 
positive impacts on professional development of the poor. Evaluations were concerned 
with who was receiving the financial rewards, how the policies were implemented, and if 
the programs were effective. Often these assistance programs’ were tied together. 
Children would be mandated to attend school and visit the doctor for regular checkups 
before families received their financial assistance, either with vouchers or direct financial 
assistance (Levy 2008b). Once there were fairly positive results in one country, additional 
countries were also encouraged to provide similar subsidy programs.  
The process created an influx of national dollars to be redistributed to individuals 
through direct transfers. Instead of transforming state public health or education 
ministries, many countries used their local governments to distribute funding to program 
participants. Beck Fenwick’s (2007) research highlights the new role local government’s 
gained in the delivery of social policies in Argentina and Brazil. She concluded that 
Brazil had better outcomes in terms of providing public services to citizens than 
Argentina due to the inter-governmental cooperation and the local government’s 
autonomy. Her research found that it was the nature of the party system and the 
constitutional status of the local governments, which matter the most for the poor to 
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receive public services. These social policies not only re-emphasized the role that local 
governments provide, but also the administrative burden added to them.  
Kaufman and Nelson (2004) evaluate how social sector reforms are occurring in 
Latin America by comparing education and health care programs in six countries. They 
claim that democratization and globalization forced more governments to clearly define 
social priorities, but the political process of reform is difficult. Kaufman and Nelson 
(2004) argue that IFIs frequently suggest to governments that it is just as important how 
money is spent for these services as how much (emphasis added in original). For these 
authors, municipal governments are proving to have a vital role in the provision of 
services. Municipal officials could assist in improving the quality of the social services 
and also the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the program design. For example, the 
authors argue that the social policy reforms have “derailed the complex administrative 
machinery” with new lines of authority of local governments at the forefront in service 
delivery (Kaufman and Nelson 2004). They agreed that decentralization, with increases 
in civic participation, could assist with the social sector reforms.  
Andrews (2008) in her work on Brazil defines the devolution of health, education 
and social policies as “deconcentration” and not further decentralization. She highlights 
that the administrative systems should be seen as managing an effective partnership 
between the federal and municipal level governments. With decentralization, poor 
municipalities became reliant on the federal government to increase local revenues, 
implement these pro-poor policies and sustain themselves (Andrews 2008). Therefore, 
the poorer municipalities are the least likely to promote decentralization policies, but 
prefer to enjoy the benefits of the national government deconcentration. Richer 
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municipalities also provide services such as health assistance programs with the help of 
the national government. She concluded that a country with a greater percentage of 
poorer municipalities would encourage a greater shift towards centralization. For her, 
wealthy municipalities are more likely to promote decentralization than poorer. As in the 
United States, there is a desire to keep own-source revenue at home to improve local 
policies and therefore have strong decentralized national policies. 
The administrative decentralization debate highlights the need for national 
governments to think of the appropriate level of government structure to manage the 
implementation and funding of social programs. Arguably, there are large variations in 
the data across countries, but researchers can evaluate where the indigent populations 
live, enabling policy makers to better target programs. As a results of the local 
government’s limited ability to raise taxes, the appropriate mixture of market-based 
incentives are difficult to establish and the fewer public goods that can be produced. This 
and the state of fiscal decentralization are described in the next section. 
2.5 Fiscal Decentralization Perspective 
Current scholarship is focusing particular attention on the fiscal aspects of 
decentralization and federalism (Abuelafia, Berensztein, Broun, and Di Gresia 2004; 
Eaton 2001; Eaton and Dickovick 2004; Grindle 2007; Haggard and Webb 2004; 
Montero 2001; Stein 1999a; Tommasi 2002; Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001; 
Willis 1999). Whereas fiscal decentralization involves the devolution of financial 
recourses from the national government to lower level governments, fiscal federalism is 
managing the contentious relationship of budget constraints at various levels of 
government. Fiscal federalism theory suggests that determining the appropriate 
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relationship between national appropriations and the revenue generated locally will 
produce the most effective public policies (Tanzi 2000; Tommasi 2002).  
Economists suggest there have been two major trends of fiscal federalism (Bahl 
and Johannes 1994; Tanzi 2000; Tommasi 2002; Weingast 1995; Wibbels 2005). 
Wiesner (2003) suggests the first generation of reforms began in the early 1980s with the 
Washington Consensus. The changes included constitutional reforms to allow local 
elections, devolving electoral responsibility; delegating taxing and spending authority; 
and encouraging results based budgeting by local governments. Wiesner includes in this 
first generation of reforms targeted fiscal transfers by sector (primarily in education and 
health) to assist the lowest income groups. For Wiesner, these targeted fiscal transfer and 
conditional welfare policies, with the exception of Chile, were flawed in terms of making 
systematic reforms.  
According to Wiesner, many national governments did not have sufficient 
understanding of the potential risks caused by public choice theory and did not provide 
adequate support and training for local governments to manage their resources. This 
caused IFIs to provide more loans to national governments in order to bailout the 
subnational level, which took out too much debt in times of need. For example, see the 
bailout case of the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 or the Argentine economic collapse of 
2001. While praising the concept of market-based incentives for reforms as performed in 
Chile, economists now promote “the second generation” of decentralization reforms 
(Tommasi 2002; Weingast 1995; Wibbels 2005). These scholars suggest that national 
governments can produce a more appropriate mix of market-based incentives.  
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Scholars argue that this “second generation,” still incipient, began in the late 
1990s in Latin America (Tommasi 2002; Weingast 1995; Wibbels 2005). The basic idea 
is based on three theoretical constructs: new institutional economics, public choice theory 
and the new theory of the firm. Although evaluations still need to be produced on the 
social and firm costs to any particular policy, this general application of microeconomics 
into public policy in the context of decentralization may be useful. Insomuch as Wiesner 
(2003) highlights policies can be implemented at different levels of government, he 
suggests that it is the national government that should stabilize the macroeconomic 
indicators of a country in order for subnational governments to engage in micro-level 
policies like economic development. 
One basic criticism of fiscal federalism is that it should be distinctive from fiscal 
decentralization—or granting the tax authority at the local level. Academics warn that 
fiscal federalism should not be confused with fiscal decentralization, but some do 
intermingle the concepts. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) defines fiscal federalism as “a system of transfer payments or grants by which a 
federal government shares its revenues with lower levels of government” (OECD 2007). 
Oates (1999) definition adds that fiscal decentralization is a “general normative 
framework for assignment of functions to the different levels of government and 
appropriate fiscal instruments for carrying out these functions” (Oates 1999). Both have 
highlighted the important role for local governments and have increased their local 
budgets, but arguably national government policies and legal frameworks still do not 
encourage local governments to raise sufficient revenues. Whereas fiscal federalism 
involves the management of budget constraints and allocation of public finance at all 
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levels, fiscal decentralization encourages local citizens to collect their own resources. 
Arguably, only fiscal decentralization (conceptualized as municipal governments allowed 
to raise and to collect their own tax revenue) helps citizens to manage their own 
initiatives, which is the key for local economic development.  
2.6 Public Finance Perspective  
There are at least three ways to evaluate fiscal decentralization: local tax 
collection efforts, expenditures of local governments and fiscal federalism, or the balance 
of the collection and revenue system at the various levels of government. Rosenbaum 
(1997) suggested that before other regions of the world, Latin America “witnessed the 
emergence of issues of fiscal decentralization—especially in terms of revenue sharing, 
national grants in aid and various types of privatization” (Rosenbaum 1997:13). 
Academics typically cite the level of decentralization as the amount of subnational 
expenditures (Bahl and Johannes 1994; De Mello 2001; Ebel and Yilmaz 2002; 
Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz 2009; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997; Stein 1999a).  
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 provide an overview of subnational revenues and expenditures 
from 1997-2006. What can be drawn from these figures is the wide range of 
decentralization that has occurred within the region. One can see that the federalist 
countries of Brazil and Argentina are far more advanced at decentralizing revenues and 
expenditure than unitary countries such as Costa Rica and Paraguay. Moreover, 
subnational expenditures have increased more than revenues. Scholars suggest that this is 
because of administrative decentralization with local governments implementing major 
social policies (Andrews 2008; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Tulchin and Selee 2004).  
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Figure 2.1 Latin American Subnational Revenues as percentage of GDP 1997-2006  
 
Source:  UN’s Economic Commission for Latin American (ECLAC).  
 
Figure 2.2 Latin American Subnational Expenditures as percentage of GDP 1997-2006  
 
Source:  UN’s Economic Commission for Latin American (ECLAC) 
 
The public finance literature suggests that it is much harder to encourage local 
governments to collect revenue than to decentralize budgetary expenditure. For a long 
time, researchers focused less on how taxes were generated (VAT, sales, property, 
income tax) and at what level, and more on recommendations on how to implement 
programs and spend funds (Benton 2001; Bird 1992b; Bird and Oliver 1968; Bird 1992c). 
Arguably at the same time, there has not been sufficient focus in the literature on how to 
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generate the most appropriate, market-oriented driven, fiscal policy that encourages 
collecting taxes at the local level. Figure 2.3 shows the total tax revenues as a percentage 
of GDP for six countries in Latin America. 
Figure 2.3 Latin American Overall Tax Revenues as percentage of GDP 1990 - 2008 
 
Source: Latin American and Caribbean Macro Watch Data Output, Inter-American Development Bank.  
 
Scholars suggest that tax revenues in Latin America are low by international 
standards (Bahl and Bird 2008; Bird and Oliver 1968; Mahon 1997; Mahon 2009). The 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reports that tax revenues in the region as a 
whole, excluding social contributions, were about 17 percent on average of GDP in 2005. 
Large discrepancies in tax burdens exist across countries and within states (at the sub-
national level). They range from the low burdens of countries endowed with 
nonrenewable resources such as Mexico and Venezuela (which are around ten percent of 
GDP) to higher tax levels such as in Brazil (which is around 36 percent of GDP). 
Whereas Brazil is one of the most progressive and decentralized systems where local 
governments do collect the highest amounts of taxes within the region (de Mello 2009). 
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Figure 2.4 Total Tax Revenue as a Percent GDP Compared  
  
Sources: Data for Mexico, United Kingdom, and United States comes from OECD. Data for Argentina, Latin America and the 
Caribbean comes from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
 
Figure 2.4 indicates that Argentina’s tax-to-GDP ratio reached 31 percent of GDP in 
2008, which is closer to the OECD average and higher than many of the other Latin 
American countries. But in some countries, such as Peru or Mexico, government revenue 
is much lower, usually in a range of 11-20 percent of GDP. This reflects the inability of 
the government to bring more dynamic sectors of the economy into the tax net, or rates 
are low, or evasion is high, or all three.  
Recent studies have shown that taxation at the local level also varies a great deal 
within the region (Falleti 2005; Finot 2001; Wiesner 2003). Wiener (2003) cites that 
Chile does not allow for much local taxation—less than 0.6 percent of GDP. Brazil 
manages a varied hierarchical tax base structure where the sub-national governments 
(states) manage up to 30 percent of GDP in some locations. The function of the national 
government is to find the appropriate balance of the fiscal capture and dissemination of 
funds to be more equitable across sub-national boundaries. At present, fiscal 
decentralization in Latin America has called attention to the financial discrepancies 
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between jurisdictions, which have created large fiscal gaps for many state economies. For 
example Falleti (2004) points out that Buenos Aires raises 92.7 percent of its own 
revenues and the Province of Buenos Aries generates 56.1 percent, while other locations 
such as Catamarca, La Rioja and Santiago del Estero raise about 11-15 percent of their 
own revenue. These inter-jurisdictional inconsistencies also exist in Brazil, Bolivia and 
Mexico (Wiesner 2003). 
Despite these internal country differences, there are a number of common 
weaknesses in the tax systems across the region. First, there is heavy reliance on indirect 
and payroll taxes—representing about 75 percent of the total—that results in a regressive 
tax system. While in developed countries the tax system helps to reduce inequality, in 
Latin America it exacerbates it (Gomez Sabaini 2006). Evidence suggest that Latin 
American countries have a high dependency on indirect taxes such as sales tax, goods 
and services tax (GST), and value-added taxes (VAT), which are collected by 
intermediaries, i.e. a retail stores, and not from the person who ultimately carries the 
economic burden of the tax. These taxes make consumers not “feel the cost” of the tax 
for the goods which they are purchasing (Bahl and Bird 2008; Bird 1992b; Bird and 
Oliver 1968; Di John 2006; Joyce and Mullins 1991; Koethenbuerger 2007; Martinez-
Vazquez 2008; Moore 2007; Schumpeter 1918; Schumpeter 1948; Tanzi 1969).  
Second, the tax system in Latin America does not appear to be determined by 
equity or efficiency criteria (i.e. the collection of point of origin or the increase of 
personal income and property taxes to broaden the tax base). According to data from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Report (2009), tax rates for small businesses in Latin 
America are higher than in several other regions (World Bank 2009). In particular, taxes 
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on profits are on average the second highest after Sub-Saharan Africa. When efficiency 
concerns over the type of taxes to be implemented, economics encourage the use of VAT 
(Bahl and Bird 2008; Bird 1992a; Bird and Oliver 1968; Bird 1992c; Birdsall, De La 
Torre, and Menezes 2007). Arguably, by simplifying tax regimes, such as reducing the 
hurdles and the time required to comply with bureaucratic procedures, are still milder 
steps to encourage better tax administrations. 
Another challenge is to broaden the tax bases in order to reduce the reliance on 
distorting taxes. For example, the resource rich countries with oil, such as Mexico, 
Venezuela, Peru need to diversity their tax base away from this finite resource (Farfán-
Mares 2010). This is not only because they need more resources to pay for public goods, 
but to also to encourage the state building processes, which allows citizen to rely on the 
governance system. Scholars suggest that institutional development, such as 
decentralization and encouraging a wider tax base, is essential for Latin American 
governments to be stronger in the future (Bahl and Bird 2008; Bird 1992b; Di John 
2006). 
Latin American countries’ ability to collect taxes, or their fiscal capture, is often 
lost to capital flight because individuals who earn higher salaries simply save it in foreign 
banks to avoid income, payroll and social security taxes. The loss of savings within 
domestic banks also creates disincentives for investments within the region. The 
combination of low tax revenues and high tax rates points to the high incidence of tax 
evasion, which can be for large corporation as well as smaller and medium enterprises. 
Studies (Kapstein 1994; World Bank 2009) have focused on micro-enterprises and their 
effective tax rate and have found it to be the largest sector to evade taxes. For instance, 
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numerous tax exemptions (especially for the VAT) and various taxes on financial 
transactions are commonplace. 
In general, the public finance literature for developing countries offers a variety of 
policy options to seek more efficient and equitable ways to tax (Bahl and Bird 2008; Bird 
1992b; Bird and Oliver 1968; Di John 2006; Joyce and Mullins 1991; Koethenbuerger 
2007; Martinez-Vazquez 2008; Moore 2007; Schumpeter 1918; Schumpeter 1948; Tanzi 
1969). For example, Bahl and Bird (2008) suggest countries should simplify and broaden 
tax bases, lower income and corporate taxes (in order to encourage business 
development), and promote reductions in trade tax rates through trade liberalization. 
Property and income taxes are generally encouraged within more developed economies 
because they are more progressive taxes and harder to implement with efficient 
administrations (Martinez-Vazquez 2008; Moore 2007). Campbell (2003) argues that the 
administrative capacity of governments to collect taxes is weak and ineffective. He 
discusses key variables when proposing progressive tax reforms: the administrative 
burden and political will for reforms.  
Economists (Bahl and Bird 2008; Martinez-Vazquez 2008; Moore 2007; 
Campbell 2003) agree that administration reforms—the management and collection of 
taxes—are as important, if not more, than the kind of taxes (VAT, sale, personal income, 
property, social security) that a country chooses to collect. Arguably, it is as important to 
have sound enforcement mechanisms and an independent administration to manage, 
collect and distribute public goods. Based on the literature, revenue collection authorities 
are more effective when they operate autonomously from the federal government (i.e. 
outside the national finance ministries). This last point could lead to a role for local 
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governments to increase tax collections. Therefore, this research helps to contribute to the 
gap in the literature on how local governments can be effectively used to leverage 
additional public finances. This research tests the capacities of local governments to 
collect and manage local resources for development outcomes. The theory of local 
economic development is described in the next section. 
2.7 Local Economic Development Theory 
In general, mainstream economic development research has focused on the role of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as a bottom-up strategy for developing Latin 
American economies. This literature suggests that new firm creation is one way to 
advance growth that encourages the strengthening of a middle class, provides equity 
between classes, and helps to maintain a healthy and peacefully stabile society (Cabrero 
2000; Malizia and Feser 1999). Although research has focused on SMEs effects on 
development, little attention has been given to the policy role for municipalities to assist 
in their creation. For example, a study done by Kuwayama et al. (2005) cites that 
according to available data from 17 Latin American countries micro, small, and medium-
sized enterprises make up 77 percent of employment in the region and nearly 65 percent 
of this proportion are micro-enterprises, measured as having five or fewer employees 
(Kuwayama, Yasushi, and Tsuji 2005).  
International donors also have advocated the support for SMEs to accelerate 
economic development. For example, between 1998 and 2002 the World Bank provided 
more than $10 billion and the United States provided an additional $1.3 billion in 2003 
alone for SME support programs (Juckett 2008). Such policies and programs encourage 
competition, entrepreneurship and have the potential to add jobs to the economy (Beck et 
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al. 2005). Problems may arise if this aid is not targeted into specific geographical areas, 
then it could be unable to make significant headway into promoting development and 
eliminating inequality within a specific region. 
The World Bank has offered another possible solution: local economic 
development (LED), which it defines as the building-up of the economic capacity of a 
local area to improve its economic future and the quality of life (World Bank 2008). “The 
term economic development is often used to refer to what is essentially land development 
or physical development,” but it can also be used in a larger policy context that directly 
helps to increase income or employment for its residents (Wolman and Spitzley 
1996:116). Conceptually, for the present study should not be confused development with 
growth. Rather this dissertation examines specific actions that a local government can do 
to improve local business investment climate, which is a form of economic development 
Programs areas to implement LED strategies may include items such as “investments in 
soft infrastructure and local business growth, encouraging new enterprises, promoting 
inward investments, sector (and business cluster) development, area 
targeting/regeneration, integrating low-income or hard-to-employ workers” (World Bank 
2007). 
Blakely and Bradshaw have suggested “local economic development (LED) is an 
emerging field, and currently more of a movement rather than a strict model specifying a 
uniform approach” (2002:55). Local economic development incorporates neoclassical 
theories of economics with economic base theory, to evaluate the flow of economic 
activity in and out of a physical area. For these authors, local and regional development 
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equals an area’s capacity (which measured in economic fiscal, technological and political 
terms) multiplied by its physical resources (Blakely and Bradshaw 2002).  
Malizia and Feser emphasize that LED originated from the 1990s literature, which 
incorporated social theories of how human interactions help facilitate economic 
development. For these authors, the empowerment of these social forces is important for 
understanding how citizens exercise their decisions within the development process. 
They suggest that these behaviors described at the firm or industry level can shape a 
city’s competitive advantage (Malizia and Feser 1999). Entrepreneurship theory, a key 
component for economic development, highlights individuals as the first to respond to 
market pressures. Under this view, they are the “visionary who attempts to marshal 
resources in unique ways to bring new ideas for products or services to economic 
fruition” (Malizia and Feser 1999:195). Studies of entrepreneurship have often been 
synonymous with small business development and the effort for entrepreneurs to create 
small businesses demonstrates a tangible measure for their success. 
According to Malizia and Feser (1999) research on entrepreneurship has been 
divided into studies of external factors for economic growth and change, while others 
focus on internal factors that promote entrepreneurial behavior and motivation. The 
former is factor of interest for this study. Environmental factors are expected to be 
particularly important here as well due to the role that local governments play in assisting 
to help promote economic development. For example, Bruno and Tyebjee (1982) suggest 
that there are twelve factors for a location to support entrepreneurs. In their list, favorable 
government politics is relevant here (Bruno and Tyebjee 1982).3 Yet, these authors argue 
                                                        
3 The other factors include venture capital availability, presence of experienced entrepreneurs, technically 
skilled labor force, accessibility of suppliers, accessibility of customer or new markets, proximity of 
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that more research is needed to understand how to manage and foster the enabling 
environment by local government officials. 
In their research, Pagano and Bowman (1995) find those factors which are most 
important for city governments to promote economic development in the United States. 
For them, “the [most] critical element in transforming the extant urban landscape into 
the cityscape of tomorrow are twofold: 1) vision of a city’s leaders, their 
determination and commitment to pursue their vision, their capacity to 
mobilize public capital for the attainment of the vision and 2) the strengths, diversity 
and resiliency of the local economic base” (Pagano and Bowman 1995):137). These 
authors conclude by suggesting the following policy advice:  
However, while city government control land (or space); it has little control over 
labor or capital. It is this interaction of politics and economics that produces 
cityscapes of the next millennium. These elements determine whether a city is 
survivalist, expansionist, maintenance, or market oriented (Pagano and Bowman 
1995:137). 
 
Since it is the government that is able to promote or change these environmental factors, 
this dissertation evaluates the administrative structure (i.e. level of fiscal decentralization) 
of Latin American countries in their efforts to promote local economic development as a 
way to encourage small business entrepreneurship. Local governments need to be 
involved and, may be better equipped than centralized governments, to provide this 
essential favorable policy environment. Efforts starting in the 1980s by many Latin 
American governments to decentralize could provide some indicators as to how to create 
these favorable policy environments at the local level. Yet, a little unknown fact is that 
LED theory has been studied and applied in Latin America for the last decade to spur 
                                                                                                                                                                     
universities, availability of land or facilities, access to transportation, receptive populations, availability of 
supporting services, and attractive living conditions. 
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growth in regional areas and can be traced by projects, research and funding located 
within the region (Albuquerque 2004; Alburquerque 1999; Arocena 1998; Benavides and 
Manrique 2000; Boisier 2004; Cabrero 2000; Coelho 2000; Costamagna 2000; 
Cravacuore 2002; Gallicchio and Winchester 2003; Marsiglia and Pintos 1999; Vázquez 
Barquero 2000; Vázquez Barquero 1999; Vázquez Barquero 2000; Ziccardi 1998).  
Within the region, Albuquerque (2004) was among the first to describe LED 
theory and how it relates to decentralization policies in Latin America. He incorporated 
Porter’s “clusters” with Kliksberg’s explications of social capital to describe how 
industrial development and economic development could be induced within a particular 
urban space (Kliksberg 2004; Kliksberg 2005; Porter 1990). Within Uruguay, Arocena 
(1998) and Marsiglia and Pintos (1999) further theorized on how local economic 
development could help countries in Latin America by critiquing several approaches 
applied in developed countries. Boisier (1998, 2001) described geographical place based 
on approaches of LED and used case examples from his native Brazil. Cabrero (2000) 
and Zaccardi (1998) used LED theories to inspire Mexican communities to direct their 
own development. 
In later work, Albuquerque (2004) outlined several scholars who worked directly 
with programs that promoted LED. For example, Coelho’s (2000) work analyzed the 
planning efforts of the Rio Braco and the municipalities around the Valle Medio Paraiba 
region in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Benavides and Manrique (2000) study of the Villa 
El Salvador, a poor suburban area of Lima, which constructed housing and urban 
infrastructure that became a best practice for LED in the region. Caceres and Figueroa 
(2000) evaluated the effectiveness of Chile’s National Solidarity Fund for Social 
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Inclusion (FOSIS) in building social capital and local investment. Gallicchio and 
Winchester (2003) wrote a book on the local development experiences of their native 
Uruguay and Chile (respectively), and describe the successes and failures of several 
communities as they attempted to implement these theories. Costamagna (2002) 
described Rafaela’s efforts to consolidate development between public and private 
sectors in the province of Santa Fe, Argentina. Finally, Cravacuore (2002) created a 
collection of research on LED activities in Argentina. Nearly all research on LED in 
Latin America uses qualitative analysis or provides impact evaluations on a specific 
location. Few studies use quantitative analysis to understand how local public officials 
are engaging in LED. This dissertation looks at the structure of governments, measured 
by fiscal decentralization, in an effort to understand how local governments are 
promoting LED programs as a way to encourage economic development.  
2.8 Empirical Evidence 
Several large-scale quantitative research studies have found a mix of results as to 
the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic development. For example, Glaeser et 
al. (1995) found a positive association between local public sector investment and a city’s 
economic growth in the United States by using panel data of 260 cases (Glaeser, 
Scheinkman, and Shleifer 1995). Scholars using a similar quantitative model to evaluate 
growth in developing countries found no casual links (Davoodi 1998). Rodden’s (2003) 
studied tax competition between subnational governments, by using data from both 
developed and developing countries, and found it limits growth. Another study of 15 
Latin American countries concluded that fiscal federalism with wide-ranging autonomy 
can create overall fiscal deficits, but lowers inflation rates (Rodden 2002). De Mello’s 
42 
(2008) study of Brazilian municipalities found public financing and government spending 
impact the growth of an area’s population. The author found that urban growth and 
municipal populations are positively affected by the increased provision of public goods 
and services that a local government can provide.  
Scholars explain the mixture of outcomes by the variation that exists in terms of 
measures of autonomy, fiscal decentralization and own-source revenue generation (Ebel 
and Yilmaz 2002; Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz 2009; Liu 2007; Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 1997; Rodden 2004). The differences can be conceptual, such as how autonomy 
is defined, to more tangible, such as how budgets are calculated and organized. For 
example, each country counts its income and expenditure statistics differently and this 
may create discrepancies in the data. To explain this, Ebal and Yilma replicate Davoodi 
and Zou’s and de Mello’s earlier studies on tax autonomy, economic stability, economic 
growth and total size of the public sector and provide different outcomes depending on 
the definition of local autonomy. 
Most econometric studies only use macroeconomic statistical models without 
evaluating how municipal governments are spending and collecting their resources on the 
ground. Many of these studies use the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the OECD data to measure decentralization, of 
which both maintain multi-country databases over a large time series. For example, the 
OECD data are from 1971-2005 and include most of the major economies in the world 
(Gemmell et al 2009). Neither the GFS indicators nor the OECD data include information 
at the municipal level of government; rather their datasets combine both state level and 
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municipal data and call the variable subnational. More specific definitions and additional 
data sets are needed to better understand these effects.  
Table 2.1 A Summary of Quantitative Research 
Author Year Method Findings 
Glaeser et al.  1995 They used panel data of 260 
cases in the United States. 
They found a positive 
association between public 
sector investment and a city’s 
economic growth.  
Davoodi and 
Zou  
1997 
 
They evaluated growth in 
developing countries. 
They found no casual links  
Rodden  2003 
 
They study the tax competition 
between subnational 
governments. 
He found tax competition 
limits municipal growth. 
Rodden and 
Wibbels  
2002 
 
They used 15 LAC to study 
fiscal decentralization and its 
effects on municipal budget 
deficits and inflation rates.  
They concluded that fiscal 
federalism with wide-ranging 
autonomy can create overall 
fiscal deficits but lowers 
inflation rates  
de Mello 2008 
 
He studied Brazilian 
municipalities as a single case 
study analysis. 
He found public financing and 
government spending impacts 
the growth of an area’s 
population.  
Gemmell et 
al.  
2009 OECD data is from 1971-2005 
and includes most of the major 
economies in the world. 
They find distortionary 
taxation reduces growth and 
productive government 
expenditure enhances growth. 
 
For example, Oates (1999) evaluates the appropriate fiscal equation that is needed 
for economic growth. He appraises the Leviathan theory, which is the increase of 
subnational governments will increase the size of the entire government and therefore 
affect its influence over the economy (Oates 1999). In the Oates model, the dependent 
variable is the public sector size measured as total aggregate government current 
expenditure as a share of GDP. In his model, two proxies for decentralization were used: 
revenue share and expenditure share. The dependent variables used to understand 
capacity include the total government share of GDP (consumption plus investment, 
transfers excluded) and government consumption as a percentage of GDP. Government 
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consumption measures spending on current operations and may be dominated by the 
government wage bill.4  
In general, more recent analyses of fiscal decentralization have focused on 
subnational expenditures and not calculated revenue generation, which is important when 
analyzing fiscal autonomy (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 1997, Ebal and Yilma 2002). 
To remedy this gap in the literature, additional measures of decentralization have recently 
been purposed (Gemmell et al 2009, Blume and Voigt 2008). For example, “revenue 
autonomy” is defined as the ratio of subnational government’s own-source revenue over 
its total revenue. Own-source revenue is the sum of tax autonomy, figured by non-tax 
autonomy minus intergovernmental grants (this is the measure used here). Subnational 
revenues are a combination of taxes, transfers, grants, and loans. While local taxes offer 
the greatest degree of autonomy, grants and loans offer somewhat less, and discretionary 
transfers probably the least. That is because transfers, even supposedly automatic 
transfers from the national to the subnational government, can be withheld and grants and 
loans generally arrive with conditions or with expenditures earmarked (Schneider 2003). 
Measuring revenues not accounted for by inter-governmental transfers could 
create some drawbacks. Therefore some authors encourage researcher to distinguish 
between the types of transfers. For example, whereas some transfers such as block grants, 
local government have more control over how they allocate the resources, others are tied 
to central government priorities and have earmarks, and still others require certain 
behaviors so that subnational governments must match the funds with local revenue. Still, 
the treatment of all revenues aside from transfers gives an indication of the degree to 
                                                        
4 Wage bill is a usual indicator of the economic “footprint” of government (e.g., Garrett 1998; Rodrik 
1998; Barro 2000). 
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which subnational governments raise their own funds through taxes, loans, fees, or sales 
of assets (Schneider 2003). 
 In order to understand the various aspects of decentralization, Ebel and Yilmar 
(2002) use four pillars for their assignment of intergovernmental fiscal systems: 
expenditure assignments, revenues assignments, inter-governmental transfers and 
subnational loans. Daniel Treisman finds five categories: structural, decision-making, 
resources, electoral and industrial decentralization (Treisman 2007). Bahl (2005) used 
four: expenditure, revenues assignment, inter-governmental transfers and subnational 
debt. Finally, Chin-hung (2007) used seven: political structure (subnational, federal and 
unitary systems and numbers of SNG); inter-governmental transfers are measured as the 
percentage revenue transfers over total SNG; tax autonomy, which is the percentage SNG 
as a tax; expenditure assignment; revenues assignment; borrowing power; political and 
hard budget constraints. 
An example of an evaluation of revenue streams is in the replication of the 
Davoodi and Zou (1998) model, where the dependent variable is the annual per capita 
GDP growth rate and the proxy for decentralization is the total subnational share of 
government expenditure, net of grants. Davoodi and Zou (1998) analyzed empirically the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth and reported a negative relationship 
across 46 developing and developed countries. However, according to Martinez-Vazquez 
and McNab (1997) there are serious methodological issues in their analysis because of 
their measure of decentralization. Davoodi and Zou measure fiscal decentralization as a 
subnational share of total government expenditure reported in the GFS. Yet according to 
one report published by the World Bank:  
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the subnational share of total government expenditure does not represent 
the multidimensionality of the fiscal decentralization process. Without 
controlling for autonomy over expenditure and revenue decisions and 
whether officials are democratically elected, the expenditure share of 
subnational governments as a fiscal decentralization variable means very 
little in representing the level of decentralization. If fiscal decentralization 
is defined as revenue autonomy of subnational governments, then 
estimation results might change (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002) p33. 
 
Schneider (2003) agrees that subnational shares of government expenditure or revenue 
are not the best approximations of decentralization, but this does not mean that they are 
irrelevant. An additional component to measure fiscal decentralization is to measure the 
levels of local administrative autonomy. This is examined by evaluating the control 
exercised over local revenues. For example, one could look at the percentage of local 
revenues from total taxation to provide an indicator of the degree of subnational control 
over resources. Taxes are different from the total amount of resources, which is more a 
measure of wealth than administrative autonomy within the decision-making process.  
Therefore, the measure of decentralization should consider the interaction 
between the relative size of subnational governments and their fiscal autonomy to 
administer programs. Such a measure will be computed in this dissertation as the “total 
own-source revenue ratio,” which is the ratio of municipal governments’ own-source 
revenue collection efforts over the expenditures such as towards public works and wage 
bill. This ratio quantitatively describes a city’s tax effort and its decision to spend its 
budget on particular budget items. Therefore this study attempts to solve some of these 
problems by creating models using the dependent variable measured as GDP and several 
measures for fiscal autonomy and decentralization for important independent variables. 
Additionally, this study uses both a quantitative and qualitative analysis to test these 
assumptions. 
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Overall this chapter has reviewed the current status of decentralization in Latin 
America. It has described the academic literature of decentralization, local economic 
development, and public finances within the region. Then an overview of how the 
concept of decentralization has been treated by Latin American scholars, in particular by 
dividing decentralization into political, administrative, and fiscal reforms, was reviewed. 
Furthermore, this chapter described the differences in measure for autonomy and defines 
how this study uses this concept in order to provide clarity in the results. The next chapter 
describes in detail the methods used in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER III  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES  
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methods used in this 
dissertation, which addresses the degree of fiscal decentralization and autonomy levels 
that cities currently have in Latin America. Concurrent with the trends of decentralization 
is the rise of urbanization. For the first time in history, more of the world’s population 
now lives in cities. With over 80 percent of the region’s population living in urban areas, 
urbanization has affected Latin America more than other regions of the world.5 Public 
service demands will likely increase, and therefore state and local governments will be 
called upon to provide additional services, such as adequate infrastructure, waste 
management and transportation services for their residents. Arguably, to better manage 
this rapid growth, cities will need more capacities to encourage economic development, 
provide safe, livable communities, and improve the quality of life.  
Local officials in many countries will, among other actions, need to improve their 
finances. This arguably could be a first step before accessing greater financing for urban 
infrastructure and other municipal services. Generally, municipalities have three different 
sources of funding through which they finance their operating and capital planning 
budgets: 1) own-source funding which comes from local taxation, fees and charges, 2) 
intergovernmental transfers which are funds transferred from the central to the local 
                                                        
5 According to UN Habitat, “The total population of cities in the developing regions of the world already 
exceeds that of cities in all of the developed regions (by 1.3 billion people). By 2030, nearly 4 billion 
people, 80 per cent of the world’s urban dwellers, will live in cities of the developing world.” UN-Habitat. 
2006. "Urbanization Facts and Figures." Pp. 4, vol. World Urban Forum III An international UN-Habitat 
Event on Urban Sustainablity. Vancouver, Canada: UN Habitat. 
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level, and 3) money that cities borrow, such as through general revenue bonds, private 
sector loans or other forms of credit. It is argued that Latin American policymakers could 
improve cities by changing incentives structures for local public officials to collect more 
tax revenue. The current levels of federal transfers made to local government need to be 
better understood and reassessed. Arguably, if cities had more autonomy they would be 
able to spur more economic development. 
The present chapter describes the research methods used in this dissertation. In 
general, a positivist approach is used to test whether fiscal decentralization helps 
economic development. This study uses a comparative analysis to test the levels of 
commitment to decentralization policies in Argentina and Mexico (George and Bennett 
2005). This is done through an analysis of historical, legal and budget comparisons. Six 
case studies are used to understand municipal capacity, the levels of budget authority, and 
autonomy to make decisions. The following sections describe the research questions, the 
research instruments, definitions, data collection and statistical methods used. 
3.2 Research Questions  
The first research question asks whether state structure matters for municipalities 
to support economic development programs. In particular, does further fiscal 
decentralization increase the amount of economic development activities in a local area? 
To what extent does fiscal autonomy influence the economic development of a 
municipality? What factors generate greater or lesser fiscal autonomy for a municipality? 
H1:  The higher the degree of governmental decentralization (political, 
administrative, and fiscal), the more likely a municipality will have 
successful economic development activities. 
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The second set of research questions seeks to understand the municipal capacity 
and the ways that cities are generating revenues to provide for economic development 
programs. Do cities with greater fiscal authority implement successful economic 
development programs? How are cities becoming more fiscally autonomous? What types 
of financial instruments are these cities developing to increase their local revenues? 
H2:    If a municipality is more fiscally autonomous, the city will be more likely 
to have successful economic development activities. 
H3:  If a municipality has a higher degree of capacity (legal, fiscal, and 
professional development) to generate revenue, the city will realize more 
economic development activities. 
3.3 Research Design 
The methods employed in this dissertation are of two kinds, qualitative and 
quantitative. The research provides a qualitative comparative analysis of six cities in 
Argentina and Mexico. Academics argue that comparative research can benefit from 
historical sequences, especially when it takes into account the varied historical 
consequences of a particular event (Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997). A study that uses 
this comparative approach can help with macro-sociological studies by eliminating 
problems such as the small n, lack of independent cases and provide a more solid 
explanation of their association for further causal exploration (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994). This dissertation compares Argentina and Mexico’s histories in the hope of 
providing a better understanding of what levels of fiscal federalism have developed in 
each country today and how public officials arrived at the decisions to promote 
decentralization. 
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The cases were selected in two federalist countries in Latin America: Argentina 
and Mexico, which are in transition (George and Bennett 2005). An analysis of 
decentralization policies with regards to inter-governmental relations, historical political 
interactions between the national governments and the states is performed. Current fiscal 
policy regarding income generation and expenditures by the national, regional, and local 
governments is also discussed. A brief description of historical events is provided for 
context. The timeframe for this analysis is from 1980 to 2010, thus incorporating major 
political and economic transformations in both counties’ recent histories.  
Qualitative Analysis 
To understand how the national decentralization policies impact the local 
governments, an analysis follows with two subnational governments and six cities 
selected as case studies. To eliminate variation among subnational governments, the 
selected cities are in the same subnational governments—the state of Guanajuato in 
Mexico and the province of Santa Fe in Argentina. The cities in each country include an 
industrialized city, a state capital and a small to mid-size town in order to analyze size, 
industrial strengthen and economic activity (see Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1: Case Selection: Industry-type and Size of Cities 
State, Country Large Industrial Cities State Capitals Mid-size towns 
Santa Fe, Argentina Rosario Santa Fe Rafaela 
Guanajuato, Mexico Leon Guanajuato San Miguel de Allende 
 
The State of Guanajuato and the Province of Santa Fe provide examples for how 
subnational governments operate in Mexico and Argentina. Both have distinctive colonial 
histories, economic development and have played roles as major centers for political 
leaders in the recent democratization periods. These governments are only a selection of 
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the larger federations; however they can provide a comparative viewpoint for how 
subnational governments work within Latin America.  
At the subnational level, the socialist party governs the province of Santa Fe and a 
right leaning pro-business party governs the state of Guanajuato. Even with these 
opposing political ideologies, the cities own-source revenues and investment decisions 
should be more dependent on the size of the city, its natural economic endowment and 
national transfers than its political affiliation. The subsequent chapters are arranged in the 
following sections: background to the internal politics, description of natural endowment, 
an analysis of the cities’ finances, and finally, the economic development efforts of each 
subnational government, paying particular attention to each city’s recent economic 
history.  
Since the cases are situated in federal governments, each state or province has 
independent constitutions. The fiscal authority for each city, such as its ability to raise 
taxes and fees, issue public debt, re-evaluate property and change the tax rate, is managed 
by each subnational constitution. The examination of each cities legal framework is also 
considered in the analysis of each state government.  
Case Analysis 
This study compares different amounts of fiscal autonomy and contrasts them 
with each city’s investments in economic development programs. Each of the six city 
governments has engaged in a range of measures to increase revenue for their local 
budgets. Fiscal autonomy is evaluated as regards to both budget composition and local 
authority. First, each community’s fiscal capacity is assessed. It is measured as the 
authority (high, medium and low) of a city to be able to increase taxes, set tax rates, issue 
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bonds, have the discretion in the use of trust funds, and have the ability to reserve funds. 
An assignment is provided to evaluate whether the cities have fiscal capacity to manage 
and pay for economic development projects, which is described in the set of questions in 
table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 Revenue Generation Authority* 1-3 
Does the municipality have a high or low ability to increase taxes?  
Does the municipality have a high or low ability to set tax rates?  
Does the municipality have a high or low capacity to issue bonds?  
Does the municipality have high or low capacity for discretion in the use of trust 
funds? 
 
Does the municipality have a high or low ability to roll over funds?  
*Composite measure for autonomy. (This will be evaluated in a likart scale of 1-3, 
measured as high, medium to low and then summed for a count variable). 
 
Second, different types of interventions are compared in regards to producing 
fiscal autonomy and contrast them in terms of various economic development indicators. 
After conducting preliminary interviews in Argentina and Mexico during the summer of 
2009, it became apparent that each city has emphasized a specific funding source to 
strengthen their local budgets. Specifically, for the case selection, the cities were first 
divided by the degree of autonomy, and from where the municipality is collecting its 
local revenue streams. They are categorized as autonomous (higher percentage of own-
source resource collection), dependent (high degree of inter-governmental transfer from 
the national and local government) or mixed (equally dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers to the collection of own-source revenue), which is demonstrated in table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3: City’s Efforts at Revenue Collection 
Degree of 
Autonomy 
City City Financial Revenue Efforts 
Autonomous Rosario The city created trust funds to finance public programs. 
Dependent Rafaela The city has strong party ties to the national government to 
finance public programs. 
Mixed Santa Fe The city redesigned its cadastre to enhance property taxes to 
finance public programs. 
Autonomous Leon The city relies upon the use of municipal bonds to finance 
public programs. 
Dependent  San Miguel  
de Allende 
The city relies upon its expatriate community for generating 
revenue for public programs. 
Mixed Guanajuato The city has incorporated public facilities and charges user-
fees to finance public programs. 
 
 Next, the autonomy of the budget revenues is quantified using a measure of Total 
Own-Source Revenue (TOSR). This involves the inputs of local taxes (property, fees, and 
fines), and public loans/debt minus inter-governmental transfers and international or 
philanthropic aid. Total own-source revenue is demonstrated in subsequent graphs, 
making comparisons with public expenditures such as wage bill (public employment), 
public works and other expenditures (which are a total of all other expenses made by the 
city government). These variables are calculated as percentage of TOSR. 
The research then compares the six cities and their efforts to promote economic 
development programs. The dependent variable is the economic development programs. 
Specific programming that a city has developed including for example, job fairs, training 
centers, promotion activities for locally produced products will be examined. Further 
examples of specific economic development programs evaluated are found in Table 3.4.  
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Table 3.4 Local Economic Development Programs 
1. The municipality has a local economic development promotional office. 
2. The municipality organizes annual fairs and carnivals to advertise local products. 
3. There are prizes and annual acknowledgement of best business and entrepreneurs. 
4. The municipality has up-to-date maps and locations of local businesses. 
5. The local government is open to free access of information to open businesses: 
access, roads, and productive infrastructure, among other things? 
6. The local government has one-window to set up business activities, commercial and 
industrial licensing? 
7. The municipality has formal connections to the local business community. 
8. The municipality has developed support programs for new small business leaders? 
9. The municipality has an updated plan of registered commercial plants and 
productivity activities in your area? 
10. The municipality receives international cooperation? 
11. The municipality has partnerships with local organizations: sister city programs, 
with local universities, international cooperation agencies. 
12. The municipality is a member of an inter-municipal association for economic 
development. 
13. The municipality administers a micro-credit plan for small and medium size 
businesses. 
 
The key independent variables include: political ideology, intergovernmental 
structure, city’s geography, mayoral leadership, and the professional development of the 
municipality’s staff. Based on a review of the literature it is assumed that: 
• If the local political leadership is involved in the national politics of the country 
then it will be able to bring more finances back to the local community and 
establish more successful economic development programs.  
• If the political leadership is more conservative and business oriented, for 
example by providing favors in terms of land or taxes to companies, then the city 
will have more successful economic development programs.  
• If the city is located in a resource rich area and/or has close access to roads 
and/or is a transportation hub for the country, then the city will be more likely to 
develop economic development programs.  
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• If the municipality has had a highly energetic mayor and the municipality’s staff 
has a high level of professional development (i.e. with several holding advanced 
degrees), then the city will be more likely to establish economic development 
programs.  
Each city is evaluated in terms of possessing these independent variables. This research 
compares local capacity and explores the role that fiscal autonomy plays in encouraging 
local economic development programs. It focuses on municipal capacity to innovate and 
create financial mechanisms those cities are using to finance the economic development 
programs. The same six cities are evaluated again for this portion of the research.  
Quantitative Analysis  
After studying the results from the qualitative case studies, a large quantitative 
dataset from Mexico is analyzed. The research provides a statistical analysis to evaluate 
the relationship of city autonomy to the economic development programs (measured as 
job creation). A formal linear regression is used to test a model with data collected from 
four sources: Mexico’s National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI), the 
National Congress’ public finance database (CEFP), census data (CONAPO) and finally, 
the federal agency which researches municipal development (INAFED). (Martínez 
Pellégrini, Flamand, and Hernández 2008) developed in conjunction with INAFED a 
large database, which reports on municipal social, economic, environmental services and 
institutional development, called the IDMB (Indice de Desarrollo Municipal Basico). The 
IDMB is also used to test these results. 
Finally, a large-scale quantitative analysis is done with data from mayors and 
local authorities throughout the region in an effort to generalize the case study results. A 
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survey was created and distributed at a large conference of local authorities and to several 
Latin American municipal associations in an effort to evaluate the performance of mayors 
and other local authorities (Appendix 1). The survey seeks to explore both how economic 
development programs work and the perception of autonomy that local authorities 
experience. Periodic requests were also sent using electronic communication.  
A model was built on the survey data that includes responses from mayors, city 
council members and executives from 13 countries in Latin America, which attempted to 
gauge whether the local officials implement economic development programs. The 
dependent variable is the number of jobs created in a local area as a proxy for measuring 
economic development programs. The independent variables include measures of fiscal, 
administrative, and political autonomy. Finally, the study attempts to control for 
municipal environmental factors. The survey evaluates the impressions of mayors and 
local authorities on establishing economic development programs and the autonomy they 
experience. Table 3.5 provides indicators used in the quantitative analysis. They include 
mayor’s perceptions of fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization. The amount 
of economic growth measured as the number of jobs created, types of business friendly 
programs and controls for other natural endowments. 
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Table 3.5 Quantitative Analysis Indicators 
Indicators  Description 
Economic Development 
Economic Growth Measured by the # Jobs, small businesses, GDP in a 
particular municipality, Economic Development programs 
created within the Municipality 
Business Friendliness 
Policies 
Composite of questions, which determine what pro-business 
policies the municipality has implemented in the past year. 
Decentralization 
Budget Autonomy Defined budget, creating and calculating taxes and expenses 
% of Budget Autonomy 
(aka Autonomy) 
 
Measures of the budget autonomy by inputs of local taxes 
(Property, fees and fines), and public loans/debt minus inter-
governmental transfers and international or philanthropic aid 
Political Autonomy  Level of decision making authority, originating internally 
Administrative 
Autonomy  
Level of capacity to define municipal authorities, processes, 
and purchases 
Control Variables: Total Budget Interval Estimated in U.S. dollars, Population 
measured in thousands, Administrative Territory, % of poverty in municipality 
 
3.4 Definitions 
 This dissertation uses the following key terms, which are defined in this section. 
Fiscal decentralization is defined as the assignment of expenditures functions and 
revenues sources to subnational levels of government. Subnational levels of government 
(SNG) include state or provincial governments and local governments—cities, 
metropolitan regions or municipalities—that report to the national government. SNG may 
also be sub-divided into counties or other administrative units.  
 Within many econometric studies, fiscal decentralization is measured as 
subnational government revenue and expenditure as a percentage of total government 
revenue (TOSR). Typically studies warn that too much fiscal decentralization could 
promote macroeconomic instability may be harmed by too much SNG spending, as such 
many studies have suggested soft budget constraints for SNG borrowing. Advocates 
promote the arguments of economic efficiency. They include an analysis of economic 
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performance, fiscal performance or governance performance. But a more specific 
definition should be used for this study. 
 For example, the OECD quantitative analysis studies use subnational government 
expenditures as its dependent variable and adjusts independent variables for tax rates and 
the base, public debt and other types of revenue sharing (de Mello 2009; Gemmell, 
Kneller, and Sanz 2009; Joumard, Kongsrud, Nam, and Price 2004). Revenues are 
decided by the national legislature and crafted annually by central government as a part 
of the budget. If the central government sets the tax rate and base for subnational 
governments then there is little autonomy for the local government to regulate tax 
collection. The World Bank uses measures such as expenditure assignments, revenues 
regulatory frameworks for subnational borrowing and the characteristics of the transfers 
in its qualitative analysis. In order to understand the authority of local governments to 
make decisions in their budget decisions, the legal framework of each city is evaluated.                             
 Additionally, economic performance also can be measured in different ways, for 
example growth rates, inflation rates, and levels of income or the purchasing power at the 
local level. This dissertation uses Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the level of 
economic performance at the subnational level (where data are available). Finally, fiscal 
performances are the level of budget deficit and are measured in government debt over 
GDP. Where data are available, GDP at the municipal level is used in this dissertation. 
This chapter described the research questions, methods, and definitions used in this 
dissertation.  
Therefore the next chapter will provide a historical analysis of how the 
decentralization process has taken place within the region. Argentina, which has 
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traditionally been a decentralized federation, has recently increased tax revenues and 
promoted more centralized fiscal policies in order to promote macroeconomic stability. 
Mexico, which has traditionally been a centralized federation, has begun to decentralize 
expenditures to subnational government, although similar levels revenue capacity or 
authority as in Argentina has not joined this process. The next chapter will look at how 
these transitions have taken place. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE HISTORY OF ARGENTINA AND MEXICO’S  
DECENTRALIZATION PROCESS 
4.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to understand the history and context of how 
Argentina and Mexico first crafted their federations. By using a comparative historical 
approach, this chapter evaluates the levels of decentralization and centralization of the 
Argentine and Mexican federations’ overtime. The chapter describes the recent changes 
in the intergovernmental systems, paying specific attention to the fiscal reforms.  
Argentina had a loose federation during a majority of the 19th and 20th century; 
only beginning in the 1970s the country began to decentralize some areas of public policy 
such as education and health. By collecting more national taxes and managing its failing 
economy (macro-economic stabilization policies), especially after the 2001 economic 
crash, Argentina is becoming more centralized.  
During most of the 19th century, Mexico tried to create a unified federation but 
was dominated by political strife. It was solidified only when the PRI gained power in the 
early 20th century. Decentralization reforms began in the late 1970s with administrative 
and political reforms, when opposition parties were allowed to run and lead the country, 
which opened the country up to democracy. Fiscal reforms were dominated by 
expenditure decentralization, which redistributes federally funded grants based on a 
formula. The national budget process is managed directly by the federal executive. 
Academics are now questioning the effectiveness of formula-driven 
redistributions (Falleti 2010; Weingast 2006). Currently the test is whether fiscal 
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federalism is based on market-based incentives or on political constraints. Arguably, this 
research will help better inform policy on how to create the optimal amount of tax ratios 
at the national and subnational level. 
 This chapter provides a brief description of the historical developments for each 
country. It is divided into two sections, first explaining Argentina and then Mexico. Each 
section includes a brief description of how the two federations were established. Then the 
chapter describes the modern day reforms each country took after becoming democracies, 
paying particular attention to Argentina Fiscal Pacts post 1990s and Mexico’s municipal 
reforms beginning in 1997. The chapter describes how each country’s history has crafted 
its current institutional arrangement and describes their tensions within their inter-
governmental relations. 
4.2 Argentina 
The Argentina federation was first established in 1853. Over the following 140 
years, the federation was marked by several periods of oligarchy and military rule, which 
finally transformed into a democracy in 1983. Shortly after this last transition, when the 
military authority handed over its power to civilian authorities, Argentina instituted the 
1994 constitution, which is in operation today.  
For a majority of the 19th and 20th century, strong provincial leaders managed 
Argentina by sending political representation to Buenos Aries to oversee domestic affairs. 
For much of this time, the federal government retained control over matters such as the 
regulation of commerce, customs collections, currency, civil or commercial codes, and 
the appointment of foreign diplomats. But the relationship between the federation and the 
provinces has fluctuated, especially with the number of policies that seek to improve the 
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macroeconomic stability of the country and the promotion of economic growth within the 
subnational governments. 
National political representation alternated between the Partido Justicalists, (PJ) a 
Populist Party, and the Union Civil Radical (UCR), a conservative Christian Democratic 
Party. The political struggle was also between Buenos Aires and the interior provinces, 
with long periods of tension regarding the division of powers between the central 
government and provincial bodies. According to Benton (2001), “provincial party 
branches had their own constitutions, rules and procedures’, elected party officers, party 
activities and membership’s lists. Often local party groups had their own names, as well 
as reserved the right to forge alliances and other parties at election times” (Benton 2001).  
 The Argentine Federal Co-participation System (FCS) was established in the 1930s 
and is characterized by a revenue sharing system, which includes mandatory payments 
from provinces into the national treasury to the co-participation fund. There are two basic 
ways that these funds are paid back from the national treasury to the provinces. These 
include: 1) transfers, such as the block grants in the United States, to provinces that have 
general responsibility for how the funds are spent and 2) National Treasury Grants 
(ATNs Aportes del Tesoro Nacional) which are non-conditional transfers for provinces 
on non-specific projects.6  The co-participation or revenue sharing funds are different 
than ATNs or other conditional transfers. The revenue-sharing grants are similar to 
unconditional block grants in that they are pre-determined by a formula and automatically 
distributed from the national government to the provinces. The ATNs were created in the 
1853 Constitution as way for the federation to subsidize poorer provinces (Habibi, 
                                                        
6 In general, scholars sometimes interchange the revenue sharing (monies sent to the national treasury) with 
the transfers (monies sent back to the provinces) by mistake. 
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Huang, Miranda, Murillo, Ranis, Sarkar, and Stewart 2001). Furthermore, there are a few 
additional smaller funds for special projects such as FONAVI (housing) Royalties (for oil 
and natural gas producing provinces) or FDR (for regional development grants). These 
last funds are relatively small compared to the transfers, which are these mandatory block 
grants sent from the treasury to the provinces. One public official reported that these 
funds were transferred from the national treasury to the provinces daily and the amounts 
were based on the commodity prices. Table 4.1 shows several of the special accounts that 
the Argentine government has created to decentralize public programs.  
Table 4.1 Principal Federal Transfers to Argentine Provincial 
Governments, 1973- 1995 (Percent of Total Transfers) 
Year  ATN FONAVI Corp. Vial FEDEI FDR Royalties TOTAL 
1973-80  52.4 8.1 4.6 0.4 2.9 3.3 96.5 
1988-90  61.4 10 3.2 0.3 1 9.2 86.2 
1991-95  71.6 6.2 1.6 0.5 0.5 4.1 87 
All years  56.7 8.8 3.8 0.5 1.8 5.6 92.9 
Source: (Benton 2001) pg 491.7 
  
History of Centralization 
Beginning in 1935, revenue sharing between levels of government marked the 
first change in the fiscal relationship for the Argentine Federation. Yet, it was not until 
Juan Domingo Peron became president (1946-1955 and again 1973-1974) representing 
the PJ, which consolidated the nation.8 He is also known for uniting the urban workers 
and enlarging the national bureaucracy. He did this by increasing federal taxes on 
agricultural exports to implement an import substitution model of economics that also 
                                                        
7 Note: ATN: Aportes del Tesoro Nacional or National Treasury Grants; Cop. Vial: Coparticipación Vial or 
Highway Fund; FDR: Fondo de Desarrollo Regional or Regional Development Fund; FEDEI: Fondo de 
Desarrollo Eléctrico del Interior or Energy Development Fund; FONAVI: Fondo Nacional de Vivienda or 
National Housing Fund; Royalties: Payments to oil and natural gas producing provinces. 
8 The PJ is later to also be known for his leadership as the Peronist party, after Juan Domingo Peron. 
65 
increased manufacturing jobs in Buenos Aires (Benton 2001). His political leadership 
was supported by urban labor groups, which promoted more centralized government and 
agricultural landowners promoted a more decentralized federation. 
 The change in the intergovernmental system and the percentages of allocations to 
municipal governments increased tension between the federal government (typically 
managed by the president, or the military, depending upon the year) and the provincial 
governments. Because some of the funding to SNG is discretional, academics have found 
a correlation between the changes in the intergovernmental system with party leadership 
(Benton 2009). This is particularly true when the Peronist Party (PJ) governed the federal 
government; there are generally increases in federal transfers and therefore more 
centralization of power over the federation (Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Eaton 2001; Eaton and 
Dickovick 2004).  
 Table 4.2 outlines the changes to the co-participation system from 1935 to 1999 
(Eaton 2001). It illustrates how presidents increased taxes (excise, sales and VAT) and 
set the distribution of those funds between the federal government, the provincial 
governments and created a federal district to manage specific funds (located within 
Buenos Aires).  
Table 4.2 Changes to the Co-participation system: 1935-1999 
Administration 
(Years in power) 
How came 
to power 
Date  
(Law No.) 
Nature of Change % Change  
Justo  
(Jan 32-Jan38) 
Election 
with fraud 
1934  
(12,139) 
1934 
(12,143) 
1934 
(12,147) 
Revenue sharing of excise taxes 
 
Revenue sharing of income and of sales taxes 
(82.5 /17.5% split) 
n/a 
Ortiz/Castillo (Jan 38-June 43) Election with fraud No change 
Ramirez/Farrell 
(June 43-June 46) 
Military 
coup 
1943 Creation of new tax on profits, not shared n/a 
 
Peron 
(June 46-sept 55) 
Democratic 
Elections 
1947 
(12,956) 
1951 
Increase provincial shares and includes 
profits tax in pool (79/21% split) 
Creation of new tax on inheritances, shared 
n/a 
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(14,060) 
1954 
(14, 390 
with SNG 
Regulatory degree decrease SNG share 
Increase provincial share of excise tax 
32% 
increase 
Leonardi/Aramburu (Sep 55-May 58) Military coup No change 
Frondizi 
(May 58-Mar 62) 
Elections 1959 
(14,788) 
Adopts five year transition period which 
SNG shares will be doubled 
(58% fed/36% prov/6% fed cap split) 
100% 
increase 
 
Guido  (Mar 62-July 63) Military Coup No change 
Illia  
(July 63-June 66) 
Elections 1964 
(16,463) 
Provincial shares in existing pool increase 
(54% fed/36% prov/6% fed cap) 
 
11% 
increase 
Ongania/ 
Livingston 
(June 66-Feb 71) 
Military 
Coup 
1967 
 
1968 
Provincial shares and federal capital share 
reduce (49% fed/41% prov + Fed cap) 
11% 
decrease 
for SNG 
Lanusse 
(Feb 71-May73 
Internal 
Military 
Coup 
1973 
(20,221) 
Increase provides and broadens set of taxes 
in pool (48.5% fed/48.5% prov/1.8% fed 
cap) 
21% 
increase 
Campora/Lastiri/ 
Peron  
(May 73-Mar 76) 
Elections  1973 
(20,633) 
1975 
(21,251) 
VAT introduced and included in pool 
 
Vat Taken out of revenue pool but provinces 
allowed to keep collecting 
n/a 
 
Videla/ Viola/ 
Galtieri/ Bignone 
(Mar 76-Dec 83) 
Military 
Coup 
1980 
(22,293) 
 
1981 
(22,451) 
Amount deducted from revenue sharing pool 
equal to cost of financing social security, 
SNG reduced to 29% 
Fed Capital eliminated from revenue sharing 
44% 
decrease 
 
100% 
decrease 
Alfonsin 
(Dec83-July 89) 
Elections 1988 
(22,548) 
Provincial Share increase to 56.7% and fed 
decreased 42.3%; tax on gas included 
95% 
increase 
Menem 
(July89-Dec 99) 
Elections 1992/93 Fiscal pacts that deduct revenues from the 
tax pool in exchange for guarantee revenues; 
some taxes removed from pool 
Estimate 
Vary 
Source: (Eaton 2001)  
 
 Argentina’s intergovernmental tension has been more acute in the past 30 years 
(1980-2010). When the president’s constitutional powers were invoked, it further 
influenced the continuing realignment of Argentina’s intergovernmental system.9 For 
example, during the most recent military junta governments, before Juan Peron resumed 
power in 1973 and again after the 1976 coup, all local legislatures could be dissolved and 
                                                        
9 The first of these powers was designed to “guarantee the republican form of government in the 
provinces.” Since the adoption of the 1853 constitution, the federal government has intervened over 200 
times, mostly by presidential decree. Typically under military dictatorships (between 1966 and 1973 and 
again from 1976 and 1983) is when they had the authority to declare vacant, nullify appointments, and 
supervise local elections at the provincial and municipal levels. 
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the military’s appointed provincial governors.10 With the restoration of democracy in 
1983, local elections returned.11 Since that time, the provincial governors and sub-
national leaders are once again elected for four-year terms. 
Benton (2001) shows that in 1973 after the re-election of Peron, the share of 
revenues, or the payments of provincial governments to the national government, rose 
from 45 percent in 1971 to over 70 percent in 1977, illustrated in figure 4.1. The 
provincial governors demanded the national government to be compensated for the 
revenue sharing increases, which increased to as high as 75.8 percent.  
Figure 4.1 Argentine Revenue Sharing 1973-1995 (percent of total transfers) 
 
Source: (Benton 2001) pg 491 
 
 The academic literature (Benton 2009; Eaton and Dickovick 2004; Falleti 2010) 
states that it was not until after Peron’s death in 1974 that the Argentine Federation began 
to reassess the distribution and decentralization of national functions with the provinces. 
                                                        
10 Military rulers led Argentina from 1966-1973, when the PJ resumed power and Juan Domingo Peron 
(PJ) returned from Exile in Spain in 1973, but was seceded by his wife María Estela Martínez de Perón 
(PJ), 1974-1976, after being shot in office in 1974. The military returned to power from 1976-1983 when 
under free and fair elections, Raúl Alfonsín  (UCR) was elected president (1983-1989). This was the last 
time the military ruled in Argentina. In 1994, Carlos Menem (PJ) changed the Constitution to be reelected 
in 1995. 
11 In 1973 with Peron return to power, provincial and municipal governments followed the return to 
constitutional government, but after the March 1976 coup, the federal government again intervened to 
remove all provincial governors and impose direct military rule over all municipalities. 
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For example, decentralization of health and primary education began during the military 
dictatorship in the 1970’s; President Alfonsin created the New Partnership Scheme in the 
1980’s, and finally, President Menem further devolved health and education policies in 
the 1990’s. Many of these programs, known as unfunded mandates, were designed to 
decentralize administrative functions without necessarily promised financing. 
 This created a secondary objective of changing the “effective partnership” between 
the state and national governments. There has always been a lack of coordination of 
spending and borrowing in Argentina, often creating successive taxes and overlapping 
laws. For example the Law 22,201 of 1973 (primary and secondary distribution) and the 
Law 23,548 of 1987 (political crisis) have created serious over spending problems for the 
country (Cetrángolo and Gómez-Sabaini 2007).  
Return to Democracy  
 The most recent phase of “centralization” began when the Radical Civic Union (in 
Spanish, Unión Cívica Radical, UCR), which controlled the federal government from 
1984 to 1987, but lost its control in Congress. The president at the time “enjoyed 
enormous discretion over the size and timing of revenue transfers to the provinces, where 
a majority of which were governed by the opposition Peronist Party” (Eaton and 
Dickovick 2004). When Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) came to power representing the 
UCR, he modified the 1973 co-participation law that was to expire in 1987. Two 
proposals were drafted and heatedly debated in Congress, although neither was approved. 
While unresolved, the UCR transferred revenue through bilateral agreements with a large 
proportion of discretionary funds (ATNs).  
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 Even though many UCR provinces saw increases in their state budgets because the 
federal government had more discretionary funds to spend on these states, the party lost 
seats in the 1987 midterm Congressional election. By the end of the year, the PJ and UCR 
governors inevitably agreed to renegotiate a new co-participation plan (Falleti 2010). The 
results left several unfunded mandates without adequate redistribution of revenue 
sharing. In the same year, the provincial shares increased to 56.7 percent and the federal 
shares decreased to 42.3 percent. Taxes on gasoline also were included in the pool. Yet, 
the fiscal pacts that recentralized shared-revenues did not last long, especially when 
hyperinflation began to affect the Argentine economy in 1989. The financial crisis 
created a political crisis. President Alfonsín was forced to leave the presidency early, 
allowing Carlos Menem (1989-1999) to take his place. 
 According to Eaton and Dickovick (2004), when the Peronist party was victorious 
in the 1987 legislative election, they encouraged a recentralization of the fiscal policies 
and passed the co-participation law. This allowed the first automatic revenues to be 
transferred to the provinces. This further influenced President Menem to pass the 
Convertibility Law, which allowed the peso to equal one US dollar. At this time, several 
fiscal pacts were made between the president and the governors, which transferred key 
responsibilities to the provinces without increasing revenues. The Fiscal Pacts of the 
early 1990s can be considered to be unfunded mandates, since they decreased 
responsibility (administrative decentralization) without sufficient resources.  
 The National Education Congress of 1988 unanimously voted in favor of the policy 
which lead to President Menem’s proposal to decentralize secondary education in 1990 
(Falleti 2010). According to Falleti, Congress approved the legislation in 1992 because it 
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was attached to a tax bill written by the Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo, a bill 
that also was set to lower inflation and create economic stability. Cavallo believed that 
the provinces could afford to manage the schools with their own revenues instead of 
effectively requesting an increase in revenue sharing. According to Falleti (2010), this 
was the prevailing opinion of the PJ ruling coalition lead by José Octavio Bordón, a PJ 
governor of Mendoza. Cavallo convinced PJ governors to buy into the plan, declaring 
that since the enactment of the National Convertibility Law, total public income was 
growing faster than sub-national expenditures from 1987-1991 (Falleti 2010). The state’s 
governors reluctantly agreed to the transfers with a financial guarantee (Article 15 of Law 
24,049). 
 The Fiscal Pact in 1991 was an agreement that deducted 15 percent from the 
revenue pool in exchange for guaranteeing that the transfers would not dip below a 
minimum monthly floor of $725 million pesos. According to Eaton and Dickovick (2004) 
the second pact was an exchange for discretionary provincial tax and social security 
reforms. Under this pact, the federal government raised the average monthly guarantee to 
$740 million pesos and increased federal control over the design of sub-national 
economic policies. As inflation hit again in the late 1990s, it was estimated that the 
provinces lost $9.3 billion dollars from having signed the transfer law (Falleti 2010). 
Likewise, the inflation continued to increase and the convertibility of the Argentine peso 
collapsed, thereby provincial governments increasingly needed to take out private loans 
to pay for public sector activities. 
 Planning his re-election, Menem called a constitutional assembly in 1994. With the 
backdrop a majority in Congress and an undivided government, Menem attempted to 
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change the election laws (Falleti 2010). One of the bargaining chips the UCR had was to 
create an independent federal district and call for the direct election of the Mayor of the 
City of Buenos Aires, a long-time political bastion for the UCR (Falleti 2010). Prior to 
this, the President appointed the Mayor of Buenos Aires, and by law, the President and 
Congress controlled any legislation that affected the city (Rosenbaum and Rodriguez 
Acosta 2008). Constitutional reforms led to an elected mayoral position, and a 60-
member legislature. Congressional members are elected by proportional representation to 
four-year terms with the possibility to be re-elected. 
 Beginning in 1995, Menem faced a divided Congress during his second term in 
office. The balance of power shifted away from the governors to the federal government. 
Regardless of his 1995 re-election, Menem faced the negative effects of Mexico’s tequila 
crisis in 1994 on the Argentine economy. He had to recentralize power to manage the 
economy and did so by successfully privatizing provincial banks. Further reforms were 
made such as simplifying the tax code, enacting fiscal reform, strengthening the tax 
agency, liberalizing internal and external markets, and privatizing other state-owned 
enterprises (Tommasi 2002). The changes were successful and the economy saw a 
positive growth rates and sharp decrease in poverty rates, which impressed not only 
private investors but also academics and international policymakers alike. The reforms 
made Argentina seen as an economic model to be followed internationally (Tommasi 
2002). 
 Yet, Argentina’s leading role in international economic policy was short lived after 
the country was obliged to default on its international debt obligations. Many academics 
suggest that the country’s default originated from the explosion of subnational debt 
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(Abuelafia, Berensztein, Broun, and Di Gresia 2004; Bonvecchi 2010; Cetrángolo O. and 
Jiménez 2003; Dillinger and Webb 1999; Eaton 2001; Falleti 2010; Melamud 2010; Melo 
2007; Tommasi 2002; Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). Much of this debt was 
issued in pesos prior to the Convertibility Law, which pegged one dollar to each peso. 
Mandatory co-participation transfers were established in the fiscal pacts at a fixed rate in 
dollars. As a result, the provincial debt was tied to the availability of dollars and when 
inflation hit, it caused public expenditures to increase while the transfers remained the 
same. Many provincial governors took out public loans to bridge the fiscal gap in their 
budgets. This in turn caused the national government to suffer instability leading it to 
default. Several provinces requested bailouts when they too generously paid out 
benefits, the fiscal deficit tripled from 1996 to 1998 (Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 
2001).  
 Faced with a deteriorating budget balance and growing debt payments, the 
Argentine Congress approved a Fiscal Solvency Law in September 1999 (Braun and 
Tommasi 2002). The law sought to promote countercyclical fiscal funds and stipulated 
multiyear budgeting. The Fiscal Solvency Law set a nominal ceiling for the non-financial 
public sector deficit. This ensured the repayment of public loans by SNG, suggesting that 
those funds could not be used to pay salaries of public employees (wage bill). The sub-
national accounts became insurmountable, and the national government started to borrow 
more from international creditors, typically with interest rates established in U.S. dollars. 
The subnational debt distorted the Argentine economy (Bonvecchi 2010; Cetrángolo O. 
and Jiménez 2003; Stein 1999b; Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). By 2000, the 
debt doubled and tripled overnight for provincial and city governments. Because of 
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international creditors demanding loans to be transacted in American dollars, with the 
pegged exchange rate and pesofication caused hyperinflation (U.S. Department of State 
2011). 
 The situation became exacerbated under the leadership of UCR President De la Rúa 
(1999-2001). In late 2001, De la Rúa forced a bank holiday (Corralito) and took private 
savings and pensions from state banks to pay down the national debt to international 
creditors. Consequently, this action spread further fear within the international credit 
markets, pushing more inflation. Without the ability to retrieve personal funds from the 
bank and increasing prices for basic foodstuff, Argentina’s economy became unstable. 
Robbing and looting became commonplaces across Argentina’s cities in November and 
December of 2001. As one way to pacify the hungry, soup kitchens (Cacerolazo) 
emerged in the streets. Within Buenos Aries, women began to protest the adverse effects 
of the federal policies by banging wooden spoons onto pots on street corners each 
evening (Hopkins 2002). This climaxed when the country defaulted on its national debt in 
December 2001. The ill fate of the economic crisis in late 2001 caused protesting in the 
streets, which left 28 people dead (U.S. Department of State 2011). 
 Argentina’s economic predicaments triggered social unrest and political turmoil. De 
la Rúa was forced out of office, which was followed by the designation of several interim 
presidents that served short stints in the Casa Rosada, Argentina’s presidential palace. 
Finally, a legislative assembly elected Eduardo Duhalde (PJ) president in 2002 to 
complete the term of former President De la Rúa. After assuming the presidency, 
Duhalde formally reversed the Convertibility Law. He stabilized the social situation and 
advanced presidential elections by six months to pave the way for a new president to be 
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elected with a popular mandate (Hornbeck 2002; U.S. Department of State 2011). 
Duhalde did this by changing the tax code five times including exemption items such as 
reducing social security contributions and increased personal asset tax rates while 
changing federal required taxes for farmers. These included the elimination of the VAT 
for honey producers, reducing the VAT for cattle producers and suspending the 
differential VAT for all agrarian activities (Bonvecchi 2010). All these fiscal reforms 
consequently increased the de-facto power of the central government. 
Recent History of Centralization 
 By 2002 most of Argentina’s financial systems had been devastated. The economic 
crisis encouraged the national government to implement several pressing financial 
reforms such as the federal pact, the role of the budget and taxation policy. While some 
scholars have focused on political-institutionalist and political-economic types of analysis 
for how reform took place (Benton 2009; Eaton 2004), others have focused on what types 
of reforms are necessary in this type of post-economic crisis (Bonvecchi 2010; Tommasi, 
Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). Some suggest these financial reforms for Argentina, and 
Latin America in general, should consider counter-cyclical fiscal policies, hard versus 
soft budget constraints, encourage debt limits, and promote market-preserving federalism 
(Bonvecchi 2010; Santiso 2005; Tommasi 2002; Treisman 2007; Weingast 1995; 
Weingast 2006).  
 Within the past 20 years, Argentina has made its fair share of reforms. Of the 16 
budget area reforms, six have aimed at introducing structural changes to the rules of the 
game. They include the 1992 Financial Administrative Law; the 1996 Second State 
Reform; the 1997 budget’s prohibition to finance increase expenditures through the 
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Treasury obligations funds, the 1999 Financial Solvency Act; the 2005 budget’s reversal 
of the prohibition introduced in the 1997 budget; and the 2006 Reform of the Financial 
Administrative Law. According to Bonvecchi (2010) the rest of the laws were piecemeal. 
“Fiscal reforms in Argentina have generally consisted of adapting revenue-sharing results 
to restrictions imposed on the federal and provincial treasuries by either economic shocks 
or stabilization policies” (Bonvecchi 2010). For most of the 1990s and 2000s the national 
government centralized control under the PJ leadership by using these transfers. 
 In 2003, Nestor Kirchner (PJ) won the presidency defeating former President 
Menem with the majority after a runoff election. He quickly restored the economy and 
the country found positive growth rates. Although Kirchner enjoyed approval ratings of 
more than 60 percent, he announced in July 2007 that he would not seek re-election and 
backed his wife, then-Senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, as the candidate to 
succeed him (U.S. Department of State 2011). Fernández de Kirchner had previously 
served in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. She won 45 percent of the vote in the 
October 2007. Three year later her husband died of a fatal heart attack in 2010 leaving 
her to be alone in power.  
 The economy has improved with the Kirchners’ presidencies. Both Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner and Nestor Kirchner are associated with the recentralization of 
Argentine’s public finances. Budget officials noted that it is difficult to follow 
Argentina’s budget process since it has changed so many times in recent years. For 
example, “fix sums, tax-reduction deferrals, and bailouts have allowed the provinces to 
maintain their status quo spending abilities at least until the following negotiation” with 
the federal government (Bonvecchi 2010). The municipal treasurers often manipulate 
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accounting measures and codes to maximize revenues streams and increase transfers 
during the fiscal year. It has been acknowledged that both Kirchners have managed to 
artificially keep the inflation rates low by politically controlling the federal statistical 
agency, the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC). One reporter stated:  
Economists say the official inflation rate of 8.5 percent in 2007 was really about 25 
percent. In the 12 months ended this June, the INDEC put the rate at 5.3 percent, 
but economists say it might be three times higher. Argentina’s vaunted economic 
growth this decade might have been exaggerated, too. Credit Suisse said the 7 
percent expansion the government reported last year is likely 2 to 3 percent lower 
(Forero 2009).  
 
This type of data manipulation increases uncertainty, making citizens (and SNG officials) 
untrustworthy of official statistics or budget information. 
 In March 2008, with a majority in Congress, Kirchner introduced a new sliding-
scale taxation system for agricultural exports, effectively raising levies on soybean 
exports from 35 percent to 44 percent (U.S. Department of State 2011). Known as the 
“retenciones” or withholdings by the agricultural commodities, this tax alone caused 
major protesting in the streets by landowners, some of the wealthiest Argentines. The 
creation of this tax alone demonstrates how the Kirchners’ government has centralized its 
power to manage a larger share of the tax efforts (The Economist 2008). The federal 
government created new taxes to increase its share of revenue; in turn they claim new 
programs that the administration has provided to local cities and towns. One journalist 
reported the following statement: 
To support her campaign, Mr. Kirchner ramped up spending on pensions and public 
works. The new government is seeking to restore the fiscal surplus to rein in the 
resulting inflation. So it has raised the already steep export taxes it levies on most 
agricultural commodities. The rate on soybeans, to take the most extreme example, 
has been hoisted to 40 percent, up from 27 percent last year” (The Economist 
2008).  
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Figure 4.2 Argentina’s Tax Labyrinth  
 
Source: (Tommasi, Saiegh, and  Sanguinetti 2001)  
 
Figure 4.2 outlines the Argentine tax system. Often called the “tax labyrinth,” since it 
shows where resources originate from the various taxes and fees and how they are 
redistributed to the provinces of at varying percentages. For example, the federal 
government receives 41.95 percent of its revenues from the net co-participation funds and 
35 percent from taxes such as fuel, import/export duties and other outside funds. The 
revenues from the provinces, which collect most of the taxes from excise taxes, income, 
gross assets, personal assets taxes and the VAT, is put into the co-participation gross fund 
and then re-distributed again depending on the fiscal pact to the federation, provinces, 
and the federal district (which is set forth in Table 4.1). 
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 Table 4.3 illustrates Argentina’s percentage of GDP disaggregate by tax source 
from 2001 to 2008. The graph shows a low percentage of property taxes, less than three 
percent annually, and the steady increase in VAT, collected at the national level. 
According to the literature in public finance, the VAT has a regressive nature and the 
property tax is progressive (Birdsall, De La Torre, and Menezes 2007). In general, the 
entire tax net has increased and become more regressive from 2001-2008. The overall 
central tax collection has increased from 21.14 percent in 2001 to 31.01 percent in 2008. 
The highest percentage was 39.35 percent tax collection during 2007, which can be 
explained by the high commodity prices and the economic boom that Argentina 
experienced during that year with increase taxes on agricultural exports.  
Table 4.3 Argentina’s Disaggregated Tax Percentage GDP 2001-2008 
Concept Concept 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
I. National 
Taxes 
Rents and Capital 
Gains 
3.99 3.04 4.30 5.26 5.49 5.31 5.44 5.30 
 
Property Tax 1.43 1.77 2.03 2.13 2.15 2.14 2.22 2.26 
VAT 8.09 7.13 7.71 9.04 8.95 9.05 9.42 9.43 
Commercial Services 
and International 
Transactions 
0.64 2.05 3.03 3.05 3.07 3.07 3.41 4.39 
Other 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.15 
Social Security 3.23 2.83 2.83 3.04 3.27 3.78 4.51 5.09 
Subtotal National 
Taxes 
17.50 16.91 19.98 22.67 23.10 23.57 25.13 26.63 
II. Provincial 
Taxes 
Property Tax 1.18 0.97 1.09 1.10 1.10 1.03 0.97 0.96 
 Goods and Services 2.08 1.97 2.35 2.58 2.74 2.82 2.97 3.21 
 Other 0.37 0.46 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.22 
 Subtotal Provincial 
Taxes 
3.64 3.39 3.81 4.04 4.12 4.17 4.22 4.39 
Total Collection 21.14 20.30 23.79 26.70 27.22 27.74 39.35 31.01 
Source: Argentina Ministerio de Economia y Produccion de la Nacion, 2009  
 
Problems with the Inter-Governmental System 
Argentine provinces have heterogeneous populations and economic development 
efforts. There is a great deal of differences between size, population density and 
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economic activity between provinces (Bonvecchi 2010). This has created major structural 
problems creating obstacles for Argentine federalism. For example, in Argentina regional 
disparities and redistribution of resources for the province of Santa Cruz’s has income per 
capita (IPC) of 8.6 times higher than that of Formosa. This is compared to Canada, where 
the difference between the richest and the poorest state is 1.7 IPC (Cetrángolo O. and 
Jiménez 2003). Debt control, the aggregate deficit problem and macroeconomic policy 
have led Argentina to become more centralized.  
Argentina has a very complex and arbitrary federal co-participation law.12 
National transfers are only a portion of the revenues collected from certain federal taxes, 
which include personal and corporate income taxes and the VAT (Brown, Díaz Frers, and 
Koola 2006). In tax revenue sharing there are several other mechanisms by which the 
federal government transfers revenues to the provinces, despite the constitutionally 
granted power of local governments to institute their own direct taxes. For example: 
The co-participation system has been severely criticized for 1) a high degree of 
vertical disequilibria; 2) extreme complexity and lack of transparency; 3) arbitrary 
distributions; 4) absence of debt limits; 5) federal bail-outs through ad-hoc 
agreements; 6) repeated breaking of commitments by the federal government and the 
provinces; and 7) the absence of a federal fiscal or judicial institutions to solve these 
conflicts (Brown, Díaz Frers, and Koola 2006).  
 
Overall, the co-participation system has produced funding difficulties among the different 
levels of government as well as abundant opportunities for corruption via the discretion 
used to distribute resources among the provinces. 
                                                        
12 Public financial officials have what is called the Tax Labyrinth map. The graphic is filled with lines, 
boxes and arrows. It shows where taxes are divided into percentages, which changes depending on whether 
it is diverted to the national or provincial governments. Provincial governments often copy the map and 
apply it to their city governments and metropolitan areas. 
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 In summary, the financial disasters of 1989 and 2001 hit Argentina hard. Both 
times the result was the ousting of democratically elected presidents for new ones and 
reorganizing the inter-governmental relations of the country. One IDB report suggested 
following:  
Economic shocks, such as the 1989-91 hyperinflation and the 1998-2002 recession, 
and stabilization policy shocks, such as the Convertibility Law and the 2002 
devaluation and pesoification of contracts, have triggered the initiation of reform 
processes in all fiscal areas and encouraged the introduction of reforms aimed at the 
consolidation, hierarchization, and centralization of resources and their management 
at the national level. But the passage of these reforms has not prevented the 
continuous extraction of compensation from the federal government by the provinces 
(Bonvecchi 2010: 122).  
 
The inter-governmental division of work post-2002 re-centralized Argentina through 
three may policy shifts: 1) through the rescue packages sent for provincial debts; 2) 
through the introduction of national co-participation taxes; and 3) by decreasing 
subnational sovereignty (Cetrangolo and Jimenez 2003). The end result of these changes 
has created political conflict and general institutional weakness throughout Argentina’s 
federation. Thus this has created serious stains on meeting public policy goals at all levels 
of government. Much of this has revolved around the concept of debt management and 
macroeconomic indicators (Eaton 2004). These policies have not been consistent. For 
instance, “between 1988 and 2008, tax legislation was changed 83 times, fiscal federal 
rules 14 times, and budgetary institutions 16 times” (Bonvecchi 2010: 122).  
Cetrangolo and Jimenez (2003) suggest that there are four observable consequences 
from Argentina’s Fiscal Pacts in regards to their inter-governmental relations. First, there 
is an incentive problem for local municipal governments to collect more taxes. Second, 
there are tax liabilities for those provinces that collect more taxes (such as Santa Fe, 
Buenos Aries, Cordoba, and Mendoza). Third, there is lack of capacity to find new 
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revenue sources and nearly no accountability of spending at all levels of government. 
Finally, there are also distributional conflicts for selecting which province receives 
finances for public projects, which also is exacerbated by the weak political institutions. 
For example, policymakers have wide-ranging political discretion on funding sectoral 
policies such as health and education as well as to create emergency arrangements, which 
may impact on quality of inter-governmental relations. 
 To summarize, Argentina was a loosely decentralized federation of caudillos for 
most of the 19th and 20th century; only when Peron came into power for the first time in 
the 1940s did the federation become more centralized. He was responsible for creating a 
strong role for the central government, which provided public services to workers and 
peasants and allowed other disenfranchised people into the political system. Traditionally 
land-owning elite were the main representatives from the provinces to the national 
government, therefore with a strong role of the central government has created tension 
between these two groups. Argentina’s recent history has been a downward spiral of 
military dictatorships, presidential coups, and economic crises. From 2002-2010, when 
Argentina’s democracy stabilized under the Kirchners, the central government has 
continued to have similar power struggles between the provinces and the presidency. The 
president’s office has favored a stronger role for the executive branch of government. 
This may be seen, for example, by Kirchner’s advocating for more federalism, but have 
also introduced several new national level taxes, such as the retenciones tax, which gives 
the national government more fiscal authority. Overall, Argentina has generally become 
more centralized, but this is very difficult to decipher since there has been so many other 
political and economic events to overcome.  
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4.3 Mexico 
 In contrast to Argentina, federalism in Mexico began as a short-term solution to 
the conflict that led to the declaration of independence in 1821. According to historical 
accounts by Merino (2010), “this was not the result of a pact between autonomous 
entities, nor the product of evolution, characteristic of regions with a strong tradition of 
self-government, but [the unification of the states] was rather an appropriate institutional 
offer to maintain cohesive political elites who had ruled the states during the late colonial 
period of the country” (emphasis in the original). For him, Mexico’s federalist system 
itself was born out of conflict between the Federalist-Liberals and the Centralists-
Conservatives.  
The consolidation of the modern Mexican State finally arose with the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1920). For most of the 20th century, the national government was built 
upon the PRI’s political machine and followed the ideology of the revolution. The 
revolution triumphed when the country could replace the apparatus of domination of 
Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) by a unique set of political and administrative institutions. The 
dominance of the center was imposed on any regional political aspirations. The creation 
of the political party Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR), the original name of the 
current Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), in 1929 had the intent to build an all-
encompassing organization which allowed any individual, region or group to be 
incorporated into the policy decision-making process. The PNR was later transformed 
into the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) in 1938. In 1946, the PRI (its 
acronym today) was created as the principal organization that served to centralize power 
in Mexico. Given the fact that most of the political conflict during the Díaz era and the 
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years after the revolution exploded (1910), the political machine’s principal objective was 
to build a mechanism to reduce conflict between local leaders and the President, who was 
considered the main caudillo with total power and authority. Prior to the foundation of 
the PNR, President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928 and de facto leader until 1935) 
described the pattern of Mexican politics at the time as a way “to lead Mexico towards 
true institutional life, it must first pass through a historical period of a ‘one man Nation’ 
to become a nation of law and institutions” (El Colegio de México 2009: 33). Yet it was 
not until the Presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934 to 1940) that the final consolidation of 
the party occurred.  
For most of the 20th century, federalism was a constitutional formality with no 
practical implementation. What followed was the systematic concentration of 
constitutional powers in the Federal Executive, accompanied by the concentration of 
resources and decisions, under the political party apparatus of the PRI. State governments 
controlled local and municipal councils (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). As a result of the national 
dominance of the PRI in all legislative Congresses, its policies and presidential initiatives 
became automatically legitimate, while Federal District’s (Districto Federal—DF) 
government was also subordinated to the presidency of the republic. Under full control of 
the government at all levels, the political machine of the PRI led the country for more 
than 70 years (1929-2000). 
History of Fiscal Centralization 
In the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution (1910-20), the state, political power and 
the tax regimes were fragmented. The 1917 Constitution established that taxes could not 
be levied by states. The states collected taxes on rural property, trade, industry, 
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agriculture, and livestock, and they were reluctant to give up any resources. That 
reluctance to cede any tax authority to the federal government made it a challenge to 
unify a national fiscal system (Figueras-Zanabria 2006). 
In 1925, the finance secretary convened the first National Tax Convention (NTC) 
with the objective to unify the tax system and to create a permanent body to solve 
problems affecting the national economy. At this event, the SNG purposed to eliminate 
local taxes that duplicated federal ones (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). In the new system, the 
states would collect their revenue shares directly and if disagreements occurred they 
would not be dealt with on the Congressional floor, but rather a technical body would 
review complaints. In Congress the proposal was discussed and rejected by the fiscal 
committee. According to Figueras-Zanabria (2006), the first call for the NTC was 
successful in two ways: first, it introduced the idea that fiscal debates were intended to be 
technical rather than political, and second, it introduced the idea of eliminating Congress 
from influencing fiscal debates, thus depoliticizing them. This allowed the federal 
government room to negotiate with the states without the Federal Deputies discussing 
fiscal deals, which ultimately enhanced the executive authority over the process. It was 
not until the PRI lost control of the Congress in the late 1990s that Congress recovered 
the authority to make financial decisions (Figueras-Zanabria 2006). 
Between 1929 and 1931 the national government began to arrange fiscal 
agreements between each individual state government. The federal government managed 
to establish fiscal agreements implementing coordination assignments on specific taxes 
with some states. The second NTC took place in 1933 but there was more political 
division than at the first meeting (Figueras-Zanabria 2006). The focus of debate was 
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divided on the topic of exports, economic support and land reforms. The discussion 
remained around the 1929 fiscal crisis and the requirement of the federal government to 
provide economic support to the states. Because property taxes were a main revenue 
source for states, land redistribution into communal property (ejidos), which was tax 
exempt, created divisions. Those federal deputies closer to the President were in favor of 
these land reforms, while other states were not. With the implementation of the law, some 
states revenue base was severely damaged. 
It was not until the second and the third conventions, in 1933 and 1948 respectfully, 
that the federal government gradually took over the main revenue sources of the country 
(Figueras-Zanabria 2006). By dividing different taxes by the levels of government, a 
better mix of fiscal federalism was determined. In 1942, the constitutional reform granted 
the federal government exclusive tax authority over foreign trade, natural, and energy 
revenues, financial institutions and public services. The federal authorities were also 
given a “special right to tax” the production and consumption of tobacco, petrol, and oil 
derivatives, matches, “aguamiel,” a liquor made from cactus, and forestry exploration 
(Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Figueras-Zanabria 2006). President Cardenas claimed authority of 
these revenues, forcing states to share federal taxes, when he came into power and 
consolidated the national political party PNR (Partido National Revolucionaria, a 
precursor of the PRI). With the PNR’s control of the state and national legislatures, they 
also controlled the regional area’s political affiliation. Arguably, through the hierarchical 
party leadership structure, political careers were created. Party obedience, not interest 
groups participation or meeting constituency demands, was rewarded. As one result, 
politically subordinated states gave away their fiscal authority in exchange for 
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unconditional transfers (Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Figueras-Zanabria 2006). Finally, at the 
1948 NTC convention, the authority to tax was reflected in the new federal proposals, 
proposals that appeared in Congress without opposition. 
The unified fiscal coordination was finally established in the 1940s with the 
installation of the federal sales tax, and later also included the income tax. Eventually, 
additional taxes were added into the fiscal coordination laws negotiated between the 
national and state governments. For example, the national sales tax (impuesto sobre 
ingresos mercantiles-ISIM) was introduced. Initially set at a rate of three percent 
nationally, if states agreed to the compact they could keep 1.2 percent of the total; 
however, they also had to agree to eliminate their internal trade and industrial tax. In 
1953, the first Law of Fiscal Co-ordination was issued, establishing a single federal 
income tax (impuesto sobre la renta-ISR). With this reform, seven more states finally 
joined the fiscal system in 1973 (Figueras-Zanabria 2006). As states joined the federal 
system, they relied more heavily on fiscal transfers rather than their own resources to 
manage their state budgets. “Between 1950 and 1975, the percentage of tax revenue by 
states dropped from 20 to less than ten percent” of their total budgets (Figueras-Zanabria 
2006:61). 
By the late 1970s, Mexican President Lopez Portillo was known for saying, “In the 
world economy, countries are divided in two: those that have oil and those that don't have 
it. And we have it!” (emphasis in the original). Since the 1970s, Mexico has behaved as a 
Rentier State.13 Farfán-Mares (2010) argued that because of the high oil revenues, 
between 1976 and 2010, the Mexican state could severely reduce taxes, even while 
                                                        
13 Rentier States are defined in the literature as countries, which are intensively dependent on oil exports to 
finance the government (Beblawi and Luciani 1987b). Often Rentier States are associated with negative 
outcomes, and the literature often addresses this as a curse.  
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providing many social benefits to citizens. For much of this time, Mexican State finances 
have depended on oil revenues.14 During periods of high oil prices, the states yielded 
even more power to the national government. For example, in 1979 Congress passed the 
new Law of Fiscal Co-ordination (LCF), which effectively did two things. First, the law 
created the national System of Fiscal Coordination (SCF) and, second, it replaced the 
national sales tax (ISIM) with the VAT. Arguably, because of the oil bonanza, the 
national government could manipulate the state governments by increasing federal 
revenue authority while providing additional transfers to state and local governments. 
According to Article 27 of the Constitution all subsoil resources are managed by the 
federal government, thereby states and municipalities have no tax authority over them. 
The oil boom helped to strengthen the national government, by centralizing revenues and 
decentralizing expenditures for public services such as education, health, and public 
security. 
Although political democratization and the change in the Presidency were in place, 
the oil resources provided by the federal government greatly increased its authority. 
States and municipalities received increasing amounts of resources building negative 
incentives toward local and state taxation. Only the state governments with more tax 
collection and competent administrations “resisted” oil abundant transfers (Farfán-Mares 
2010). The support for the one-party regime under the PRI was fueled by oil, and thus not 
until the democratic transformation in 2000 was there a new fiscal transformation of the 
state.  
                                                        
14 Farfan-Mares claims that in 1921 Mexico was the ranked second among the world’s producers (just after 
the United States) but from 1924 onwards Mexico declined as a major producer (falling to the fourth 
place). It was not until 1981 that exports multiplied 23 times from its rates in 1974. Production continued to 
increase from 653,000 bpd (1974) to 2,748,000 bpd (1982), peaking to 3.5 million barrels per day between 
2003 and 2004 (Petróleos Mexicanos 2008). 
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Return to Democracy  
It is argued that the decentralization of the Mexican state caused the democratic 
transition of 1983-2010 (Selee 2006). The one party lead by the PRI began to change in 
1983 when subnational governments selected opposition parties (notably Guanajuato was 
one of the first PAN governments to win state level elections in 1991). It was not until 
1988 that political pluralism began, and electoral reforms soon followed. From 1994 to 
1997 the political system changed substantially, which included reforms to the country’s 
electoral system and the political party composition of local governments, the state 
Congresses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal District government (Mexico City). 
In 2000, the national government changed from PRI party leadership to PAN as Vicente 
Fox became the president of Mexico (Selee 2006).  
The most notable fiscal reforms were made to article 115 of the national 
Constitution in 1983.15 The reform assigned municipal government with responsibility of 
portable water, drainage, and sewerage systems, public lighting, tax collection, public 
markets, cemeteries, slaughterhouses, streets, public parks and public safety. This reform 
coupled with President Salinas’ (1988-1994) new federal poverty alleviation program 
called the Programa National de Solidaridad (PRONASOL), which provided public 
funds for basic infrastructure at the municipal level. These were the first to be 
decentralized and transferred to the local level. Salinas also decentralized education 
expenditures to the states in 1993. The states were responsible to manage these policies. 
                                                        
15 The fiscal federalism system in Mexico is the result of the creation of National System of Fiscal 
Coordination (SNCF) in 1980. Although in principle, the Mexican Constitution establishes a formal 
distribution of fiscal sources for each tier of government, in practice, the SNCF guides the distribution of 
resources between tiers of government. (Raich, Uri. 2002. "Impacts of Expediture Decentralization on 
Mexican Local Governments." Pp. 44. Mexico City: Budget and Public Expenditure Program at the Centre 
of Research and Teaching of Economics (CIDE). 
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Similar to Salina’s education decentralization effort, Zedillo also decentralized health 
expenditures to the state in 1998. In that year, Mexico’s Congress also approved a no 
bailout law for the subnational governments. 
Fiscal Decentralization Reforms  
The fiscal and governmental structure was not transformed overnight. It gradually 
changed during the 1980s. A federal tax system was created under President Miguel de la 
Madrid (1982-1988) in which states collected revenues and sent them to the National 
Treasury, whereby the National Treasury re-distributed the funds back to the states 
according to a formula.16 If a state did not send its full tax collections to the National 
Treasury, it was penalized by a reduction in Federal Revenue Shares (FRS). If a state 
refused to abolish some of their own taxes, such as sales, trade or otherwise they were 
expelled from the FRS system. This highly incentivized states to follow the FRS system. 
Under the FRS system, the Supreme Court decided any disputes or unauthorized states’ 
claims. The federal government created the National Institute for the Technical 
Strengthening of the Subnational Finances (INDETEC) as an independent agency to 
provide technical advice as the FRS governing body. Essentially, the Mexican states gave 
up their power to tax once they became part of the federal coordination system. Since the 
federal government managed their bases, rates, and administration, they were in control 
of virtually all of the nation’s public finances. Figueras-Zanabria (2006) identified those 
state taxes, which were abolished by the FRS since 1980. They are listed in table 4.4. 
 
 
                                                        
16 The Fiscal Coordination Law (LCF), Chapter III, art 15 has this equation. There are several people, both 
in academia and public policy officials who claim that the formula is not working to promote equity across 
the states. 
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Table 4.4 State Taxes Abolished Since 1980      
1) Entertainment and public shows 
2) Property transfers and other real estate operations 
3) Income from professionals and lucrative activities 
4) Capital yields 
5) Trade of motor vehicles between private parties 
6) Promotion, dilation, and trading of alcoholic beverages 
7) Premises for the selling of alcoholic beverages 
8) Real estate leasing 
9) Fees 
10) Petro and oil derivatives purchase 
11) Livestock exploitation, slaughtering, trading, and shearing 
Source: Based on information from INETEC (1998) 
 
Not until the PAN began to win subnational elections did a debate about the 
national distribution of fiscal responsibilities begin. New political dynamics began at the 
national level, once the opposition political party began to win local elections. This first 
happened when President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) allowed an opposition party 
member to win the gubernatorial election in the State of Baja California in 1989. 17 This 
was a surprising result, as the PRI often “resorted to all manner of both legal and illegal 
means to win election: fake voter registration lists, ballot box stuffing, disqualification of 
poll-watches, even intimidation by making sure that there was a prominent military 
presence at conflicting polling stations” (Figueras-Zanabria citing Cornelius 1987: 77). 
Salinas was notorious for ousting governors, sacking more than any other PRI president, 
as another way to control the state governments within the federation. 
                                                        
17 After many fraudulent elections, it was not until the victory of the PAN in Baja California that President 
Salinas accepted his first opposition candidate winning the election. But he did not accept the victories of 
the PAN in Guanajuato, whose winner was Vicente Fox, nor in the state of Michoacán where the PRD won. 
Some suggest that it was because Michoacán was the birthplace of Cardenas, an important left-leaning PRI 
politician at the time. It was again in 1991 in San Luis Potosi that an opposition candidate representing the 
PRD won, but the President imposed Fausto Zapata in his place. Salvador Nava, the victim of the electoral 
fraud by the PRI went on a hunger strike in the Zocoalo, center of Mexico City, until he was deemed the 
winner. That same year, President Salinas with support by both the PRI and the PAN passed a law that 
allowed the state to burn the ballot boxes from the 1988 Presidential election, which was also deemed 
fraudulent. 
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After the win in Baja California, the PAN had further victories in Aguascalientes, 
the Federal District, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Morelos. After fierce protest of 
fraud in 1991, interim governors replaced “elected” PRI governors in Guanajuato and 
San Luis Potosi (Figueras-Zanabria 2006). The federal government did not acknowledge 
the left-leaning PRD (Partido Revolucionario Democratico) wins as readily as the right-
leaning PAN victories. The parties knew they needed to become allies in order to beat the 
PRI in future presidential elections and create a coalition in Congress to change economic 
policies. 
The Salinas administration was faced with two significant challenges. First, it faced 
large oppositions within the country, and second, it wanted to be viewed as democratic, 
open, and honest, especially by the international community. This was occurring at a time 
when structural adjustment programs and neo-liberalism policies were dominant in 
Washington, D.C. and seen as the best alternative to improve developing economies. 
Salinas understood that fiscal decentralization would empower local political actors but 
also encouraged political fragmentation (Figueras-Zanabira 2006).  
As a result, Salinas created a new federal program for poverty alleviation called 
PRONASOL, which included funds for municipal development for basic infrastructure 
projects such as water, sewerage systems, and electrification (Moreno 2004). Although 
PRONASOL allocated funds for communities to co-work and manage those resources, 
federal discretion, electoral-biased criteria, and central oversight over those resources 
were strong. Salinas also decentralized the education expenditures to the states in 1993.  
“The Municipal Funds constituted around 14 percent of the total Solidarity [also 
part of PRONASOL] budget” (Selee 2006:88). Although at first view this was a major 
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increase in municipal revenue, it was clearly a de-concentration of wealth for 
municipalities to provide functions already listed in the 1983 Constitutional Reforms. The 
PRONASOL funds represented an increase in the state’s dependency on federal transfers 
to perform their basic functions (Rodriguez 1997; Selee 2006; Ward and Rodriguez 
1995). Figure 4.3 presents the differences between local finances and national transfers. 
The dark black line represents own-source revenue collected by Mexico’s subnational 
governments and the light gray line represents the transfers from the Federation to the 
states.  
Figure 4.3 Difference between Mexico’s Municipal Revenue and Federal Transfers 
Source: Merino-Huerta (INEGI data 2008) measured in thousands of pesos. 
 Additionally in 1990, Salinas made three major policy reforms related to 
Mexico’s fiscal policies. First, his administration changed the formula for how the funds 
were to be distributed to state governments. The reformed formula would be determined 
by the following criteria: population, level of economic development and tax collection 
efforts. A compensatory fund would be allocated inversely to the population with the 
highest amount of poverty and lowest amount of local own-source tax collection. Second, 
Salinas’s administration consolidated the complete tax collection process by introducing 
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additional VAT. The tax resolved the problem that the local administrations (at the state 
and municipal level) were generating too few revenues overall, which jeopardized the 
total tax revenues collected (Figueras-Zanabira 2006). Finally, and most notably, Salinas’ 
major accomplishment was the signing of the NAFTA agreement, which boosted 
domestic support of his economic reforms.18 This covered up the internal disputes to 
international audiences. 
The government of President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) was rather unsuccessful 
at home and abroad with its policy reforms (Figueras-Zanabria 2006). With the uprising 
of the Chiapas guerrilla movement led by Commandant Marcos in 1994, the world 
observed Mexican politics even more closely. Zedillo’s principal goal was to maintain 
political control through his federal program called “New Federalism.” According to 
many scholars, Zedillo’s federal reforms ended the centralized power structure that the 
political system maintained and controlled (Rodriguez 1997; Selee 2006; Ward and 
Rodriguez 1995). This single reform transformed the federal government and its 
subordinating relationships to the states and municipalities.  
Fiscal policies under Zedillo’s “New Federalism” plan included modification of 
already existing federal funds (expenditures) while changing the Law of Fiscal Co-
ordination or how some taxes were collected (revenues). First, his administration took 
Salinas’ PRONASOL social funds and converted them into a single line item in the 
federal budget for social development (Ramo 26).19 This new budget item was designed 
                                                        
18 NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in 1994 by the United States, 
Canada and Mexico. 
 
19 A Ramo in Spanish means budget item. Each major support fund in the Mexican budget has a specific 
number and is known for that number. 
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on the basis of poverty indicators and only contributed resources to the neediest states.20 
In 1996, this fund was modified once again, and the Fund for Individual Priorities of 
States disappeared. The Federal Fund for the State and Municipalities (Ramo 33) was 
created in its place in 1997. These funds were created to be compensatory for poorer 
states to promote economic development. Local governments also receive Ramo 28 (also 
called Participaciones), which are standard mandatory unconditional transfers to the 
states in the federation. Table 4.5 provides a description of the federal transfers and how 
the Federal government distributes them to the states. 
Table 4.5 A Description of federal transfers to states and municipalities 
Concept  
 
 Shares Federal  
(Ramo 28) 
 
 Shares Federal  
(Ramo 33) 
 Federal Revenue 
Surplus 
 Resource 
Reallocation 
Agreements 
 
Distribution   Resources 
distributed 
according to the 
provisions of 
the Budget Act 
and Fiscal 
Responsibility 
 Funds 
distributed by 
formula and 
criteria 
established in 
the Fiscal 
Coordination 
Law 
 Resources 
distributed 
according to the 
provisions of the 
Budget Act and 
Fiscal 
Responsibility 
 Resources 
allocated in 
accordance with 
the provisions of 
the conventions 
themselves 
 
Designation  The funds are 
not labeled 
expenditure 
 The resources 
have cost labels 
established in 
the Fiscal 
Coordination 
Law 
 The resources 
have partial 
spending in the 
Budget Law and 
Fiscal 
Responsibility 
 The resources 
have cost labels 
established in the 
conventions 
themselves 
 
Destination 
 
 Resources in 
different 
proportions for 
states and cities 
 6 state funds 
and 2 municipal 
funds 
 Resource for 
states 
 
 State and local 
resources 
Source: (SEGOB 2008) 
 
                                                        
20 In spite of PRONASOL ending by President Zedillo in 1995, the basic policy continued through the 
Oportunidades Program and PROGRESA, which were described in chapter III. 
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Aportaciones (Ramo 33) are the conditional transfers, consisting of seven 
different funds that can be spent only based on the Fiscal Coordination Law.21 Cañas 
García (2011) contends that these funds were designed to be compensatory for the poorer 
states in order for them to invest in their own development. They were established as a 
response to the problems of poverty and inequality as a strategy of spending intended to 
compensate poorer states.22 On average, these transfer funds are nearly half of each 
state’s budget. It is part of the government’s strategy to affect different dimensions of 
poverty and inequality, so the fund contributions are divided into conditional funds for 
education, health, safety, social infrastructure, among other social expenditures (Cañas 
García 2011). 
  
President Ernesto Zedillo not only changed expenditure decisions between the 
federal and state governments, he also changed revenue collections through revisions in 
the tax code for the VAT, income tax and car and licensing taxes. For example, in 1997 
                                                        
21 The seven funds include: Fund for Basic and Normal Education (FAEB); Fund for Health Services 
(FASSA); Fund for Social Infrastructure (FAIS); Fund for Strengthening Municipalities and Territorial 
Boundaries and the Federal District (FORTAMUN-DF); Multiple contributions Fund (FAM); Fund to the 
Technology and Adult Education (AFTE); Fund for Public Security of the States and the Distrito Federal 
(FASP) and the Fund to the Strengthening of Federal Entities (FAFEF). 
 
22 Cañas García (2011) research focuses on how these funds have increased the wellbeing of the citizens in 
these states 
Table 4.6 Revenues Sources of State Budgets 
 1997 1998 1999 
Own Revenue  (taxes and fees) 12.7 13.5 12.1 
Revenue sharing by origin 4 4.3 4.4 
Common pool revenue sharing (FRS) (Ramo 28) 33.4 34.1 34.7 
Unconditional Federal Contributions 0.0 2.4 3.6 
Conditional Federal Contributions (Ramo 33) 3.2 35.1 38.2 
Matching funds 36.6 1.9 1.9 
Negotiated and extraordinary transfers 10 8.8 5.1 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Based on Couchene and Dias (2000) p. 223 from Figueras-Zanabria 2006 p. 66. 
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he re-established the federal law for the tax on new automobiles. Zedillo argued that the 
potential for inter-state competition would lead to serious fiscal gaps and suggested that 
the federal government assign the rate, while the states managed the collection.23 The 
new car tax (Impuesto Sobre Auto Nuevo or ISAN) and the car licensing (tenencia) did 
not become a state tax, but rather would be administered by the state and managed by the 
federal government. According to one public official, the general fear of revenue loss has 
prolonged the debate over the decentralization and management of collection of these 
funds.  
According to one of the municipal association, “in 2000, the Ramo 28 represented 
38 percent of the state income but for municipalities that proportion went as high as 44 
percent” (FENAMM 2003). Arguably, the reforms have raised state government’s tax 
revenues, but the difference of the transfers to local own-source collection is still large. 
Mexican municipalities can levy some taxes, fees, products, and fines (impuestos, 
derechos, productos y aprovechamientos). Because of the amendments made to Article 
115 in 1983, municipalities can also levy property taxes.  
Table 4.6 indicates the percentage of revenues on average that municipalities 
receive to manage their local budgets. Zedillo’s efforts at decentralization were marked 
with the increase of transfers to lower levels of government or “expenditure 
decentralization,” while maintaining major control over the revenue collection. Yet 
                                                        
23 This debate continues within Mexico and is an issue that is addressed by international investors. The 
federal government sets the rate for the new car and licensing taxes and State governments manage their 
collections. In the mid 2000s a new reform was proposed to use these taxes as collateral for state’s public 
debt.  
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Zedillo faced major opposition in Congress to approve his 1997 budget.24 A coalition 
between the right PAN and the left PRD formed in Congress, ultimately increasing 
additional gubernatorial seats, which allowed the opposition parties elect Vicente Fox, of 
the PAN, as president in 2000. 
Problems within the Inter-governmental System 
Even as Mexico has become more democratized, many have acknowledged that 
there are several problems in the inter-governmental system (Cabrera Castellanos and 
Cruz Mora 2009; Cabrero and Carrera 2002; Cañas García 2011; Figueras-Zanabria 
2006; Flamand 2004; Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2008; Rodriguez 1997; Santín 
2004; Selee 2006). For example, research has suggested that the transfer funds created 
since 1998 have reduced the incentives of local governments to collect taxes, particularly 
property taxes, as the most important tax revenue source for municipal governments 
(Moreno 2004; Raich 2002; Sour 2004; Sour, Ortega, and San Sebastián 2003). Arguably 
given the choice, a local policymaker prefers to rely on federal transfers to finance public 
goods, instead of increasing local taxes, especially if it entails a political cost.  
Table 4.7 Problems with Mexican Municipal Legal Structure 
Entity  Problem Feature 
Municipal Council Underrepresented municipal council policies 
 Uniqueness of the 
municipalities 
There is no Federal recognition of differences 
between Mexican municipalities 
 Short government 
terms in office 
Three years is not enough to develop a consistent 
plan 
 Re-election There is no re-election of mayors 
 Participation There are no formal mechanisms for citizen 
                                                        
24 Mexico’s budget cycle begins in early May, when the ministries communicate the Ministry of Finance 
their programming budgets. They craft their budgets based on guidelines provided by Undersecretary for 
Expenditures, Ministry of Finance (MOF) which is released during the second half of June. Expenditure 
ceilings are provided to all administrative units during July. MOF condenses the ministries budgets into a 
single document, which must be sent to Congress by September 8th. The Chamber of Deputies is the only 
house that can revise the Federal Executive’s Budget Proposal, since the Senate as excluded from that 
process in 1886. The Federal Deputies have until November 15th to approve the budget. 
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participation 
States “Usos y Costumbres” 
or local cultural laws 
Some states do not recognize the uses and customs 
in predominantly indigenous municipalities 
Source: Alvarado and Ramírez, 2002 and Guillén 2003. 
 Researchers have analyzed the legal structure of municipalities to determine why 
they are not collecting more local own-source tax revenue. Table 4.7 outlines some of the 
difficulties sub-national governments face in collecting more taxes. For example, several 
scholars have studied the “flypaper effect,” increased use of federal transfers, displaces 
local revenue generation (Cabrero and Carrera 2002; Raich 2002; Sour 2004; Sour 2008; 
Sour, Ortega, and San Sebastián 2003). The majority of them have found a correlation 
between increases in transfers with the displacement of local tax collection. The federal 
government in Mexico still dominates the majority of decisions regarding the budget, 
policies, and standards. There is little doubt that Mexican federalism decentralized more 
revenues with the last 27 years of reforms; state governments now have more sovereignty 
and freedom than before (Merino Huerta 2008).  
State governments now have greater political influence especially because the 
hegemonic party system is gone. Increasingly, States have used their formal powers 
granted to them by the Constitution to appeal laws. Municipalities have also benefited 
from an explicit policy of strengthening its powers and resources, which not only led to 
reform Article 115 on two occasions (in 1983 and 1999), but has been openly supported 
by the reforms to the national system of fiscal coordination and a long list of legislative 
changes. Municipal governments have begun to be a principal institutional player in the 
operation of public policy at the federal level. Municipal governments now manage more 
policies such as: urban development planning, granting of building permits from these 
plans, the provision of public services and the foray into the municipal public security 
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detention that have represented a loss of authority for state governors and on many 
occasions, new sources of conflict with local councils. 
Table 4.8 Constitutional Law Suits by Municipalities to the Federal 
Government (1993-2007) 
State Number of Suits State Number of Suits 
Nayarit 1 Hidalgo 9 
Campeche 1 Morelos 9 
Quintana Roo 1 Guerrero 9 
Coahuila 1 San Luis 10 
Baja California 3 Jalisco 14 
Querétaro 3 Puebla 16 
Yucatán  3 Chiapas 16 
Durango 4 Chihuahua 17 
Colima 4 Tamaulipas 20 
Tabasco 5 Veracruz 25 
Aguascalientes 5 Nuevo León 28 
Tlaxcala 8 Estado de México 31 
Zacatecas 8 Sonora 38 
Michoacán 8 Oaxaca 84 
Total 737  
Source: (Merino Huerta 2008)  
 
Table 4.8 shows that there have been over 700 court cases since 1993 from 
municipalities to the federal government over issues of territorial, taxes or other rights 
issues (Flamand 2004; Flamand 2005; Merino Huerta 1991; Merino Huerta 2008). 
According to Merino (2010), Mexican federalism has failed to transcend three problems 
since its inception: the tax collection process; the competition regime between states; and 
the dominance of the political apparatus (particularly the PRI) at all levels. Hence, 
following the renewal of democracy, federalism has also arisen with new conflicts, 
particularly between the federal executive and state governments and between them and 
municipal governments. Merino (2010) suggests that there is a zero-sum game to 
strengthen Mexico’s federal and municipal level governance. Each attempted to 
strengthen federalism; it has weakened the scope of municipal government. Each time the 
national government offers new ways to govern municipalities; it further weakens the 
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autonomy and authority of states. Yet the national government continues to delegate most 
of its public policies to be managed by local government.  
4.4 Summary Discussion 
This chapter described how Mexico historically has been very centralized and the 
country increasingly has focused on fiscal decentralization. While Argentina traditionally 
has been more decentralized than Mexico, the country is now gradually becoming more 
fiscally centralized. In regards to Argentina, this assumption relating to the levels of 
decentralization and recentralization is relatively correct. Because Argentina’s 
macroeconomic instability has caused the central government to take a tighter control of 
its public finances. The national government, particularly with the current administration, 
has promoted more centralized tax revenue to be collected and managed by the federal 
government. The numerous reforms have proved difficult to determine the exact levels of 
fiscal decentralization or centralization that exists within the country. 
Mexico is increasingly committing more fiscal transfers to subnational 
governments for expenditures, but this has not been accompanied with the appropriate 
regulatory framework to encourage municipalities to collect their own-source revenues. 
Rather the expenditure decentralization has maintained the central management of the 
national budget by the Congress and the President. While state governments have more 
federal resources to spend, Mexican municipal governments do not. This is creating an 
increase in legal battles at the national level. Inter-governmental conflict has increased as 
a result of both Argentina and Mexico efforts to either centralize or decentralize. The 
next chapter evaluates the local autonomy of the case studies selected and describes the 
debt capacities of local governments for both Argentina and Mexico. 
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CHAPTER V 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 
 ARGENTINA AND MEXICO 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares the legal structures in Argentina and Mexico in order to 
better understand their level of commitment to fiscal decentralization policies and each 
country’s effort at creating more fiscally autonomous local governments. Argentina and 
Mexico are two of the four federalist countries in Latin America.25 While the 
decentralization phenomenon has been widespread within the region, not all countries 
have taken the same process to devolve authority and responsibilities to subnational 
governments and therefore the process has affected each quite differently.  
The chapter tests the hypothesis that the institutional arrangements and legal 
framework of governments in Argentina and Mexico shape and limit the extent of 
decentralized policies within each country. The chapter evaluates size, capacity and legal 
framework of local budgets and how these decentralization reforms have affected the 
local budgeting. Overall it is found that Argentina’s cities officials have more authority to 
tax, set rates and bases, and make budget decisions than do officials in Mexico. Mexico’s 
local governments are extremely limited and subject to the state’s authority for many of 
their budget decisions.  
The last section of this chapter describes the debt capacity for subnational 
governments in Argentina and Mexico. The chapter tests the argument in the economic 
literature related to subnational government’s debt capacity and need to enforce soft or 
                                                        
25 Brazil, because it is a Portuguese speaking country, and Venezuela, because of recent political turmoil, 
are the other two federalist nations that were not selected for this study.  
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hard budget constraints, which may create macro-economic instability for their countries. 
This research shows that Argentine local governments again have more legal authority to 
take out loans—but they have recently been subject to new restrictions and must have 
federal treasury approval of these types of loans. Mexico on the other hand has always 
had a very centralized decision process as regards to obtaining private sector loans 
regulated by the federal treasury. Even recently as legislation has further tightened, 
municipalities are increasing their debt loads in Mexico. Wealthier subnational 
governments often take out more debt, but also have better balance sheets to cover these 
larger loans. 
Chapter V is broken down into the following sections. First, it provides an 
overview of the federal structure in both Argentina and Mexico. It describes the tax 
authority and revenue trends (measured as tax revenues/GDP) at various levels of each of 
the selected governments. Finally, the chapter concludes by demonstrating the debt 
capacity of the local governments in this study, thereby showing more accurately the state 
of fiscal federalism in each country.  
5.2 Structural Comparison 
 The creation and unification of the Argentine and the Mexican state were assisted 
by the use of a federalist system. The term “federalism” is defined as a system of 
government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between a central governing 
authority and constituent political units (such as states, in the case of Mexico, or 
provinces in Argentina). Federalism is a system in which the power to govern is shared 
between national and provincial/state governments, creating what is often called a 
federation (Watts 2008).  
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 Table 5.1 provides a review of the institutional frameworks for the four federal 
countries within Latin America. It gives dates for democratic transitions, year of the 
Constitution as well as the number and structure of the political units and their ballot 
structure and timing. Arguably, the administrative division of municipalities is not within 
the federalist debate. These are often associated with theories of direct democracy and 
self-government.  
Table 5. 1 Federalist Constitutional Structure and Political Decentralization  
Country Demo- 
cracic 
Transi- 
tion 
Most 
Recent 
Constitu-
tion 
SNG Political 
Unites  
Selection of SNG 
Executive 
Ballot Structure and 
Timing of National and 
SNG Elections 
   State Local State Local State Local 
Argentina 1993 1853 
1994 
23 
Province 
1 fed 
district 
1638 
muni 
Elected 
(1983) 
Elected 
(1983) 
Separate 
Ballot 
Concurrent 
Elections 
Separate 
Ballot 
Concurrent 
Elections 
Brazil 1985 1988 27 
States/ 
 1 fed 
district 
4974 
muni 
Elected 
(1982) 
Elected 
(1985) 
Separate 
Ballot 
noncurrent 
Elections 
Separate 
Ballot 
noncurrent 
Elections 
Mexico 1994 1857  
1917 
31 
States/ 
1 fed 
district 
2412 
muni 
Elected 
(1994) 
Elected 
Indirectly 
(1994) 
Separate 
Ballot 
noncurrent 
Elections 
Separate 
Ballot 
noncurrent 
Elections 
Venezuela 1958 1999 23 
States/ 
1 fed 
district 
335 
muni 
/1,084 
parish 
Elected 
(1989) 
Elected 
(1989) 
Separate 
Ballot 
(1989) 
Non 
concurrent 
Elections 
Separate 
Ballot 
(1989) 
Non 
concurrent 
Elections 
Source: (Benton 2001) collected from (Nickson 1995; Perry, Javed Burki, and Dillinger 1999) and 
updated with (United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG ) 2010).  
 
 Overall, the Argentine Federation has a population of 40.4 million and a GDP per 
capita of U.S. dollars $6,050.26 The federation consists of 23 provinces and one federal 
district and was established as a unification of provincial caudillos, made up of land-
owning elite. Argentina has a Presidential system, whereby the President is elected by 
                                                        
26 Notes taken from the CIDE Summer School 2010 lectures on “Federalism and local government 
decentralization in Argentina and Mexico,” taught by Martin Lardone from the Catholic University of 
Cordoba, Argentina and Mauricio Merino from CIDE, Mexico City, Mexico. 
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direct vote every four years and can be re-elected only once. The National Congress 
consists of a Chamber of National Deputies with 257 members and a Senate with 72 
members, composed of three senators elected from each province and one from the 
federal district. The bicameral system has been characterized by malapportionment with 
an overrepresentation of less populated provinces (Eaton and Dickovick 2004). Often the 
electoral imbalance creates a challenge for inter-governmental relations because it slants 
policies toward these provinces and influences the amount of transfers they receive.  
The national Constitution makes a distinction of functions by the different levels 
of government that describe which authorities manage the other levels. The first Article 
of the Constitution established the federal republican representative form of government 
in Argentina. Experts have identified that the federal government in Argentina has 
exclusive responsibility for the following functional items: external relations, issuing 
currency, regulating commerce and defense. The national and subnational authorities 
share responsibility for the following functional activities: administration of justice, 
police, social security, education and health. Table 5.2 presents sections from the 
Argentine Constitution, which relate to local governments.  
Table 5.2 Excerpts from Argentina’s National Constitution 
Article 121- The provinces retain all powers not delegated by this Constitution to the 
federal government, and expressly reserved to themselves by special pacts at the time of 
its incorporation.  
 
Section 122 - They determine their own local institutions and are governed by them. 
They elect their governors, legislators and other provincial officers, without intervention 
by the federal government.  
 
Article 123 - Each province enacts its own Constitution, as provided by Article 5, 
ensuring municipal autonomy and ruling its scope and content in the institutional, 
political, administrative, economic and financial.  
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 Mexico consists of 31 states and one federal district (located within Mexico City’s 
metropolitan area) with a current population of over 113 million people and a GDP per 
capita of U.S. dollars $9,715. Mexico has been heavily influenced by excessive 
centralization since its revolution from 1910-1920 (Watts 2008). This centralization was 
further encouraged and driven by the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) party, which was created in 1929 and held federal executive power until 2000.  
 Mexico’s first Constitution in 1824 defined municipalities as “free;” however, in 
practice, the nature and functions of local governments was left-up to the states. During 
the Mexican revolution there were several constitutional assemblies, which finally 
resulted in the 1917 Constitution, which is still enforced. Authority is divided between 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and it established a federal 
system, which gave significant rights to states in municipalities. Haber et al. (2008) noted 
that the “Constitution of 1917 contained provisions recognizing both individual political 
rights (including the freedoms of expression and association) and collective social rights 
(including rights to land, a minimum wage and free public education)” (Haber, et al. 
2008: 118). These authors suggest that the diversification of rights, both to the individual 
as well as to the collective, have conflicted with one another, which has also effectively 
put into question who in Mexico is responsible for property rights and local taxation.  
 Municipalities often enjoyed far-ranging powers, steady sources of income, and 
internally democratic procedures. According to Selee (2006), “Municipalities were 
generally responsible for providing education and basic services, administering the law in 
local disputes, and organizing elections. They also raised revenues through the alcabalas, 
a form of local tariff on goods passing through a jurisdiction, as well as other taxes and 
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fees that they levied” (Selee 2006: 73). The most important part of the Mexican 
Constitution for local governments is article 115, which limits state authority and in so 
doing serves to define municipal governments’ responsibilities, authorities, and limits of 
control. Excerpts related to municipal governments in the Mexican Constitution are in 
table 5.3.  
Table 5.3 Article 115 if the Mexican Constitution 
The States may not in any case: 
• Make any alliance, treaty or coalition with another State, or with foreign powers. 
• Coin money, issue paper money, stamps, or stamped paper.  
• Levy duty on persons or goods passing through their territory.  
• Prohibit or levy duty upon, directly or indirectly, the entrance into or exit from their 
territory of any domestic or foreign goods.  
• Tax the circulation of domestic or foreign goods by imposts or duties, the 
exemption of which is made by local customhouses, requiring inspection or 
registration of packages or documentation to accompany the goods.  
• Enact or maintain in force fiscal laws or provisions that relate to differences in 
duties or requirements by reason of the origin of domestic or foreign goods, 
whether this difference is established because of similar production in the locality 
or because, among such similar production there is a different place or origin.  
• Issue bonds of public debt payable in foreign currency or outside the national 
territory; contract loans directly or indirectly with the Governments of other 
nations, or contract obligations in favor of foreign companies or individuals, when 
the bonds or securities are payable to bearer or are transmissible by endorsement. 
•  States and municipalities may not negotiate loans except for the construction of 
work intended to directly produce an increase in their revenues. 
  
 It was during the Miguel de la Madrid presidency (1982-1988) that there were 
Constitutional amendments (including Articles 25, 26, and 115) which changed the inter-
governmental relationship between levels of government. Municipalities were given 
unprecedented fiscal and regulatory duties and power. According to Merino (2010), after 
these reforms took place, federalism in Mexico significantly changed in at least the 
following ten points: 
1. The municipalities were no longer administrative bodies controlled by local 
authorities. 
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2. The municipalities were no longer the preserve of a single party.  
3. The councils ceased to depend on resources approved by local legislatures. 
4. Local councils run left alone the standards issued by the local legislatures 
5. The municipalities were no longer belt transmission of claims and rural 
conflicts, small villages and scattered settlements. 
6. Local executives no longer belong to the same political party. 
7. Local executives, meanwhile, were no longer subordinate to the resources and 
decision of the Presidency of the Republic. 
8. Local executives failed to respond to instructions issued by the President of 
the Republic.  
9. A single party no longer dominated the state Congresses. 
10. The Congress allowed states to reproduce uncritically the content of the 
legislation issued by the Congress in their states. 
 
Mexico and Argentina’s political, territorial, and organizational structures are 
summarized in Table 5.4. The administrative structures are relatively similar, with three 
levels of government, elected democratically. Mexico has more inhabitants, more densely 
populated, with a higher GDP per capita, but in general organizational terms, the 
administrative structures are comparable. 
Table 5.4 Mexico and Argentina Political and Territorial Organization  
Country Levels 
of 
Gov 
(#) 
Government 
Level Names 
Intermediate 
Level (#) / 
Average Pop 
Level 2 
Local Level 
(#) / 
Average 
Pop Level 3 
Pop in the 
largest city 
(% of urban 
pop) 
Pop in 
urban 
agglomerat
ions  >1 
million (% 
of total 
urban pop) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(current 
US$) 
Argentina 3 Federal, 
Provincial, 
Municipality/
Department 
24 / 
1,654,436 
1638/  
24,108 
35 39 $6,645 
Mexico 3 National, 
State, 
Municipality 
32/  
3,290,016 
2454/ 
42,901 
23 34 $9,715 
Source: UCLG data Collection (2007) 
 
5.3 Tax Authority and Revenue Bases 
The next section briefly reviews tax collection in Argentina and Mexico. Tax effort is 
measured as local tax revenues/ total collections (by adding all levels of government). 
Figure 5.1 shows that total government tax collection is larger for Argentina than 
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Mexico. Argentina has a wide difference between total tax collection at the central 
government, and what is collected at the provincial and municipal levels. Municipal and 
provincial governments collect substantially more taxes in Argentina than their 
counterparts in Mexico. Until recently in Mexico, there has been a centralized effort 
made by the national governments to manage its public finances. This has been done by 
either changes in the legal authority to raise taxes in Mexico, or by instituting new taxes 
in Argentina (CIPPEC 2008).  
Figure 5.1 Tax Revenues of Argentina and Mexico as percentage of GDP 1990-2009 
 
Source Data Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
The top orange line in the graph indicates the total government revenues as 
percentage of GDP; the bottom orange line shows the central governments revenues as a 
percentage of GDP in Argentina. The wide gap between the two lines indicates that the 
large difference between what the subnational governments collect and the national 
government. Mexico, on the other hand represents the middle green lines, which has little 
variation between the central government and the total government revenues, which 
indicates that the subnational governments collect relatively little national revenues. The 
109 
historical legacies and institutional frameworks of their federations may have determined 
these differences between Argentina and Mexico’s revenue collection. Argentina has a 
flexible legal framework that allows local government more authority to collect taxes. An 
Argentine local government is allowed to introduce new taxes, change its rate and base, 
while in Mexico, the state governments can dictate these matters. Mexico’s central 
government and states have control to veto local budgets, which further demonstrates that 
lack of autonomy to administer its budget. There is no consecutive re-election for 
municipal presidents, which severely hinders the continuation of public policies. The 
result is that Mexican local governments have less authority and autonomy to collect and 
manage their local budgets than their Argentine counterparts. Table 5.5 illustrates this 
reality.  
Table 5.5 Autonomy Granted in Revenue Assignments to Local Governments  
Country Ability to 
introduce 
new taxes 
Ability to 
set tax 
rates within 
legal limits 
Ability to 
change tax 
base 
Control or veto over 
local gov’t budgets 
by Central/Regional 
governments 
Responsibility for the 
collection of  
Fees Taxes 
Argentina Yes Yes Yes No Local 
gov’t 
Local 
gov’t 
Mexico No No No  Regional Local 
gov’t 
Local 
gov’t 
Source: UCLG data Collection  
 
The types of taxes that local governments can collect are similar. Both governments 
allow property taxes, fees, and fines to be collected at the local level. The types of fees 
that each state government collects depend on their individual constitutions. For example, 
Argentine provinces collect fees for public utilities (such as water and gas) and in Mexico 
the States determine whether they will collect these fees or not. Table 5.6 outlines the 
types of taxes and fees collected by each national government. 
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Table 5.6 Assignment of Taxes and Fees to Local Governments  
Country Types of Taxes Types of Fees 
Property Others  
Argentina Urban/rural property (and its 
increase value b/c of public 
investment* 
Car registration, turnover tax Public utilities, fines 
Mexico Urban property Car registration (all other 
taxes are centralized 
Varies by State 
Source: UCLG data Collection  
* Argentina: Not all provinces have delegated property taxes to their municipalities 
 
5.4 A Description of Subnational Public Debt  
 Chapter V closes with a description of each country’s subnational debt policies as 
another way to understand municipal autonomy and fiscal authority. It compares 
Argentina and Mexico’s legislation and recent reforms of sub-national debt financing as a 
way to better understand each cities’ ability to become independent from the national 
government. 
Argentina’s Constitution is a unification of the provincial governments. Since the 
enactment of the 1994 Constitution, there has been a series of financial reforms to 
increase privatization as well as for the decentralization of administrative reforms. The 
most recent law of co-participation allows the assignment of transfers and tax revenues to 
be generated. Each provincial government decides the requirements for its obligations of 
municipalities. In Argentina, provincial governments are only allowed to tax on specific 
goods and services as indicated in the state’s law.  
The independence of the provincial governments makes it difficult to coordinate 
national programs. Many experts credit the Peronist party’s regional leaders (especially 
when they come from opposite parties such as Santa Fe) for decentralizing policies 
(Abuelafia, Berensztein, Broun, and Di Gresia 2004; Benton 2009; Bonvecchi 2010). 
Moreover, governors have an effective role in the balance of responsibilities between 
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national and regional governments. The result is a complicated set of rules for each 
province. For example, the province of Buenos Aries has a set tax rate, which is 
determined by macro-fiscal measures, pre-determined by the Treasury ministry. The 
province of Santa Fe may or may not meet the same standards. The city of Buenos Aires 
has a debt ceiling, which forbids it from taking a loan out that is more than 15 percent of 
its net current co-participation transfers. Legally, provincial governments cannot take out 
public debt without the approval of the treasury ministry of the national government.  
The province of Santa Fe, for example, has not changed its Constitution since the 
federal government modified its fiscal rules after the crisis in 2001. The province still has 
three criteria to categorize their cities—according to its size, its population and its 
territorial development—to redistribute its public finance to municipalities. Rosario, for 
example, is one of the most important areas for the economy of Santa Fe, and therefore 
receives more federal funding than Rafaela. Similarly, the province has not changed its 
law to better distribute its wealth, so there are other cities that do not have as many 
resources as Rafaela. Figure 5.3 describes the ratio of public debt that the province has in 
relationship to the total income (transfers and local own-source revenue).  
Figure 5.3 Santa Fe’s Public Debt Ratio to Revenue (in thousands of pesos)  
 
Source: Argentina’s Interior Ministry Web site (2011)  
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Figure 5.5 illustrates the public debt ratio for the province of Santa Fe. The purple line 
represents debt (measured in thousands of pesos). The green line is the current revenue 
(measured in thousands of pesos) and the blue line is the debt/revenue ratio (measured as 
a percentage). The sharp increase after 2001 is the result of the change in the value of the 
peso after the reversal of the National Convertibility Law (three pesos equal 1$ US dollar 
after 2001). The top line is the total percentage of increases in the provincial budget, 
which also has increased significantly since 2001. The debt for Santa Fe has been 
managed at a rather low rate, as can been seen in the lowest line in the graph.  
Mexico passed Article 9 in the National Fiscal Coordination Law (NFCL) in 
1997, granting municipalities the right to contract loans from commercial banks with 
federal authority. Successfully approved by Congress in 2000, there has been a new 
emphasis on public debt in Mexico with many subnational governments taking out more 
public debt. The idea behind this reform was the better use of national bank reserves for 
development projects. The law requires two rating agencies to evaluate public budgets, 
evaluating their financial systems, operational activities, financial status, and eight other 
qualifying criteria (such as economic liquidity, debt, finance, support systems). The four 
major rating agencies in Mexico include Standard & Poor's, Moody’s, Fitch Ratings and 
HR, a local rating agency. According to one ratings firm interviewed, of the 2,454 
municipalities in Mexico as an estimated 155 have access to commercial banks and 40 
municipalities have public debt issued from private banks.  
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Figure 5.6 Total Debt compared to a Selection of State Debt in Mexico (2000-2008)  
 
Source: Cámara de Diputados H. Congreso  (2008 Mexico) Data measured in Current Pesos 
 
 State governments are more likely to take out loans than are local municipalities. 
According to one ratings agency, loans are used for a wide variety of public services such 
as removal of groundwater, sanitation, and telephones as well as municipal waste 
disposal, roads, and traffic lights. Several states, which defaulted on loans during the 
Tequila crisis in 1994, had the option to restart public borrowing after the laws changed 
in 2001 (Tamayo-Flores and Hernandez-Trillo 2006). Illustrated in Figure 5.6 are the five 
states with the highest amount of debt. Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Morelia, Michoacán are 
also some of the wealthier states and have recently accessed new loans. They are also 
among the states that defaulted and were bailed out by the national government in 1994. 
 Cities have diverse options for the public loans. City officials can select higher or 
lower interest rates and longer or shorter terms for the services by using either public or 
private sector packages. Figure 5.7 illustrates the four categories of loans: development 
bank (blue line), trust funds loans guaranteed from own-source revenue (red line), trust 
fund loans with guarantees from the Mexican stock market (green line) and public loans 
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guaranteed from future transfers (purple line). Less developed states like Chiapas, 
Veracruz and Coahuila take out more loans from development bank than from private 
investors or directly from the capital markets.  
Figure 5.7 Types of and amounts of Public Debt of Mexican States (data from 2008)
 
Source: Cámara de Diputados H. Congreso (2008 Mexico) Data measured in Current Pesos 
 
 Traditionally, public loans were only allowed to be issued by the National Bank 
of Public Works and Services (Banobras), the national development bank, which was 
established in 1933 to finance public works and municipal governments. Banobras 
managed a loan portfolio of more than $10 billion dollars in 2010. The type of loan a 
state selects is determined by its economic development and the appetite for risk. 
Banobras uses part of the Federal Reserve to guarantee state government financing. One 
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way is by using a trust fund as a financial vehicle, which pays the debtors directly, while 
leaving a residue in the Federal Reserve. This is important because of the potential influx 
of foreign exchange, inflation or other macroeconomic factors that devalue the funds in 
the account. Some states securitize their loans by promising future inter-governmental 
transfers to pay for these loans. 
 An alternative financing mechanism is the Bank of North America (NADB) for 
the Border States, which provides loans for projects that meet United States 
environmental protection standards. Private commercial loans are also available. Most 
offer interest rates to short terms, for example, do not allow a rate of maturity of ten years 
or less. Recently, states like Guanajuato began to manage a World Bank loan program, 
which allows access to municipal bonds. According to Mexican law, subnational 
governments cannot borrow without the approval of the national government. This is to 
protect state sovereignty. 
Arguably, municipalities may use the debt to finance public works and other 
forms of economic development activities, thus allowing the national governments to 
implement more social programs for poverty reduction. Municipalities need independent 
audits to evaluate the costs of economic development programs. With the best allocation 
of resources and increased local taxes, communities can make better decisions about how 
to use their municipal budgets. This chapter has shown that political parties are less of an 
important variable for the cities to participate in the bond market, rather the wealthier 
cities engage in public debt policies first.  
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5.5 Summary Discussion 
The current chapter described how the legal structure of local governments in 
Argentina and Mexico were created and their effects on to the local taxation system. 
Because of various fiscal reforms, local governments in both countries are now better 
able to manage their resources. For example, they can now make complex finance 
decisions about their budgets. In both countries, municipal bonds can be allocated for 
infrastructure, but also for managing the budget when extra revenue is needed, such as for 
paying wages and other expenses. Today, most large international banks provide loans 
for infrastructure managed at the national level with large amounts of national debt.  
 It was assumed that with a higher degree of fiscal decentralization, a country 
would be more likely to have fiscally autonomous states. With a legal review of 
Argentine and Mexican frameworks, this research suggests that in reality, the history of 
inter-governmental relations is much more complex. Whereas Mexico has recently seen 
an increase of fiscal decentralization and a stronger commitment by the national 
government to decentralize, principally after the 1997 reforms, the country has only 
decentralized revenue expenditures. Since that time, the appropriate reforms of legal 
frameworks to create incentives to generate more local revenue have not followed. In 
Argentina after the economic crisis of 2001, there has been a greater trend of fiscal 
centralization. Arguably, this fiscal imbalance between the providences is one of the 
major causes, which led Argentina into macroeconomic instability. After various fiscal 
major reforms that Argentina made between 1988 and 2008 among other factors has 
made the country relatively unstable.  
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The subsequent chapters examine a set of cities in Argentina and Mexico, in terms 
of their local fiscal capacity, in order to determine whether further autonomy leads to 
cities engaging in increased economic development programs and thereby promoting 
growth. The next chapter specifically looks at Argentina’s province of Santa Fe and 
evaluates how these fiscal reforms have influenced three cities—Rosario, Santa Fe and 
Rafaela—tax collection efforts and decisions to invest in economic development 
programs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ARGENTINA’S CASES 
6.1 Introduction 
 Historically Argentina has been more decentralized and now is gradually becoming 
more fiscally centralized. The purpose of this chapter is to present the three Argentine 
case studies (the cities of Rosario, Rafaela, and Santa Fe) and describe the demographics, 
political context, fiscal data, and economic development efforts that each city 
government has made to influence their local economies. By describing how one sub-
national government, the province of Santa Fe, managed its public finances, tax structure 
and investments in businesses, the chapter illustrates the effects of Argentina’s 
centralized tax system. This in turn enables one to better understand how 
intergovernmental relations have changed. 
 Although Argentina is a federal country and has decentralized allocation of 
spending responsibility, it has increasingly created a more centralized tax structure. 
Approximately 50 percent of total spending occurs at the sub-national level, yet the 
vertical fiscal imbalance is wide. According to Abuelafia et al. (2004 p22) “in 2003, the 
federal government collected 81 percent of the total tax revenues, but spent only 53 
percent of total expenditures.” The authors added that about 5.85 percent GDP is 
automatically transferred to the sub-national governments through their tax sharing called 
“co-participaciones” (Abuelafia, Berensztein, Broun, and Di Gresia 2004). Argentina’s 
budget process is already centralized prior to being submitted to the national Congress.  
 Even as the national government has begun to recentralize its fiscal resources, the 
research presented in this chapter shows how local governments are managing their local 
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budgets and local economic development policies. The evidence in this study shows that 
fiscal autonomy and economic development are not always correlated. This research also 
found that local tax collection is not always correlated with implementing economic 
development programs. Rather each city from the six case studies holds a different view 
of local economic development and budgeting decisions. The differences may lie within 
political demands of the party in charge. For example the current socialist government in 
the city of Rosario does not offer tax abatements to attract businesses, but rather the 
current administration prefers to provide better social policies in health and education. 
The more conservative administration in the city of Rafaela has encouraged business 
development through tax incentives, business incubators, and creating an industrial park. 
Tax collection efforts of these two cities are more aggressive than in Santa Fe. The 
evidence shows that tax collection efforts and development programs are not necessarily 
linked. 
 Even as Argentina’s national tax policies are becoming more centralized, the city 
governments in this study are rarely effected. Rather efforts to collect taxes and promote 
economic development programs relate more to politicians own political interest than that 
of their communities. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a description of three cities 
within the province of Santa Fe. Each city will have a description of the demographics, 
political context, fiscal data, and economic development efforts of the city governments 
and their influences on these local economies. Table 6.1 describes the population, budget 
sizes and industrial strengthen of the three Argentine cases. 
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Table 6.1: Case Selection Santa Fe, Argentina 
City Size Population Budget 2005 
Rosario Large Industrial City 1,198,528 155,000,000 
Santa Fe (capital) State Capital 521,759 29,470,000 
Rafaela Mid-size town 181,381 15,659,000 
Source: Estimations according to the (National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) 2010) 
 
The next section describes how the province of Santa Fe manages its part of the federal 
budget and what type of authority that it has to decide budget decisions, such as how 
much tax revenue the province collects and redistributes back to the national government.  
6.2 The Province of Santa Fe 
 The province of Santa Fe (population 3,242,551) has been historically a major 
industrial base of the country. The province has an active port, lively manufacturing and 
extensive farming and agriculture production to service its economy. The province 
currently has an elected socialist government that has been in office for the past two 
decades. The Partido Progreso Social (PPS) party was created locally to be left-of-the-
center to the politics of the Partido Justicialista (PJ) that Argentina’s President Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner currently leads. The former governor and mayor of Rosario, 
Hermes Binner, handpicked the current governor Antonio Bonfatti. Both men represent 
the Frente Progresista a new formation from the PPS (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias 
2011). 
 The province of Santa Fe has an annual GDP of nearly $US23 billion dollars and is 
one of the most prosperous regions in the country. Rosario, the state’s major city, 
contributes more than half of the province’s GDP, which is approximately five percent of 
the country’s GDP. Its geographical location, natural environment and port are all factors, 
which have contributed to the province’s economic development. Rosario is the 
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province’s largest city, with nearly a million residents. The other major city is the 
provincial capital with the same name, Santa Fe, which has approximately 500,000 
people.  
The State’s Political History  
 The province of Santa Fe has developed its socialist political roots from its major 
industrialized city, Rosario. Although the first nationally recognized socialist politician, 
Alfredo Lorenzo Palacios was from La Boca in Buenos Aires, the party has strong ties in 
Santa Fe.27 New socialism was developed in 1973 within student groups at the National 
University of Rosario (UNR) but did not win major provincial elections until the 1980s.  
 Locally, the socialist began to win elections when Hector Cavallero was elected 
mayor of Rosario by a stroke of luck. In 1989, Mayor Horacio Usandizaga (1983-1989), 
representing the UCR, quit in the middle of his second term in office because of a 
campaign promise that he made. He stated that if Carlos Menem won the presidency, he 
would resign.28 Apparently, a man of hot temper who resented Menem’s policies, 
Usandizaga term was completed by Héctor Cavallero of the Socialist Party (SP). 
 The national and the state politics, with Rosario leading the way, are vital for 
understanding the political life for the people in the province of Santa Fe. The current 
                                                        
27 Alfredo Lorenzo Palacios (1880-1965) was the first socialist elected to the Argentine Congress, was 
known as Argentina’s father of public administration. Born in Buenos Aires, Palacios studied law at 
Universidad de Buenos Aires and became a Dean at the University of La Plata. In 1902, he was elected to 
the Buenos Aires' legislature, and two years later elected to the Argentine Chamber of Deputies to represent 
La Boca. He helped create several laws including the “Ley Palacios” against sexual exploitation, and others 
regulating child and woman labor, working hours and Sunday rest. Palacios was elected Senator in 1932, 
serving until the Senate was dissolved in 1943, and in 1955 was appointed ambassador to Uruguay. In 
1960, Palacios was elected again as Senator and as Federal Deputy in 1963. Palacios started a group in the 
1930s called “Alto Comercio” which recommended to the country the need for public administration.  
 
28 Usandizaga was first a councilor and then Mayor of Rosario from 1983 -1987 taking the empty seat left 
behind from Usandizaga. He was re-elected for four more years but resigned and left office on 22 May 
1989 
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provincial governor, Binner’s political background started in 1972 when he founded the 
Partido Socialist Popular (PSP), with fellow student activist Guillermo Estévez Boero 
from the UNR, a party which later merged with Argentina’s Socialist Party (PSA) and 
other left-wing groups. In 1995, Binner succeeded Cavallero as mayor of Rosario, 
winning two consecutive terms (1995-2003). Immediately following his campaigned for 
the governorship, Cavallero was nominated as the PJ candidate. Subsequently after his 
first defeat, he campaigned once again and reached the governorship of the province with 
clear majorities in 2007. He beat out the coalition party Frente Amplio Progresista which 
was made up of JP leaders Rafael Bielsa and Agustín Ross. Binner (2007-2011) was the 
first Socialist to become the governor of an Argentine province, and the first non-PJ to 
govern Santa Fe since the return to democracy after the dictatorship. 
 A medical doctor, Hermes Binner’s political strategy has been to focus on social 
policies for the province. Significant investments have been made to create public health 
centers. The city decentralized the health center in order to allow more residents to have 
access to public services. Public health is so important for the province that the Fesprosa, 
a public coalition of public health employees, campaigned for Binner in his 2011 
presidential race.29 The province has implemented a large portion of their budget 
dedicated to public health and social programs. Table 6.1 presents the provinces 1991-
2009 budget expenditures, which include large percentages for education, health, and 
social services that the state provides.  
 
 
                                                        
29 The full title of the group is the Consejo Ejecutivo Nacional de la Federación Sindical de Profesionales 
de la Salud de la República Argentina. 
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Figure 6.1 The Province of Santa Fe Budget 1991-2009  
 
Source:  (Ministerio del Interior 2011) 
 
Binner used his social welfare spending to promote a healthy workforce in order to attract 
economic development to the province. For him, if the government provides good public 
services then it will attract more international corporations and businesses will relocate to 
Santa Fe. The socialist government of Santa Fe has capitalized on the decentralized 
healthcare policies created by former President Menem. An example of this, arguably, 
was when Governor Binner used his medical background and dedication to social welfare 
within his political campaigns. 
Public Finances 
Argentina’s 1994 Constitutional amendment established the institutional structure 
for municipal transfers. The amendment strengthened the authority of the 24 Argentine 
provinces to determine revenue streams within their own constitutions within the 
Federation. Several provinces copied the national framework for the distribution of 
revenues to local governments. For example, to the province of Santa Fe determined its 
allocation by charactering its cities into three levels, by population, territorial size and 
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poverty rates. The province of Santa Fe also is obliged to collect fiscal revenues in order 
to share them with the national government. This is the revenue-sharing component of the 
fiscal pacts described in chapter IV. Because Santa Fe is relatively wealthy compared to 
the rest of Argentina, it shares a larger portion of their tax revenues. 
According to the Liberty Foundation, a conservative think tank in Rosario, Santa 
Fe’s total amount of annual contribution to the national treasury has increased 
substantially from 2003 to 2009. Although Rosario received nearly four times more funds 
in 2009, the province is “sharing” more revenues than it received in federal transfers 
(Leonardi and Mandolesi 2010). The National Fiscal Coordination Office within 
Argentina’s Finance Ministry provided data illustrated in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Annual Contributions of Santa Fe to the National Government 
Year Millions of pesos Annual Variation 
2003 1,671,940 - 
2004 2,437,410 45,78% 
2005 3,000,390 23,10% 
2006 3,743,340 24,76% 
2007 4,842,110 29,35% 
2008 6,175,340 27,53% 
2009 6,662,490 7,89% 
           Source: (Leonardi and Mandolesi 2010:39) 
 
The amount of the national transfers depends on how well a local economy is doing in 
comparison to other regional areas. The low annual variation observed in 2009 is 
explained by the contraction of the local economy, which directly impacts the national 
treasury’s budget. Because Santa Fe produces a high amount of agricultural goods, which 
are shipped around the world, the local economy is based on price of global commodity 
markets. One report defined this relationship:  
If a comparison is made between the funds received by Santa Fe between 2006-
2010, the rate was around 29 percent until June 2008. The rate increased to 40.8 
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percent during the first half 2010 [due to the global financial crisis]. This marked 
an increase of national transfer to the province(Leonardi and Mandolesi 2010:39).  
 
The dependency of Santa Fe on global commodity markets is further explained. If 
comparing Santa Fe to other economically successful provinces such as Cordoba and 
Buenos Aires, for the period of 2007-2010. These provinces received approximately to 
$20,404 million pesos, which was 1.98 percent less than what Santa Fe received. Buenos 
Aires received 2.3 times higher than Santa Fe for a total of $47,581 million pesos. The 
report went on to explain how little the area received in transfers:  
If one considers the revenue sharing per capita [funds sent to the federation], the 
highest amount corresponds to Santa Fe $2,041 followed closely by Cordoba with 
$1,942 and third place in Buenos Aires with $993. Yet when evaluating the 
federal investments in roads by surface area, Santa Fe shared 49,064 pesos per 
kilometer, Cordoba 39,573 pesos per kilometer, and Buenos Aries allocated 
50,091 pesos per kilometer in 2009 (Leonardi and Mandolesi 2010:40).  
 
It is difficult to recognize the appropriate fiscal balance that the province should collect in 
revenues and share to the national government. Much of this is highly correlated with 
international commodity prices. One public official highlighted that with the new 
farmers’ tax (retenciones) established by the federation, created a loss of local revenues 
for Santa Fe. The new tax on commodity exports increased centralization of finances to 
the national government because it is now collected by the national government (which is 
a form of recentralization). When the national government collects the largest share of the 
local economy, this creates substantial cuts into the provincial budget. The retenciones 
tax displaced one of Santa Fe’s main sources of revenue. Additional research is needed to 
better understand the fiscal impact of this tax on the transfers for the state’s revenue.  
Because Argentina is a federation and each province has its own constitution, 
individually, each sub-national government also decides independently on how to 
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reinvest its finances for public works, wage bill and infrastructure development. Within 
Santa Fe, city governments can collect taxes on urban and rural property, car registration, 
taxes on propriety property transactions, public utilities, local fines, and fees. Whereby 
the SNG collects taxes and redistributes only a small percentage to other parts of the 
government and then to the cities at the various tiers. A majority of these funds are 
maintained at the city level. Provincial handouts often augment budgets, which can be as 
high as 50 percent to 75 percent of the local budget. Some of the provincial funds include 
the funding from the co-participation fund created by the national government and 
managed by the Finance Ministry. What is clear is that wealthier provinces like that of 
Santa Fe pay more to the federation than it receives in revenues from the co-participation 
agreements. 
Economic Development and Regional Efforts 
 In 2008, Binner’s team published a strategic plan for the province’s economic and 
regional development. The plan was the result of a deliberative process completed during 
that same year, in which thousands of residents from the province met to participate in 
citizen assemblies. The meetings were open to the public so a broad debate could be had 
to consider future projects and development ideas for the region. Assemblies were held in 
five separate regions of the province, which the provincial government later used to 
create new functional territorial divisions for economic cooperation. The “Provincial 
Strategic Plan” sets up the framework for the priority of programs within five regional 
levels and is based on three strategic areas: a) Integrated Planning; b) Social Quality, and 
c) Development Economics (Binner and Bonfatti 2008).  
The provincial plan also interconnects the five regional plans into a provincial 
whole, which further integrates concepts that link education, environment, security, 
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health, welfare, water, energy resources and infrastructure development policies 
together. In terms of economic development, the plan seeks to build better 
highways, air, rail, waterways, and ports to provide access and transportation 
options for incoming businesses (Binner and Bonfatti 2008).30  
 
One public official admitted that this was the first time in the history of Santa Fe that a 
strategic plan had been created to link the 362 local governments, which consist of 50 
municipalities and 312 small communities. It was indicated that citizens’ participation 
was a first step to becoming more decentralized within the provincial plan. The co-
participation laws provided little help for the province, which collects 60 percent of its 
tax revenue locally and receives 40 percent from the national fund. Rosario tax collection 
ratio is closer to ten percent transfers to 90 percent total own-source revenue. This is 
because of its low percentage of poverty and industrial development.  
 Santa Fe’s provincial budget was approximately US$5 billion dollars in 2009. For 
that nearly 66 percent went for salaries for 119,000 employees, the largest percent of the 
workforce being teachers, police officers and nurses. New investments in infrastructure 
are only eight percent of the provincial budget. This is compared to social development 
programs, which are estimated at 40 percent of the budget (much of which are paid in 
salaries for public health care employees and education professionals). With the federal 
laws that decentralized schools in 1992, the provinces paid an additional $9.9 million 
dollars. One public official stated that the national decentralization plan allowed the 
provincial government not only more responsibility but also justified its costs for public 
welfare programs. It can be argued that the socialist government has profited politically 
from the implementation of these decentralized social obligations, for which a majority of 
its budget is dedicated. 
                                                        
30 The plan was supported by a grant from the European Union in 2008 for approximately US$1 million 
dollars to pay for the exercise. 
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 Likewise, Binner’s provincial agenda to decentralize is less about city autonomy 
and more about a de-concentration of administrative functions. For him autonomy is not 
financial, primarily because Rosario is the largest city and collects most of the 
providential taxes. Instead, Binner’s fiscal policies have tried to better utilize inter-
jurisdictional relations and set the appropriate taxes and incentives to ensure effective 
public policies.  
 It was suggested that the PJ favors a more federalist approach to balance payments 
across Argentine provinces. The politics of decentralization is often more rhetoric than 
action within Santa Fe and across Argentina. In reality, poorer provinces (Salta, 
Tucumán, and Jujuy) are in worse shape than the more industrialized and wealthier ones, 
such as Santa Fe, to provide a basic subsidy for Argentina as a whole. Santa Fe is one of 
Argentina’s most affluent provinces and sees its public finances threatened by other sub-
national governments in the north or south and will fight to maintain more of its local 
own-source revenues.  
 According to one public official, municipalities within Santa Fe deliberately do not 
collect more local taxes because public officials prefer to take advantage of the national 
transfers. Some municipal officials stated that they have received up to 30 percent 
transfers (ATNs) from the treasury as unconditional transfers. Although these transfers 
are not a reliable source of revenue, they do provide help when fiscal gaps appear in 
rough times. The latter exemplifies the dimensions of Argentine’s intergovernmental 
fiscal balance, which is distorted with poor incentives and its political gaming. 
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6.3 The City of Rosario 
 
Rosario is known for its progressive government. It has a population of nearly one 
million people, the third largest city in Argentina. Rosario and its metropolitan district 
historically has been a major industrial and commercial cluster for Argentina. Rosario is 
in the southern portion of the province of Santa Fe. The city is situated in a 
geographically strategic place to work with Mercosur trading partners, located some 300 
kilometers from Buenos Aires and on the edge by the Paraná River.31 The city is at the 
heart of an urban agglomeration known as the Greater Metropolitan Area of Rosario, 
which is highly dense with a rate of about 5,350 residents per kilometer squared and 
drives much of the economy for Argentina. Over the past ten years, Rosario has been a 
self-proclaimed socialist government of the people. Governor Binner and Mayor 
Lifschitz both emerged from the same student movements. 
Nearly 71 percent of the population in the Greater Metropolitan area of Rosario 
was born there; nine percent come from towns within Santa Fe, and 16 percent are from 
other provinces. The remaining population is foreign born. Approximately 86 percent of 
households have basic telephone service. Health services are excellent, with 79 percent 
coverage of primary care health facilities in Rosario. The municipality of Rosario spends 
more than 25 percent of its budget for health care.  
According to one local public official, Rosario’s progressive government run by 
the Socialist party has generated a positive spirit in the public sphere. For example, the 
city government has organized public conversations through a participatory budgeting 
system, urban planning forums, public art displays, educational forums and children’s art 
                                                        
31 Mercosur is a trading block (like NAFTA or the EU) of several countries in Southern America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay are members). 
130 
center. The city has extensive public parks, municipal banks among many other public 
services. Several universities, museums, and cultural centers are located in Rosario. The 
city has an efficient public transport system and traffic is managed by dedicated bus and 
taxis lanes. Most buses are powered by natural gas.  
Transparency is also a very positive part of the city’s image. All the most 
important laws and bi-annual plan of the city are placed on the Website. Citizens can 
review the plans for area construction, including infrastructure, parks, in addition to 
legislation, local restrictions, and permits. In the public plan there is an explanation of 
public loans that have been contracted to finance infrastructure. In the late 1990s, Rosario 
invested in a trust to fund municipal projects. 
Rosario’s Political Landscape 
Rosario’s political transformation began in 1989 with Mayor Horacio 
Usandizaga’s resignation. Usandizaga, representing the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) 
conservative party, served as mayor of Rosario from 1983-1987. He was reelected for 
four more years, but resigned and left office on May 22, 1989. After Usandizaga’s 
resignation, the city of Rosario and the state’s politics have been controlled by the center-
left. Hector Cavallero of the Progressive Socialist Party (PPS) filled into Usandizaga’s 
seat to become mayor. Cavallero was re-elected from 1991-1995, winning by majority 
vote.  
Cavallero became a transformational figure for Rosario and for the province. 
Despite his initial socialist affiliation, Cavallero eventually decided to align himself with 
the Partido Justicialista (or the Peronist party PJ), the party of Carlos Menem and was 
elected as a provincial deputy from 1999-2003. Even after changing parties, Cavallero 
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ran for several other offices, but lost many. Binner proceeded Cavallero as mayor of 
Rosario from 1995-2003, won a consecutive term from 1995-200 and was later elected 
governor in 2007. 
 Cavallero changed parties again to run as mayor of Rosario in 2007. He founded 
new party called Social Progress Party (PPS). Even with the support from the governor’s 
candidate Rafael Bielsa and under a new umbrella party called “Frente para la Victoria,” 
which was mostly Peronist (PJ) but had young faces and included the populist sectors of 
the party (including Omar Perotti from Rafaela). Despite this, Cavallero lost by a 
landslide to his former socialist collaborator, Miguel Lifschitz (2003-2011).  
 Interesting social dynamics played a large role in the 2007 mayoral election. 
Cavallero’s campaign tried to reach the wealth socialist elitists from Rosario’s urban 
core, by highlighting the poverty of the people living on the outskirts of town, whom did 
not benefit from the socialist policies such as new urbanism. Cavallero’s 2007 campaign 
highlighted that sectors of Rosario still did not have water and the city had taken out 
public debt to establish infrastructure projects, which did not result in public benefits.  
 Locals complain that politicians seek PJ party leadership when the socialist party 
does not accept them, although, the PJ also projects a left political agenda. Major 
contenders of the PJ have links to socialism. For example, Rafael Bielsa (PJ) serves as a 
federal deputy in the National Congress.32  
 At the time when Binner was elected as governor, he took much of his Rosario staff 
to Santa Fe, which left the municipality with many new young leaders in charge. Binner 
handpicked Lifschitz to become mayor and managed much of the municipality’s staff that 
                                                        
32 Originally from Rosario, Bielsa is the great-grandson of Alfredo Lorenzo Palacios. Bielsa served as 
President Nestor Kirschner’s foreign minister from 2003-2005 and set up National public Law for civil 
service reform in Argentina while serving as the federal deputy. 
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remained. Many worked for the gubernatorial campaigns under Binner, and for many this 
was their first job out of college. The socialist party has been a source for university 
students to find jobs and conversely to recruit students to help out in local political 
campaigns.  
 In 2011, another colleague from the socialist party Mónica Fein was selected to 
succeed Lifschitz as mayor. In May 2011, she won with full majority (49.6 percent) of 
the vote over Cavallero (who received 28.2 percent) who ran again, losing for the third 
time. Fein will resume as the mayor of Rosario in January 2012 (Fein 2011). Since the 
rise of Cavallero in 1989, the city government in Rosario has experienced several 
tensions between its various socialists faction, but it is also responsible for producing 
much of the policy for the entire province.  
The city of Rosario is internationally known for its efforts to decentralize the 
city’s administrative offices. During the time when Binner was mayor, he created satellite 
offices throughout the city where people could apply for birth and death certificates, 
buildings permits and business applications. Rosario financed the project with a trust 
fund. The fund was set up as a separate accounting system and was paid by future 
intergovernmental transfers from the national government. One public official suggested 
that the city also took the loan from the national treasury, which was administered by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) program.  
At the height of Argentina’s hyperinflation in 1989, the city took out a bank credit 
from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which was for $65 million dollars to 
restructure the operations and the public function of the city in addtion to pay for these 
satellite offices. The funding paid for the disconcentration of the establishmed and 
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administration of the regional offices for the local administration. At the time, Binner was 
promoting the improvement of health policy, clinics, and services. Binner argued that 
centers could include health clinics in order to provide care to the residents throughout 
the city.  
According to one public official, the UNDP program offered serve as a guarantor 
for the loan, locking the interest rates at 21 percent. Although the loan was provided in 
local currencies (pesos) when the peso was equal to one U.S. dollar. The loan agreement 
set the rate to be repaid in the total amount, even through the ear of hyperinflation. It 
lasted through the financial crisis and maintained through that the devaluation of the 
currency. They payments were reset during the economic crisis and in 2008 there were 
only $200 thousand pesos remaining to pay (approximately US$70 thousand dollars). The 
city did not need the provincial government’s approval for the loan, but because the laws 
have changed, it would need it today. One public administrator admitting retold, “the 
same credit would not be able to be done today, this is mostly because of the set rate for 
the interest rate and the UNDP as the underwriter.” 
 The city also decentralized its public employees’ pension funds from the 
province through a local settlement. Former President Carlos Menem privatized all 
pension funds in the 1980s. The city bought out its portion by using nearly 30 percent of 
the fund and set up a retainer fund for public use. This one action alone created goodwill 
among the public employees. It required that, the staff must work six months before 
accessing the fund. Micro-credit funds are available for all city employees. The credits 
are issued through the Municipal Bank. This helped to radically change the high interest 
rate loans for entrepreneurs and families to access small credits.  
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When Binner first left his position as mayor to take the governorship, he took 
many of his best staff from Rosario to Santa Fe. Binner and his staff essentially run the 
municipality directly from Santa Fe, subsequently maintaining many of the original 
policies he established during his tenure. Binner is known for handpicking his successors 
and building support with university students. Many students find jobs within the 
municipality right out of college or after campaigning with the local socialist groups. The 
public officials are highly efficient, educated, and on the cutting edges of their fields. 
Many are also highly inexperienced, but very dedicated to learning new ways of 
providing government services.  
Rosario’s Municipal Finances 
 The autonomy of the city to improve its tax collection has been done in the 
following areas: 1) taxes on property 2) licenses and car registration and 3) business 
licensing. These credits are meant to increase flows of money in the city of Rosario, and 
in return, increase economic development. The following section will look at the 
economy of Rosario and its recent efforts at increase tax collection and budget 
management. Figure 6.2 has the total amount of Rosario’s budget and tax collections at 
the local level (TOSR). 
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Figure 6.2 Rosario Total Expenditures and Revenues vs. TOSR  
 
Source: Rosario’s Office of the Municipal Treasury 2011. 
The city of Rosario has a robust economy and strong internal financial 
management system. In 2010, Rosario estimated $2.4 billion dollars in revenue to be 
generated with approximately half coming from inter-governmental transfers.33 The ratio 
of own-source collections (TOSR) to federal transfers is approximately 50:50. The total 
city budget has increased substantially since 2002. This indicates that the local economy 
is doing substantially much better since the 2001 financial crisis.  
According to Figure 6.3 approximately 40 percent of the budget is spent on goods 
and services and nearly 20 percent on wage bill (public employment). The city spends 
less than ten percent annually on its public debt. The ratios for budget expenditures have 
stayed relatively the same even though the financial crisis in 2001. 
 
 
                                                        
33 Since there is no centralized database by the national government with subnational level or municipal 
data in Argentina, all city level financial figures for Argentina was collected in person with the municipal 
treasurer or budget offices. Independent auditing is still not practiced. therefore there is little verification if 
the financial transactions are correct. 
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Figure 6.3 Rosario’s Total Desegregated Spending (1999-2010) 
Source: Rosario’s Office of the Municipal Treasury 2011  
 
City officials claim that they have used innovative financing to manage the city’s budget 
and promote sustainable revenue streams. The 2010 municipal agenda included its 
priority focus on: 1) health clinics and facilities with 24 hour care; 2) decentralization of 
municipal public budgeting, administration, and civic participation; and 3) urban 
infrastructure development with parks built using public-private partnerships. To build 
more health centers in 2011, the city had to take out another public loan. To accomplish 
this, the city’s governing body had to request authorization from the federal treasury.34 
Copied from the City of Curitiba’s experience in Brazil, Rosario introduced 
participatory budgeting (PB) in 2001, at the midst of the financial crisis. However, it was 
not fully implemented until the 2002 budget cycle. No more than 8-12 percent of the total 
budget was dedicated to participative budgeting. Arguably, the process was started in 
Rosario as a political tool to deal with the 2001 financial crisis and public discontentment 
with the government. PB has now been incorporated into the political landscape of the 
                                                        
34 This is a result of the Federal government’s enactment of the 1999 Financial Solvency Act. 
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city. Beginning in 2005, there were approximately 40 assemblies formed and each had 
different spending priorities and various funding requests. 
In general, the process includes the following. Each assembly had a workshop to 
discuss priorities and neighborhood budgets. Then these groups selected a representative 
to be a part of the district council. First, the size of the neighborhoods was decided on the 
percent of population rather than on the percent of people who would be participating in 
the process. The meetings were open to the public and delegates are selected to be gender 
neutral (typically representing one woman and one man to the general council). Next the 
neighborhood groups selected their first plan called “mi barrio,” or my neighborhood. 
The regional delegates meet in a group to analyze the plan and select the top project for 
each district. Those proposals are further reviewed by the city’s budget office for public 
financing and arrangements are later made within the municipality’s public works 
department to complete the project.  
Whether it is the pavement division or the parks and recreation division, the work 
is completed in the order that it is most efficient to finish. One public official noted that 
the government had difficulty to disseminate information about completed projects to 
citizens. For example, the feedback loop of demonstrating to citizens that the work was 
completed was difficult for the city to manage. The city finally developed a campaign 
booklet where they published select finished projects.  
In 2008, the total participative budget was $30 million pesos and the budget was 
expected to increase to $32 million pesos in 2009. This means that three percent of the 
whole budget was used for the program. One bureaucrat explained that the internal 
administrative office needed to be reformed to manage the participatory budgeting 
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process. For example, the public works office had change their structure and timing of 
project due to the request of cities. They were also responsible to notify the public 
budgeting office of finished works. Several programming problems have occurred where 
the public complained of which programs still needed to be done. Similarly, some 
projects were completed but still not reported to the public budgeting office. 
Accountability and reporting issues have been problematic.35 Unfortunately, in late 2008, 
the budget was accruing a large fiscal deficit because of the global financial downfall, so 
the city’s program was also in jeopardy.  
Another innovative program developed in Rosario, during the financial crisis, was 
city identification cards for welfare beneficiaries. At that time, the Confederation 
Organization of Workers (CIT), the union of public employees, signed up all the 
unemployed people and gave them work. Rosario was the first city to issue private ID 
cards in order to manage their funds with the work accomplish. The program idea was 
later replicated by the national government. The cards worked as an ATM or bankcard 
and allowed people to take out money to buy food. Anyone over 18 could register and 
more than 50 thousand people began when the program stated. In 2009, there were an 
estimated 100 thousand beneficiaries of public and social programs in Rosario. This 
program was replicated by the national government and eventually used in the Plan Jefes 
y Jefas de Hogar, Kirchner’s major social assistance program after the financial crisis. 
 
                                                        
35 For example, the Public Works department takes its time to finish their work and may not have told the 
office of participative budgeting what they have finished. The Sec. General’s office makes the plans for the 
municipality to set its planning orders. Follow-up is a major issue. With so many problems, one questions 
whether these projects are just another form of political propaganda (using funds that the municipality 
already had to maintain public sectors of town) or if there is a value in the participative budget program fro 
building of democracy, as the liberal theorist suggest? 
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Rosario’s Local Economy 
The Greater Metropolitan Area of Rosario has a vibrant local economy. The area 
represents an industrial, commercial, and financial center nestled in the heart of the 
agricultural and livestock producing region. Approximately 42 percent of the economy 
works in the industrial sector, which consists of 53 percent of total employment. Rosario 
is emerging as a strategic location which links the state of Rio Grande Do Sul (Brazil) on 
the Atlantic Ocean with the region of Valparaiso (Chile) on the Pacific Ocean. Greater 
Rosario is a central place for commerce for many MERCOSUR countries, serving as the 
crossroads for trade and services. Figure 6.4 describes the industrial base of the region. 
The data comes from the National University of Rosario UNR (Instituto de 
Investigaciones Económicas 2011). 
Figure 6.4 Sectoral Development of Rosario in US$ Dollars  
 
Source: Data from the University of Rosario 
A transportation hub for the northern part of Argentina, the city has an extensive network 
of rail, roads, national highways and provincial inter-connects that link it to other towns 
within the province and the country. For example, the bus station has daily departures to 
neighboring countries (Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia).  
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The educational standards are higher in Rosario than the rest of the country. The 
city has six universities with approximately 77,400 students. The local universities 
include the National University of Rosario and the National Technological University 
and Catholic University of Argentina, Austral, the Latin American Educational Center 
and Abierta Interamericana, which is privately owned. Fifteen percent of the population 
of Rosario attends or attended the university, which is comparatively higher than the rest 
of Argentina. Rosario accounts for 60 percent of the provincial researchers, which is 
eight percent of the national total. This represents a ratio of 18 people in every 10,000 
residents that studied science and technology, which is also higher than the national 
average. It has regional and national science and technology centers.  
Table 6.3 depicts the type of employment within the city of Rosario. It provides 
the type of employment (public, private self employed) at the level of government 
(municipal, provincial or federal). The region generates 53 percent of employment for the 
province, where 62 percent of the local industrial establishments within Santa Fe.  
Table 6.3 Population according to occupational categories (Rosario) 
Category Municipal Provincial Federal 
Employee in the public sector 17.81%  19.54% 21.20% 
Employee in the private sector 49.66%  48.22% 48.94% 
Patrón (local bosses) 7.46%  8.37% 6.24% 
Self-Employed 22.10%  20.18% 20.26% 
Family worker 2.97%  3.70% 3.37% 
Source: National Ministry of the Interior’s statistics.  
 
Table 6.4 demonstrates the strength of various sectors to the local economy. 
Strong industries include trade, manufacturing, electoral, transport and real estate.36 In 
                                                        
36 The data was calculated by the UNR’s economic division former director Alicia Castagna who is 
married to the Ministry of Economy Angel Sciara for the province. 
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respect to industry and trade, Rosario is responsible for approximately 50 percent of the 
total provincial GDP, which is five percent of the national GDP.  
Table 6.4 Economic Development of the Metropolitan Rosario 1993-1998* 
Sector 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Manufacturing 750,009 783,783 760,639 866,785 904,595 1,048,866 793,718 
Electric Gas and Water 200,512 219,473 237,171 214,348 228,582 223,475 221,234 
Construction 141,828 136,345 145,934 127,757 134,864 187,455 126,731 
Commercial sector 1,323,730 1,401,981 1,163,753 1,280,387 1,436,887 1,611,402 1,485,008 
Hotels and Restaurants 179,388 240,413 201,081 202,1981 222,795 199,757 205,156 
Transport and Communications 488,090 557,413 617,356 645,847 675,690 677,883 663,311 
Financial Transactions 184,642 202,235 227,095 190,646 185,905 188,134 182,110 
Real Estate 1,443,634 1,551,406 1,501,835 1,529,610 1,575,817 1,611,091 1,569,201 
Public Admin and Defense 235,863 253,502 272,186 283,889 291,259 301,082 321,561 
Teaching 266,082 305,952 327,730 345,748 364,577 374,933 432,359 
Health and Social Services 312,562 369,251 443,356 433,105 420,382 472,283 5,488,860 
Other Communitarian Activities 270,401 305,126 330,839 328,034 368,401 391,125 399,058 
Private homes 83,393 89,189 73,195 75,292 76,873 78,646 80,999 
TOTAL 5,880,134 6,416,033 6,302,170 6,523,646 6,886,627 7,376,132 7,029,306 
Source: (Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas 2011) 
*Values are in Millions of Current Pesos (which were equivalent to the US dollars)  
 
For example, the region of Rosario operates over 3,670 industrial workshops, employing 
over 63,000 people, which generates approximately US$1,000 million dollars of added 
value annually. The main industry of the region is food production (representing 21 
percent of industrial activity). As for the food industry, Rosario and its region have the 
largest vegetable oil complex in the country. This complex accounts for 50 percent of the 
country’s production and 68 percent of which are exported abroad. The port exports 
products such as petrochemical, paper, lumber, textiles and plastics.  
 In relation to the metalworking industry, Rosario is one of the regions with the 
largest agricultural machinery industries for the country with 11 percent of all enterprises 
within the province. Nearly 17 percent of manufacturing establishments reside in Santa 
Fe, of which 26 percent are for building machinery and other industrial equipment. This 
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item has a long industrial tradition in the city and was particularly from the 1950s and 
1970s. Nearly 63 percent of businesses in the area are small and medium enterprises.  
Large companies do exist in Rosario. Multinationals, such as General Motors, 
Dupont, Cargill and John Deere, are located in the surrounding the metropolitan area. The 
Italian car company Fiat had a plant but left the area after the 2001 economic crisis. The 
agricultural wealth of Santa Fe helps Rosario’s large port complex devoted primarily to 
international trade in cereals, seeds and oils. Rosario’s port complex moves about 
US$6,472 million dollars annually in exports and approximately US$835 million in 
imports. This area is responsible for 68 percent of exports of vegetable oils in the 
country, 85 percent of shipments of products and 47 percent of grain shipments. After the 
2001 financial crisis, many farmers invested in building and construction, not trusting the 
banking system, and therefore, many new buildings and shopping centers grew out of the 
crisis in and are located around Rosario’s urban core. 
The Rosario Stock Exchange trades futures prices of agricultural commodities 
such as cereals, alfalfa, and corn. Situated near the port of Rosario, the Stock Exchange 
manages large accounts that include the pricing of Argentina’s industrial and agricultural 
exports. Rosario’s Exchange represents about ten percent of all securities traded in the 
country, the second most important market in Argentina. The stock exchange operates 
about $786 million dollars in annual revenues, with a turnover rate that excesses over 
103,000 local contracts, which is approximately 2.6 million tons of soybeans, wheat, and 
corn exports. In one interview, the director of international relations highlighted the 
importance of the stock exchange for the community by identifying that it assists the 
community with information and economic studies. He highlighted that the exchange 
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provides benefits to the local community such as cultural activities with a museum and 
library. The market also supports a laboratory to test for molecular genetics of the cereals 
and oilseeds to analyze chemicals for byproducts such as vegetable oils. The physical 
geography of Rosario provides much of its economic development and serves an 
important transportation hub for many of the agricultural industries of the country. 
Rosario’s Economic Development Efforts 
 Rosario is the major hub for the province and therefore its economic plan is 
modeled heavily after the provincial plan. Binner and his staff in the provincial 
government have used Rosario as a model for the rest of the province while taking 
advantage of its highly educated workforce, fiscal location and prosperous economic 
outlook. According to the Provincial Strategic Plan:  
The confluence of the main roads of the country and installed capacity in 
industrialization and manufacturing, together with the ports, make this region a 
powerhouse. This is an area that favors the development of traditional economies, but 
also enables a host of opportunities for consolidation of new strategic sectors (Binner 
and Bonfatti 2008:238).  
 
Rosario accounts for over 70 percent of the production of agricultural machinery in 
Argentina. Similarly, the auto parts and petrochemical complex, meat, and textile 
industries, among others are constantly evolving, adding value to markets.  
 Rosario has internationally recognizable universities and many qualified 
professionals for research. The National University of Rosario is one of the most 
prestigious academic institutions in the country, both by the number of students and its 
level of quality research. Applied knowledge, software development and production, and 
tourism are some of the new emerging degrees catching the enthusiasm of the region’s 
youth. The major areas of development in the provincial plan include 1) building 
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highways, railways, seaport, and airport; 2) improving R&D centers for innovation; 3) 
improving the energy production with biofuels and biogas; 4) increasing the number of 
scientific centers with biotechnology; and 5) finally, improving the of business 
associations throughout Greater Rosario. 
 The City of Rosario has set up economic development activities offices 
throughout the metropolitan region. The city officials use Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS), to map out businesses, in order to help start-ups (Rosario 2011). City 
officials indentify establishments and actively seek how to help new businesses by 
providing public loans and administrative support. For example, the office seeks to 
strengthen small-scale commercial production by selling local artesian work and linking 
the value chain of production of products into the same geographical spaces. Finally, the 
city government also helps to provide training and support for low-skill workers.  
 In general, the region needs to improve its transportation infrastructure. Currently 
there is one major highway in and out of the city. An alternative route is necessary to 
divert heavy traffic, as the major highway often become saturated with grain trucks 
waiting to load containers to be shipped internationally. Additional public works 
expenditures are also in bad shape. The city’s road equipment is outdated and the city 
needs to maintain the vehicle fleet to improve the current demand and improve travel 
times for its citizens. The Paraná riverfront is suitable for small vessels to ship 
commodities overseas but larger shipments need to be transported through large barges 
from the Paraná to Buenos Aires (to later be docked and shipped abroad). The waterway 
needs new technology to make the road and rail access more effective for the port.  
145 
 Because Rosario is the epicenter of the metropolitan region, its economy is also 
based on the service sector and industry. The main economic activities are the city’s port 
logistics, finance, and stock exchange services, the significant presence of SMEs and 
emerging technology development in the area of biological sciences. The support base of 
the economy lies in the model of agribusiness and export products derived from this 
activity. The region accounts for 70 percent of Argentine agricultural exports in the 
“industrial riverfront,” which, combined with the presence of Rosario’s Stock Market in 
the operation of the physical grain market, the futures market and the stock market, is a 
major strength for the region. The petrochemical, steel, and metal represent a 
considerable addition, fully integrated into that economy. Clean-energy production and 
tourism are growing industries in the region. The area also has great scenic spots, which 
permits deep-sea navigation, fishing, and recreation. 
 Finally the Provincial Strategic Plan has recognized the region’s rich and complex 
institutions in which the scientific, technological, and cultural plays a leading role for 
economic development (Binner and Bonfatti 2008). The city seeks to link a network of 
social actors who work in public and private universities and research centers to serve as 
information hubs to enhance and the regional economy. By networking the formal and 
informal sectors and the regional universities, the city of Rosario seeks to provide a 
strong institutional network to increase social inclusion, facilitate public transit, provide a 
quality care model, and leverage the bureaucracy to be a decentralized and participatory, 
to attract the private sector. 
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6.4 Rafaela, Argentina  
 
Located in the northern part of the province, Rafaela is historically known for 
fixing trains that stopped on their cross-country journeys from Buenos Aires to the 
Andes. With its current 83,642 inhabitants, the city has grown rapidly, taking advantage 
of the railway, which was established in 1890. In the last part of the past century, the 
residents managed broken trains, which passed through the town. Residents started to 
manufacture frequently broken parts and since then the locals became experts at 
manufacturing. When the trains stopped, the city’s manufacturing plants began producing 
auto parts. The area currently has an estimated 400 industrial establishments, many of 
which are small business owners producing auto parts for export. Rafaela also produces 
most of the milk and its bi-products such as yogurt, cheese, and butter for the country.  
The regional area is known for its high migration from the Piedmont, a region in 
the northern part of Italy. Population density is less than in Rosario. According to the 
National Population Census 2001 in the northern region of the province of Santa Fe there 
is a population density of 2.94 inhabitants per kilometer squared, whereas in the south 
this indicator is of 22.37 kilometer squared. According to the Provincial strategic plan, 
the city of Rafaela has the industrial capacity to entice international companies to re-
locate and develop companies into the area. Many agro-industries are sparsely populated 
across the region. The city has undertaken a series of initiative to promote local economic 
development and this growth has been important to the territory to be sustainable. 
Rafaela’s Political Landscape 
 
City officials in Rafaela have worked specifically on improving the area’s local 
economic development. The municipality has made a priority for public-private programs 
147 
to promote employment and new venture programs in order to attract additional business 
development. Rafaela has some political autonomy, but not a large tax base and therefore 
relies heavily on its regional and national leaders for its public finances, especially for the 
construction of roads and major infrastructure. Several public officials have noted that the 
continuity of the same political line between Ricardo Peirone (PJ) and Omar Perotti (PJ) 
has helped to produce better results in the management of economic resources. Both 
previous mayors are trained accountants, for which many in the town say they trust an 
accountant more than a trained politician.  
At the age of 31, Omar Perotti (PJ) was elected mayor of Rafaela in 1991. During 
his first term in office in 1995, his management team earned a presidential award. After a 
successful term in office, Perotti became the Minister of Production for the Province of 
Santa Fe. In 1999, Perotti was elected to be provincial senator representing Rafaela in 
Santa Fe’s Congress. In 2002, he lived in Washington DC to complete an IDB training 
program. After winning the 2003 elections, Perotti returned to public administration to 
become the mayor for his second term. At that time, his work emphasized the public 
work for professional development-primarily urban sanitation works and improving the 
competitiveness of local companies. In 2007, Omar Perotti was re-elected mayor for his 
third time achieving 50 percent of the vote. 
Perotti is currently serving his third term as mayor of Rafaela, but has had several 
failed attempts at seeking higher office such as a federal deputy and governor for the 
province. He has been in and out of office of the municipality for over 20 years. For 
example, when he sought the governorship he formed a coalition party with the Héctor 
Cavallero as his running mate. At that time, instead he was ran against Carlos Reutemann 
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(PJ), a former Formula One racecar driver, transformed into politician and became 
governor of Santa Fe from 1991–1995. Since the provincial Constitution does not allow 
for re-election, after four years Reutemann was reelected the governorship from 1999–
2003. During those years, his profile grew to become one of the leading politicians in 
Argentina.37 Ruetemann was preceded and proceed by Jorge Obeid also from the PJ. Still, 
Perotti an independent Peronist has lead the city of Rafaela into the 21st century. 
When Perotti was not mayor of Rafaela, his colleague from the PJ party Ricardo 
Peirone served, who had also been a provincial deputy from 2003-2007. Although both 
men represent the same party, but there have been clashes in their decision-making 
efforts. For example, Peirone was a direct follower of the former Foreign Minister Rafael 
Bielsa, both were profound rivals when Perotti and Cavallero sought the gubernatorial 
candidacy (Castellanos 2006). Nonetheless, the major politician that the city has been 
exposed to for its recent history is Mayor Omar Perotti and his management team for the 
past 20 years. 
Rafaela’s Municipal finances  
Because of the consistency of Mayor Perotti’s terms in office, the municipal 
finances have also been steady and consistent with an operating budget of approximately 
US$33 million dollars in 2008. The city collects most of its revenue through taxes on 
property (i.e. cars, boats, and houses for which includes nearly 40 percent of its total 
budget), through the registration of industries, and licensing fees. The province considers 
Rafaela a second tier city (because there are less than one million inhabitants) and 
                                                        
37 During the economic recession beginning in 1999 (just prior to the 2001 economic collapse) Reutemann, 
kept a conservative fiscal policy in Santa Fe, whereby applying discounts and freezing public workers’ 
salaries and pensions through an Economic Emergency Law. The province was among the few not to resort 
to the issue of government bonds as a form of quasi-currency, and thus did not become highly indebted 
needing a bail out. 
149 
therefore it receives less provincial transfers than Rosario. Property tax rates are 
established as concentric rings around the city and the size of the terrain, but are not 
valued on an estimate of the property or the quality of its construction. Whereas the most 
valuable properties are near the center plaza, the prices of the taxes decrease as the 
property is constructed outside the outer rings, regardless of its overall size of the 
property The city does not have a property appraisal office, since the location of the 
property is what matters more than the quality of the construction. 
One public official explained that the Rafaela has had a difficult time with 
managing its underground water and sewer systems. Several public programs have sought 
to improve the quality of water within the area and also upgrading the sewage system. To 
pay for these public works, the city lobbied the national government for support. 
Especially since the provincial government had divided the territory into five divisions, 
the city (with its opposition political leadership) is concerned over stalled public works 
projects. One public official explained that existing projects could not be completed 
because of the provincial portion of the cooperative agreements was eliminated. 
According to him, this was “for short-term political gaming over the long term of the 
benefit of the population.” 
Another city official suggested that he stays connected with the province by 
participating in organized forums and meetings. For example, finance officers meet at 
least once every quarter to review plans and coordinate projects across the province. The 
municipal treasury explained a federally funded project to improve the highway, which 
travels from Buenos Aires to Salta, in the northern part of Argentina. A project worth 
approximately $50 million dollars with an annual budget of $3 million dollars seeks to 
150 
improve the transportation hub and bring tubes of gas and electricity to the city. For 
which, in an interview, one public official describe that he was concerned that the 
provincial government might eliminate a project because the governor and the Federal 
government did not belong to the same political party. 
Figure 6.5 Total Own-source Revenues in Rafaela 
 
Source: City of Rafaela’s Municipal Finances 
 
 Figure 6.5 shows Rafaela’s tax collection efforts. Its total own source revenues 
(TOSR) line appears very close to the total collections rate. Yet, with closer look the 
expenditures line, which should be the same as the revenues, is much lower than the 
actual budget. This creates an appearance of mismanagement of financial transactions or 
a data error. The major decline in the numbers after 2001 is due to Argentina’s financial 
crisis, but the numbers have climbed up slowly from that period. 
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Figure 6.6 Rafael’s Total Spending Disaggregated (1989-2008)
Source: City of Rafaela’s Municipal Finances  
 
The budget picture of expenditure showed in Figure 6.6 changes with a majority of the 
funding for the municipality’s wage bill (public employees). This demonstrates that much 
of the public programs are funded through the higher levels of government and the city 
itself only funds and manages staff for its programs that it manages. Very little amounts 
of the city’s wealth are dedicated of expenditures such as public works, goods and 
services or economic development. This reflects the well-qualified public employees 
working within the municipality. There is also a small line item for international transfers 
for subsidies, which includes social programs within Rafaela. 
 Traditionally, municipalities in Argentina were administrative units in charge of 
garbage, lights, and pavement, and many cities still have the budget category titled it as 
such Basura, Luz y Pavimento. In Rafaela, the public finance bureau expressed 
confidence with its level of autonomy, but believed political pressure from representing a 
different political party (PJ) and the governor’s office (socialist) created limited liability 
of resources for the city. Because the government has been around for many years, 
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everyone within the administrative office is friendly, open and honest about the tension 
between the provincial government and the city administration. City officials manage this 
relationship delicately.  
Rafaela’s Local Economy  
 
Rafaela has a strong entrepreneurial culture and has developed many small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). Some locals suggest this culture originates from the high 
migration from Piedmont region in Italy. Nonetheless of the motivation factor, the region 
has outstanding results in the quality of the products of the region (Asociación Cultural 
Piemontesa de Rafaela 2011). According to a publication made by the City of Rafaela:  
The industrial power of Rafaela includes 432 companies. During 2005 all the 
companies in the local industrial unit billed US$1,936 billion dollars, which 
include exports of US$201.9 million dollars. At the end of May 2006, occupied 
industries 7,798 people in its establishments in the city, 742 in nearby localities 
and 1,501 in other cities around the country and abroad, bringing to 10,041 the 
total labor positions that involve firms (City of Rafaela 2007:8).  
 
As can been seen in Table 6.5, a majority of the eligible workers in the 
municipality are employed by a private sector, many of which are in small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). Of Rafael’s estimated population of 94,450, a majority are women 
and nearly 45.7 percent are younger than 30 (City of Rafaela 2008). Nearly 48.8 percent 
of the population is economically active with approximately 46,200 people working or 
actively looking for work. The unemployment rate was 5.4 percent in 2008 (City of 
Rafaela 2008). 
Table 6.5 Population according to occupational categories (Rafaela) 
Category Municipal Provincial Federal 
Employee in the public sector 13.80%  19.54% 21.20% 
Employee in the private sector 54.97%  48.22% 48.94% 
Patrón (local boss) 8.21%  8.37% 6.24% 
Self-Employed 19.93%  20.18% 20.26% 
Family worker 3.10%  3.70% 3.37% 
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The growth of SMEs has increased with a $2 million dollar grant from the IDB, 
which funded by a special program that began in 2007. The city took a participative 
approach to analyze the economy, its strengths and ways to promote economic growth in 
2004 (Oyhanarte 2004). Through this participative approach and guidance by other 
international development firms, the city decided to strengthen four industrial clusters of 
metal work, milk production, masonry, and train and car parts. Table 6.6 identifies the 
major sector of the economy in Rafaela, which has changed little over a five-year period. 
Table 6.6 Structure of Rafaela’s Economy by Sectors (2004-2008) 
Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Agriculture 2.0 3.0 1.2 1.1 1.5 
Industry 25.8 24.5 24.5 27.6 23.8 
Commerce 22.2 18.0 20.8 20.1 20.5 
Services 43.4 47.0 44.2 43.9 46.9 
Construction 6.6 6.7 9.3 7.3 7.3 
Source: (Municipalidad de Rafaela 2008) 
Rafaela’s Economic Development Efforts 
The city developed an office for promoting economic development under Perotti’s 
first administration between 1991 and 1997. City officials worked to leverage outside 
funding to promote the economic base of the community. Part of the project was to 
develop an industrial park and concentrate business in one area of the city, for which was 
nearly full when visited in 2009. The office also provided funds for micro-credits for new 
businesses and supported them through an incubator, which is a central location in which 
businesses can share functions such as secretarial, auditing, and accounting services. The 
plan was made official in 2006 with the IDB grant to set up the La Asociación Civil para 
el Desarrollo y la Innovación Agencia Rafaela (ADICAR) which serves as the secretariat 
but works between the municipality’s office and the business community to promote the 
local economic strategies (ADICAR 2011). The offices are located in the industrial park 
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and claim remarkable success at strengthening the business community in the 
surrounding area.  
Yet, the provincial government has set out different development goals for 
Rafaela in its strategic plan. The city and province’s plans do not necessarily compete but 
have created conflicts among political actors. For example, several highways need to be 
maintained and paved. The provincial government sees that the rural road network 
structure provides great economic activity in the region, mainly that which linked to the 
dairy industry. But the city officials disagree with the province’s strategic plan on which 
roads need more attention.  
The provincial government also identified the benefit of the Piamonte 
entrepreneurial culture to develop SMEs. The Provincial Strategic Plan features the 
region with its diversity of products and services that are increasing value and creating 
employment. It also suggested that the region has a high propensity of outward migration, 
where young people leave the area to pursue higher levels of education. The provincial 
government has linked Rafaela’s economic plan with the Northern part of the province, 
but people from Rafaela do not see their economy linked north but rather South to 
Rosario and Santa Fe. For the province, “the social-economic indicators of this region 
reveal the diversity of scenarios. While 31 percent of the population of the far North has 
unmet basic needs, this indicator falls in the south to just over 8 percent” (The National 
Population Census 2001; Binner and Bonfatti 2008:28).  
The socialist government sees weakness in the region’s overall infrastructure, 
which lacks human resources, has difficulties with vulnerable groups (elderly, disabled), 
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and persistent problems with illiteracy as well as high school dropout rates. This sort of 
report is drastically different than the public propaganda that the city produces. 
6.5 Santa Fe, Argentina  
 
 The city of Santa Fe is renowned as the site of various significant moments in the 
country’s political history from the Constitutional Convention in 1853 to the National 
Constitutional Assembly held in 1994, which produced the many of the last constitutional 
reforms.38 The city of Santa Fe, itself, is home to the three branches of the provincial 
government. The city also has one of the top provincial universities, Universidad 
Nacional del Litoral which began its operation in 1919. Overall, the region is also 
characterized by an active public service, both serving the city and the province. The 
grain and oilseed production are the city’s main industrial activity, which is 
supplemented by dairy, meat, and leather production. The area also thrives from its 
livestock sector and timber enterprises. It also has a growing tourist industry. One 
interview suggested that Santa Fe’s economy was built on economic futures and capital 
gains made from exporting gain through the city’s port but there had been no large 
industrial development as had occurred in Rosario and Rafaela. 
 According to the Provincial Strategic Plan, the biggest problem for Santa Fe is the 
high poverty rate, immigration, and at-risk youth. According to the National Population 
Census 2001, nearly 15 percent of the population lives below the poverty rate. 
Immigrants come from within the province and from neighboring countries in search of 
work. Clusters of low-income people have settled within the Greater Santa Fe 
                                                        
38 Juan de Garay founded Santa Fe in 1573. In 1660, the Port was declared necessary for the Spanish New 
World, which caused the boats to circulate in the Paraná River to pay a tax. The city was declared a 
National Constituent Congress in 1852 and enacted the first Argentine Constitution on May 1, 1853. 
Constitutional assemblies have also met in Santa Fe in 1860, 1866, 1957, and most recently 1994 to make 
various important legislative reforms. 
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metropolitan area and in its surrounding towns. Table 6.7 identifies the type of 
employment that the working population of the Grater Santa Fe has. Notice that the 
percentage of self-employed and public sector work is larger than the cities of Rosario 
and Rafaela. 
Table 6.7 Population according to occupational categories (Santa Fe Capital) 
Category Municipal Provincial Federal 
Employee in the public sector 28.92%  19.54% 21.20% 
Employee in the private sector 39.73%  48.22% 48.94% 
Patrón (boss) 6.37%  8.37% 6.24% 
Self-Employed 22.10%  20.18% 20.26% 
Family worker 2.89%  3.70% 3.37% 
 
 
Santa Fe’s Political Landscape 
 
 The current mayor, Mario Barletta (2007-2011), comes from a coalition of 
Progressive, Civic and Social Fronts, which is a combination of the UCR and PPS of 
Rosario. Barletta, a professor of engineering from the National University of the Littoral, 
began his political career as a member of the UCR party. His political discourse is a 
combination of better social services and fiscal reasonability over the city’s budget. For 
example, one of his first measures in office was to call for an internal auditing of the 
municipal finances. Barletta also ran for governor but lost in the primaries to Agustin 
Rossi. 
Santa Fe’s Municipal Finances 
 
 The capital city of Santa Fe has nearly half a million people and one half the 
budget of neighboring Rafaela with approximately US$12 million dollars reported in 
2008. Santa Fe is ranked a first tier city and receives the same amount of benefits as 
Rosario. The total budget has fluctuated for the years which data was available. For 
example, it’s all time high of US$31 million was in 1998 and an all time low of US$5 
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million was in 2004.39 These fluctuations can only be understood through a) 
macroeconomic crisis and its impact; b) local administrative affairs and its 
mismanagement of funds or c) political relations with the provincial and national 
governments with increased subsidies. In 2003 there was a devastating flood that affected 
the outer corridor of the city, for which the public finances were insufficient to help the 
people left homeless by the flood. At that time, the city government simply relied on the 
provincial governor for aid. This demonstrates the city’s fiscal and political reliance of on 
the province for funding.  
 In 2008, the budget bureau attended a national seminar to learn how to manage its 
finances. Since that time, they use a new budgeting software system, which downloads 
total revenues, expenditure reports and ongoing expenses into files. Unfortunately, the 
system does not have a place for past reports and was somewhat difficult and 
cumbersome to manage the download for the appropriate information requested. The 
tables listed here do not include these financial reports. Figure 6.7 shows the decline of 
Santa Fe’s revenues and expenditures since the financial crisis in 2001. Also there is a 
slow recovery of the city’s finances since the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39 The data was retrieved from the municipality was the only city (from all six case studies) which did not 
have information in electronic format. Rather instead the budget bureau made photocopies of previously 
constructed and approved manuals, for which of the data series from 1995-2008, three years were absent 
from the files. When asked about these years, the administrator suggested that we look and ahead and not 
behind in the past for guidance. 
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Figure 6.7 Total Own-source Revenues in Santa Fe 
 
Source: Data is unreliable from municipal records. 
Figure 6.8 shows that Santa Fe spends more on wage bill, goods and services and 
increasingly on transfers than the other cities from Argentina in this study. Additionally, 
Santa Fe has overdue public debt for which it also is paying. In particular, highly 
significant is the decrease in their total overall budget overtime, as noted above.  
Figure 6.8 Santa Fe’s Total Spending Disaggregated (1989-2008) 
 
Source: Data from unreliable municipal records. 
The city is highly dependent on the province not only for financial assistances but also 
technical assistance. One city administrator admitted to having shifted positions from 
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Minister of Tax Revenue from the province to the city’s Budget Direct to return again to 
work for the provincial government to become the Minister of Economic Development. 
This further demonstrates the city’s high level of dependence on the province for 
financial, technical and public employees. 
Santa Fe’s Local Economy  
 
 As the capital of Santa Fe, the city is located in a strategic place, both at the 
provincial and national level with a wide variety economic possibility. The city has little 
private investment and is still primarily maintained by government activities. Because the 
city houses many of the capital buildings for the provincial government as well as many 
of the city’s functions, there is little private sector investment. The city has some of the 
poorest developments in the surrounding areas, which is caused by the immigration of 
rural farm areas. Major sectors of the economy include agribusinesses, primarily dairy 
and livestock and their by-products such as meat, yogurt, cheese, and hides. Steel and 
metallurgy have had great momentum in recent years. Meanwhile, tourism is emerging as 
a new set of high economic impact for the region. One thriving business includes the 
local newspaper El Litoral. According to one businessperson, the city incoming 
investments and finances originate from Buenos Aries. Typically these are investors who 
seek to speculate in the futures of grain exports and travel to Santa Fe to establish 
secondary operations. 
  In terms of regional infrastructure services, Santa Fe serves as the backbone of the 
providence and provides necessary electricity and natural gas as well as aqueducts and 
communications services. However, according to the Provincial Strategic Plan, these 
structural networks fail to supply all the municipalities. The area has a significant 
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infrastructure deficit in water, sewer and natural gas. The geographic region has excellent 
conditions for obtaining drinking water, yet almost 15 percent of households do not have 
access. While some of the surrounding towns have modern sewage systems, yet only 45 
percent of households have coverage. This is a priority for the province to improve the 
access to sewage and drinking water for all. The same is true for natural gas, where only 
46 percent of households in the area have this service.  
 The city of Santa Fe has several scientific and technological institutions in the area. 
They include: the Center of Research and Development Regional Santa Fe, the National 
Water Institute, the National Institute of Limnology, Institute of Technological 
Development for the Chemical Industry and Technology Park Coastal Center. One major 
priority for the province of Santa Fe is to promote synergy between the scientific and 
productive sectors, and encourage the development of technology parks and industrial 
areas (Binner and Bonfatti 2008). According to one businessperson, the city expects to 
have a Hilton Hotel built in the next few years next to the port for business travelers to 
stay while in Santa Fe. 
 The growing interest in tourism for the region, in particular of cultural historical 
heritage, could be an important attraction for many Argentines. The idea is to attract 
Argentines to learn about the Constitutional reforms and assemblies have meet and create 
a museum for this type of historical tourism. Currently, tourist services are supplied by 
private enterprises and therefore the provincial government wants to assist with 
development of this commercial area (Binner and Bonfatti 2008).  
 The port of Santa Fe is in the heart of the Parana-Paraguay waterway, which is the 
last point where overseas vessels can dock on the river. The port of Santa Fe is just 
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further north of Rosario and has begun to modernize its infrastructure to meet current 
cargo demands. The Western shores of the Parana River have fertile soil for small 
farming. Traditional rice is harvested along the river’s islands and marshes. According to 
the Provincial Strategic Plan, the diversity of climates has created different types of 
productive activities (Binner and Bonfatti 2008). The area has many small-scale ventures, 
which cause a poor use of resources for farmers. The small-scale ventures experience 
structural problems to grow and develop into corporations. The plan suggests that it is 
necessary to carry out a task of revaluation, incremental improvement, marketing, and 
management to maximize the utilization of resources, especially in fruit, horticulture, 
fishing, and small-scale dairy sectors.  
 Industrial activities in the small towns surround Santa Fe include, such as the 
Franck dairy center, cattle and slaughterhouse, the Recreation and Nelson, a brewery, the 
glass industry in San Carlos and tanneries in Esperanza. Also an imminent timber 
enterprise exists with forestry and fine furniture production beginning, which augments 
the provision of industrial food systems, traditionally known in the region. The 
production of cereals and oilseeds are highly pervasiveness, while the commercial and 
artisanal fisheries, and tourism services are growing. 
Santa Fe’s Economic Development Efforts 
 According to the province of Santa Fe’s Strategic Plan, it is necessary to encourage 
and promote new ventures are ordered to improve the region’s economic-productivity 
(Binner and Bonfatti 2008). Furthermore, the demand for temporary work, mainly to 
harvest fruit and vegetable, causes an inflow of Bolivia workers, which also have 
precarious working conditions, inadequate health care and poor employment terms. The 
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area has a low-level workforce, in general. Public officials seek to improve educational 
policy according to its regional economic development.  
 Finally, the provincial government, through its commitment to develop the area’s 
human resources, has enhanced the access of health care to expand the supply of 
available personnel. In the surrounding small towns there is a significant deficit of 
primary health care services. The situation reinforces the centralization and the overload 
of demands on public hospitals in the city of Santa Fe. Despite the efforts to strengthen 
human resources, inequity regarding access to health care, the health system appears 
between different levels of government, which hampers efficiency. The neighborhood 
structure of the city has flaw too. It suffers from the lack of mobility with medium and 
high complexity for the transfer of patients, staff, supplies, and drugs. On the other hand, 
the provincial government recognizes the strength of Santa Fe’s science and technology 
system. Various academic institutions (Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Universidad 
Tecnológica Nacional, Universidad Católica de Santa Fe), contribute to the formation of 
highly trained human resources in the region. 
6.6 Summary Discussion  
 
Many academics describe the Argentine intergovernmental system as highly 
unproductive, poorly designed and inefficient. Tax compliance is also low both at the 
national and the provincial level (Abuelafia, Berensztein, Broun, and Di Gresia 2004; 
Benton 2009; Brown, Díaz Frers, and Koola 2006; Cetrángolo O. and Jiménez 2003; 
CIPPEC 2008; Dillinger and Webb 1999; Eaton and Dickovick 2004; Haggard and Webb 
2004; Leonardi and Mandolesi 2010; Melamud 2010; Montero 2001; Uña 2007). 
Although tax evasion is hard to calculate, it was estimated that the provinces collect on 
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average about 4.5 percent GDP, but there is a considerable variation between provinces 
(Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001).  
 Argentina’s compliance in collecting the value added tax (VAT), for instance, is 
estimated at 55 percent, which is considerably lower than neighboring countries such as 
Chile with 80 percent and Uruguay with 70 percent (Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 
2001). Recently, several provinces have been bailed out for various reasons, but most 
economists suggested that this was because the federal government was seeking policies 
to improve macroeconomic stability, such as decreasing deficits in sub-national budgets 
or rescuing the ailing pension systems. The national government has had to pay 
substantial resources for these policy shifts. For example, the deficit was calculated to be 
approximately $500 million in 1996, increasing to nearly $1.5 billion in 1998 (Tommasi, 
Saiegh, and Sanguinetti 2001). 
This causes a complicated mess of rules for each city government to understand 
and comply in order to collect more local revenue. Because the province of Santa Fe has 
not amended its provincial constitution, they continue to use the same public financing 
rules, which the nation uses to distribute its funds to municipalities. The province uses 
three criteria to characterize their cities according to the size of its population, economic, 
and territorial development. Rosario, has the most important economy of Santa Fe, 
receives more funds than Rafaela and Santa Fe. Most dependent on its provincial funds is 
Rafaela because it is not a top tier city. Rather city officials seek political partnerships 
from the national government, which belongs to the same political party. For example, 
local administers have relied on the Federal government to support sewage system and 
improvements on roads around Rafaela. This further demonstrates that the rules of the 
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intergovernmental system do not match the needs of local governments to perform their 
jobs efficiently. Political relations have a direct impact on the success of a city’s efforts to 
promote economic development. 
Similarly, the province of Santa Fe has not changed its laws to better distribute 
wealth. There are cities that do not have as many resources as Rosario, which not only 
funds the province but also the nation. Because of this, Rosario does collect most of the 
SNG taxes, which it later distributes to the rest of the province and then to the nation, 
through the co-participation law. Rosario has been the center of politics for the province 
since 1989 when the socialist government came to power and took over the city and later, 
Binner won the governorship. As a result, the government acknowledges that its local 
taxes help other parts of the country but often has confusing messages about what 
decentralization means. For the various socialist administrations, decentralization has 
meant the disconcentration of administrative offices around the city and implementing 
participatory budgeting.  
Finally, Santa Fe has been heavily influence by the provincial government’ts 
politics and finances. Much of the city official records are inaccurate because of 
bookkeeping and mismanagement. Because the city is the capital and hosts the provincial 
government, it is likely that city administrators relied on the transfers from the provincial 
government to finance public programs over collecting more taxes locally. Little can be 
concluded about the city’s public finances, budget, and tax collection in comparison with 
the other cases. The next chapter evaluates Mexico’s subnational government finances 
and intergovernmental relations by looking specifically at the state of Guanajuato and 
three cases Guanajuato, San Miguel de Allende and Leon. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
MEXICO’S CASES 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate one of Mexico’s state government’s 
efforts at tax collection and its inter-governmental relation. The state of Guanajuato has 
the sixth largest economy in Mexico with a population of nearly five million people 
(4,893,812). The state is at the heart of the “Bajío,” a region of fertile land, which grows 
much of the nation’s food. At the center of Guanajuato is the village of Dolores, where on 
September 16, 1810, the priest Miguel Hidalgo led a peasant uprising that began 
Mexico’s independence war from Spain.  
Guanajuato is also where former PAN President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) began 
his political career. The state government has a unicameral legislature and a tradition of 
being pro-business and conservative. In recent history, Guanajuato has been instrumental 
in encouraging the democratic reform of the national government. Because of this, 
Guanajuato is often credited for starting the political decentralization movement in 
Mexico. Ultimately, the election of Vicente Fox marked the end of the PRI’s one-party 
rule (Tulchin and Selee 2004). The PAN political party has remained in power in 
Guanajuato and continues this tradition. 
The chapter VII is arranged into the following sections. First, it provides a 
background to the internal politics, natural endowments, and development of the State of 
Guanajuato’s governments, paying particular attention to its recent political and 
economic history. A similar city-based analysis follows. This section evaluates the public 
finances, demographics, political, and economic histories of three cities: Guanajuato, San 
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Miguel de Allende and Leon as a way to see how these national political efforts are 
affecting local governments’ economic decision-making. A budget analysis of total 
disaggregated expenditures and TOSR is calculated from 1998 to 2008 for each city. 
Independent variables of concern are: inter-governmental relations; importance of 
political parties; and how much the local governments are spending of their own source 
revenues on economic development programs. 
7.2 The State of Guanajuato, Mexico 
Guanajuato is one of the smallest states in the country. However, it is also one of 
the most densely populated with 4,893,812 inhabitants, a density of 152 persons per 
kilometer squared. The large industrial complexes are the cities of Leon, Irapuato, and 
Celaya, which comprise of 42 percent of the state’s population. In general, Guanajuato’s 
population is very young. The 2005 census reported that 60 percent of the population was 
less than 30 years old. The state has had a constant increase in population since 1950. 
Guanajuato has a high rate of emigration to the United States, 35 migrants per 1,000 of 
the population. The average level of education in the state is 7.2 years, and 50 percent of 
the population over 15 has not completed primary school. Guanajuato has the highest 
concentration of Catholics of any Mexican state, with almost 96 percent of the population 
reported to be Catholic. 
Political History 
The political culture of the PAN has been crucial for understanding the economic 
development of the State of Guanajuato. During President Fox’s administration, the PAN 
politically managed 36 municipalities within the state. Even after the regional elections in 
2009, the PAN held a majority in 27 municipalities, which is nearly 80 percent of the 
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state. The PAN state leadership has been strong for many years. The gubernatorial 
election of 1991 was contested, when the PRI claimed more votes from the PAN. 
President Salinas recalled the election, placing a defacto governor into office. Two major 
factors that contribute to Guanajuato’s importance to national politics are: first is the 
traditional Catholic political movement; and, second, is the political aspirations of a 
former Coca-Cola executive and Harvard graduate, Vicente Fox. 
Many people attribute the PAN’s fight against the status quo from the states’ 
tradition of Sinarquismo.40 This is a political culture that originates with strong pro-
Catholic, hardworking individuals. Many of the “Sinarquistas” political party joined the 
PAN after the 1964 local election, sharing similar values. Shortly thereafter, the party 
began to win municipal elections. For the past 20 years, Leon, the largest city in 
Guanajuato, has been managed by PAN administrations. The PAN’s presidential 
leadership has ended some of the more paternalistic patterns of the PRI (Bailey 1990).41  
Second, the political aspirations of Vicente Fox have influenced not only the states’ 
politics but also the nation. Fox joined the PAN on March 1, 1988 and ran for the federal 
Chamber of Deputies, which he won that same year representing the third Federal District 
of Leon. After serving in the Chamber of Deputies, Fox sought the governorship in 1991, 
but lost in a contested battle with the PRI’s candidate Ramón Aguirre Velázquez. With a 
close election and possible fraud in the counting of the ballots, results were not 
immediately published. The race was nationally televised and after one week no one 
                                                        
40 The sinarquistas comes from the National Synarchist Union (Unión Nacional Sinarquista) is a Mexican 
political organization founded in Leon Guanajuato in 1937 as part of the Roman Catholic extreme right, in 
some ways similar to clerical fascism which, violently opposed to the secularist policies of the PNR, PRM, 
and PRI governments that ruled Mexico from 1929 to 2000. 
 
41 For example, according to one public official, current governor Romeo Hicks did not depend on the 
national government’s political contributions for his state election campaign.  
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knew who had won. President Salinas inevitably intervened and appointed an interim 
governor. For ten days Fox launched a public campaign and mobilized his supporters to 
request that the official election statistics be publicized. One march included 300 PAN 
members who walk from Leon to Guanajuato where the State Electoral Tribunal (TEE) in 
order to demand the election results (Ortiz Pinchetti and Ortiz Pardo 2001). Shortly 
thereafter, the TEE publicly announced that 30 of the 700 ballot boxes were annulled and 
Ramón Aguirre Velázquez was announced the winner (Ortiz Pinchetti 2001). 
Following the election, intensifying local discontent caused the state Congress to 
appoint Carlos Medina Plascencia as interim governor, who served until 1995. That same 
year, Fox decided to run in the following gubernatorial election and was elected governor 
with nearly 50 percent of the vote. Shortly thereafter, on July 7, 1997, Fox publicly 
announced that he would run for President (Ortiz Pinchetti 2001). Despite some 
opposition within his own party, Fox presented his candidacy representing the Alliance 
for Change, a political coalition formed by the PAN and the Green Ecological Party of 
Mexico (PVEM). After a complex campaign, Fox was elected to be the President of 
Mexico with 15,988,545 votes. He defeated the handpicked PRIsta candidate Francisco 
Labastida who received 13,574,677 votes or nearly 36.1 percent of the vote, and 
Cuahtemoc Cardenas, the son of a former president representing the Alliance for Mexico, 
a left leaning a PRD collation, with 6,259,018 votes (Ortiz Pinchetti 2001). With 42 
percent of the vote, Fox become the first candidate, since Francisco Madero in 1910, to 
beat the PRI. 
As governor of Guanajuato, Fox promoted government efficiency and transparency. 
One public official said that he was the first governor to give a clear and timely account 
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of the public finances in Guanajuato. In his time in office, Fox pushed for the 
consolidation of small firms, promoted the sale of manufactured goods overseas and 
created a micro-credit industry to support small and midsize enterprise (SME) 
development. Under Fox, Guanajuato became the fifth most important state in Mexico. 
Guanajuato received more direct financial transfers while Fox was in office.42 Since 
Fox’s term as governor of Guanajuato, the PAN has had majority rule in the state and 
continues his tradition of open government. 
Table 7.1 Governors of the Guanajuato 
2006-2012 Juan Manuel Oliva Ramírez  PAN 
2000-2006 Juan Carlos Romero Hicks PAN 
1995-2000 Ramón Martín Huerta PAN 
1995-1999 Vicente Fox Quesada  PAN 
1991-1995 Carlos Medina Plascencia (interim) PRI 
1985 - 1991 Rafael Corrales Ayala PRI 
1984- 1985 Agustin Téllez Cruces (interim PRI 
1979 - 1984 Enrique Velasco Ibarra PRI 
Source: Web site for the State  
 
Table 7.1 outlines the governors of the state of Guanajuato. Currently the governor 
is Juan Manuel Oliva Ramírez, who is also a member of the PAN. Other governors have 
been influenced directly by Fox. For example, Ramon Martin Huerta was Fox’s Security 
Director prior to becoming governor and later worked as the national Secretary of the 
Interior. Juan Carlos Romero Hicks served under the Calderon government as the 
Director General of the Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACyT), a 
prestigious government agency regulating investments in science and technology 
research and managing the higher education system in Mexico.  
 
                                                        
42 The INEGI data shows an increase in federal resources was sent to the state during the Fox 
administration through the various decentralized funds created by Zedillo, particularly through Ramo 33. 
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The State’s Public Finances 
The state continues to manage its finances and investments as it did during the time 
when Vicente Fox was governor, noted one public official. The Fox administration did 
this by creating bureaucratic offices throughout the state for economic development, 
which were mandated to seek out foreign investments and create financial incentives for 
companies to relocate to Guanajuato. For example, in 1995 Fox established the Secretary 
of Planning and Finance, which managed internal finances of the state in order to draw in 
international investments. In 2000, Governor Romero Hicks established the Secretary for 
Social Development, and finally in 2003, he separated the two agencies. These miniseries 
were managed directly by the governor’s office. Arrangements were made by changing a 
law to allow the governor direct control in order to coordinate these special projects.  
The State manages the municipal governments through the Secretary of 
Governance, which also reports directly to the governor. This allows a direct link 
between the state and subnational leaders such as municipal mayors and treasurers. Each 
city is requested to send reports to their state government. Reporting standards for the 
state include financial reports, which are sent to the Public Accounting office (Cuenta 
Pública) each month and then to the State Congress. Generally the reporting includes 
income and expense reports. Each state must publish budgetary information by law, even 
though Guanajuato does not have mandated independent audits.43  
The state’s investment office or COPI, for its Spanish acronym Cooperación de 
Inversión del Estado, coordinates the state’s finances with the regional planning and 
infrastructure development. The COPI office manages the state’s investments and 
                                                        
43 The state office of governance reviews its reports (like the US’s Government Accounting Office—GAO) 
to evaluate if work has been completed. The office is often backlogged and does not evaluate each report. 
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consolidates the public reporting of investments. The office reports to a council for 
development, which is made-up of public-private partners. One public official listed 
potential projects, which included ideas such as building university campuses, 
overhauling water extensions in rural areas and also infrastructure development such as 
the Celaya highway project, a fast train between Guanajuato to Irapuato, and an internal 
transportation hub in Leon. Other ongoing projects include new road construction 
between Irapuato and Leon and highway improvements between San Miguel and 
Guanajuato.  
Although the COPI is small, it manages a large portfolio of investments, which are 
highly influential for the state’s economic development.44 For example, the World Bank 
provided credit of up to $100 million in late 2005 for a public loan to the state. However, 
because of federal regulations, the state was forced to take on the bank credit offered by 
Banobras, the public investment development bank instead. According to one public 
official, Banobras had higher interest rates at comparable terms than a private bank. With 
the loan, the state developed several sectors of the economy (funded water extensions, 
housing, infrastructure, and provided institutional support to the local governments) and 
                                                        
44 The office has 10-12 employees who work full time on fiscal evaluations of the projects as well as 
project follow-up of the existing portfolio. 
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also received technical assistance from the bank staff.45 Cities within the state have 
varying credit ratings, which are demonstrated in Table 7.2.46  
7.2 Credit Ratings of Guanajuato 
San Miguel de Allende BBB (mex)  09/05/08 
Celaya AA- (mex)  22/02/08 
Irapuato AA- (mex)  11/06/08 
León Aa3(mex)  18/10/07 
Source: (INAFED Instituto para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal 2010) 
 
Economic Development and Regional Efforts 
Guanajuato is a major contributor to the Mexican economy. The economy is broken 
into the manufacturing sector, which represents 26 of the state’s GDP; service activities, 
representing 20 percent; and SMEs, which represents 16.5 percent. The service industry 
attracted more than two million tourists to the state in 2006 alone (INAFED 2010). Small 
business sales consist of up 50 percent of the state’s GDP and 80 percent of its 
employment (INAFED 2010). Despite the small share of agriculture in the state’s 
economy, Guanajuato’s wheat, strawberries, broccoli, and onions are sold nationally, 
with their tomato production as the second largest in the country (INAFED 2010).  
Guanajuato is highly unequal. In total, only 39 percent of the population is 
economically active in Guanajuato, (i.e. employed by the formal economy). Marked by 
high rates of inequality, the region is below the national average. Merely 47 percent of 
                                                        
45 The COPI was the coordinating office for the loan, managing the reporting for three years. The office 
director complained about the paperwork which came with the loan, including the numerous reporting 
categories and the various requirements for the subcontracting process, especially with public works 
projects Smith, Heidi Jane M. 2009a. "interveiw with Luis Navarro Rabago, General Director, General 
Coordinator for Programming and Management of Public Investments, State of Guanajuato." Guanajuato. 
The development projects and the loan were well known by many public officials throughout the state and 
the country, as one of the first World Bank sub-national financing projects. 
 
46 Mexico has a BBB country rating for international investors. Than within that grade it has variation 
between cities. 
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the population in Guanajuato receives more than two minimum salaries. Many people do 
not have adequate housing, basic services, or access to basic medical services. Salaries 
are also inequitably disbursed among the population, with a large number of the 
population deprived of decent living conditions. 
Although this situation seems grim for the residents, the state paints a different 
picture for potential investors. The state’s economic development office has identified 
Guanajuato as a place that provides a high quality of life for future employees. The state 
emphasizes its cultural and traditional values as a selling point for investors (INAFED 
2010). Because of generous mineral deposits found beginning as early as the 18th 
Century, the region is not only the cradle of the Mexico’s fight for independence but also 
has a tradition of creating wealth and having high levels of economic activity. Today the 
city of Leon dominates the region’s economy with high-end tourism and business 
attractions. The municipalities of Dolores Hidalgo, Guanajuato, and San Miguel de 
Allende are predominant in tourism with many historical, cultural and other attractions 
for tourists. 
The state’s geographic position within the country creates a unique comparative 
advantage. Attributes include its climate, infrastructure, access to natural areas and 
cultural centers. For more than 20 years, the auto parts industry has emerged as an 
important element of economic development. Its robust production of car parts is 
exported internationally. For example, the state’s transportation and manufacture sector is 
the fourth highest in the country (INAFED 2010). Yet, Guanajuato’s local economy 
confronts many challenges. Several public officials admitted that the state works to 
attract high skilled labor to move to Guanajuato. For example, the state invests in a first 
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class infrastructure to support economic activity. The state also works with the technical 
schools to develop degree programs.  
The capital city of Guanajuato, which holds the same name, has a population of 
nearly 150,000 inhabitants. Major industrial cities in the state include: Leon with 
1,200,000 inhabitants; Irapuato with 520,000; Celaya with 415,000; and Salamanca with 
223,000. Each city in Guanajuato has its own history of wealth and development: Leon 
earned its wealth from the shoe industry; Irapuato for growing strawberries; Celaya for 
the cultivation of corn, alfalfa, and sorghum, and finally, Salamanca has the state oil 
refinery, Pemex (Bazan, Estrada, Nieto, Sanchez, and Villanueva 1988).  
 The government has divided the state into four regional areas1) Leon, 2) Celaya, 3) 
the San Francisco del Rincón, 4) Purisima del Rincón, which is located in the Western 
part of the state bordering Jalisco.47 For each area the state has assigned federal transfers 
(Ramo 33) for urban development. Currently, the state’s priority is to develop these 
metropolitan zones. It has created specialized trust funds for economic development, 
which include infrastructure development areas.48  
Each of these regional areas have development councils, which are called Consejo 
de Planeación para el Desarrollo del Estado de Guanajuato (COPLADEG)—organized 
through the state’s planning council called the Instituto de Planeación Estatal 
(IMPLAN). According to one public official, these councils only work some of the time. 
                                                        
47 In dealing with municipalities, the state has a specific office to manage municipalities, which is located 
within the Secretary of Governance, and offers training programs for local government officials. The office 
also monitors and evaluates each municipality and provides technical assistances for local government 
officials with issues, problems and high amounts of citizen complaints. Essentially, this office helps 
manage the municipal authorities. The municipal law mandates that each municipality have 12 to 15 locally 
elected commissioners. 
 
48 National agreements were created in 2007 and 2008.  Both were formally named with funding 
allocations and business plans to match. 
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For example in Leon, the planning committee is active and consists of many members of 
the business community. Yet, the committee has had to change its strategy several times 
because of citizen protests from the northern corridors to the east and the west. The 
municipalities of Leon, Celaya, Irapuato, Romita (which is a smaller town located 
between Guanajuato and Leon) are part of the industrial corridor that maintains the 
state’s industrial activities. 
Some citizens have criticized the state’s economic development policies.49  
Traditionally, the PAN leadership sought to bring new firms into the state by attracting 
multinational corporations and offering tax breaks and low-wage workers. This economic 
model has been successful to bring many firms into the state. The American car firm 
General Motors (GM) moved into Celaya in 1990, which effectively changed the 
economic matrix of the state. Shortly, thereafter the city of Celaya developed an 
industrial park near a major highway, which serves as the major artery for the Bajío. This 
highway serves to transport agricultural, industrial products and people to and from the 
major regional airport. One economic development director retold that when the GM 
plant was installed, the foreign management promised to produce the 3,500 jobs, but 
instead produced fewer low-skilled ones. The director continued, “At the time when the 
plant was opened, the citizens who worked there couldn’t even afford the car they made 
nor were they offered financial plans to obtain one.”  
                                                        
49 Dr. Suarez Paniagua, Director of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Guanajuato, Leon 
Campus, takes a sociological look at the developmental process of the state and analyzed the implications 
of the GM plant and its implications for women workers. In an academic presentation at LASA in Rio de 
Janiero (June 2009), she described the life/work balance for people within the state and their relationships 
with the current government’s efforts at economic development.  
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The next section of the chapter describes the three case cities in Guanajuato. First it 
looks at Guanajuato (capital), then San Miguel de Allende, and finally, Leon. Each has a 
different economic base and approach to its municipal finances. For example, Guanajuato 
(capital) may be considered to be one of the most fiscally autonomous and independent 
cities in the Mexican Federation. The city recently annexed the Museo de Los Momias 
(Mummy Museum) which was part of the national patrimony from the country and is a 
source of great pride to the community. In order to accumulate more local revenue, the 
city now charges entrance fees, which produces more revenues than property tax, rents, 
and fines combined. This translates into a double income to invest in public works to 
strengthen the tourism sector of their economy. San Miguel de Allende is an ancient city 
in the Cordillera del Bajío, which has about 140,000 inhabitants, 20 percent of them are 
retired Americans who do not speak Spanish. The city depends largely on this foreign 
influence for economic development. Finally, Leon earned its wealth from the shoe 
industry and now has several new industrial developments. For each case, a short 
description will be provided depicting their political histories, public finance records, and 
economic development. Finally, the chapter describes each city’s initiatives to further 
spur economic growth. Table 7.3 sets data from each of the cities’ population, GDP, 
average per capita salary and total budget revenues. 
Table 7.3 Mexican Case Demographics 
City Population in 2010 2005 GDP  
2005 GDP 
Per capita  
2005 Budget 
Revenues  
San Miguel de Allende 160,383  1,065,245,712   7,647  30,000,000 
Guanajuato 171,709  1,493,480,230   9,738  24,000,000 
León 1,436,480  16,191,394,636   12,668  180,000,000 
All financial information is in US dollars Source: Mexico’s CONAPO 
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7.3 The Capital City, Guanajuato  
Guanajuato, the capital city, is famous for its old city charm and is one of Mexico’s 
most visited tourist destinations. It’s also remembered for being the birthplace of 
Mexican Muralist Diego Rivera. Arguably, less known about the city is its quality public 
services and its remarkably transparent public budget. Citizens have access to monthly 
electronic newsletters, which include information on interest rates, current public 
investments, budget allocations and other general financial information. In addition, each 
year the state hosts an international transparency conference. The total population of the 
municipality of Guanajuato is 171,709 inhabitants, which represents three percent of the 
total state population.  
The city government is composed of a mayor, 12 regiadores (elected council 
members) and two sindicatos (union members). To pass legislation, a majority of the 
municipal council must be present. The elected mayor selects the treasurer, private 
secretary and directors of public security, public services, infrastructure, economic 
development, and project management. From a national survey in 1995, there were 97 
registered NGOs in Guanajuato, but that number jumped to 235 in 2000, increasing by 
some 142 percent (Santín 2004). These numbers suggest that the city and the state have 
been active in promoting civil society organizations. Table 7.4 lists the municipal 
presidents from the city of Guanajuato. In recent years, the city has been managed by 
PAN leadership. 
Table 7.4 Guanajuato’s (Capital) Municipal Presidents  
1980-1982 Edgardo Meave Torrescano  n/a 
1983-1985 Rafael De Jesús Villagomez Mapez PRD 
1986-1988 Edgardo Meave Torrescano  n/a 
1989-1981 Eduardo Knapp Aguilar  PRI 
1992-1994 José Tomas Maclovio Zavala  n/a 
1995-1997 Arnulfo Vázquez Nieto  PRI 
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1998-2000 Luis Felipe Luna Obregón  PRI 
2000-2003 Rafael De Jesús Villagomez Mapez PRD 
2003-2006 Arnulfo Vázquez Nieto PRI 
2006-2006 Antonio Valdes Fonseca PAN 
2006-2009 Eduardo Romero Hicks PAN 
2009-2012 Niceforo Alejandro de Jesús Guerrero Reynoso PRI 
Source: (INAFED Instituto para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal 2010) 
 
Guanajuato Capital Municipal Finances 
 
In order to maintain stability in municipal public finances, public officials often 
trade positions. Both the mayor and the municipal treasurer of Guanajuato manage the 
city’s budget. According to one public official, 40 years ago the mayor managed all 
budget decisions, but now there is a high reliance on the municipal treasurer, who is also 
a certified accountant. The current official has been city treasurer for nine years, or 
through three consecutive mayoral terms (which consist of three years terms). Because of 
the federal non-reelection law, with each new election cycle the mayor must nominate 
new staff. This consistence is a unique case for Guanajuato, since many local public 
officials replace all members of their staff leaving no records behind for the next 
administration. In Guanajuato, the municipal treasurer testified that his consecutive role 
as treasurer has helped to solidify the finances of the city and its public policies.  
The city’s financial solvency record is due to its well-educated municipal staff. For 
example, one public official propose that the city annexed the Museo de Los Momias 
(Mummy Museum), one of the country’s archeological treasures. Since changing the 
administrative structure from the nation to the local government, the museum has 
generated more local revenue, totaling more than property tax revenues, rents, and fines 
combined. This translates into income for the city to invest in public works in order to 
strengthen the tourism sector of the local economy. To become more economically 
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developed, the city has taken advantage of its historical importance. For example, 
Guanajuato is the first place where the Spanish extracted gold and silver within the 
Americas. As such, the city has developed a cultural tradition to celebrate the Cerventino 
street festival, which attracts tourists annually to the city.  
The city’s largest revenue source originates from the sale of entrance fees to the 
mummy museum. Other revenues are generated from 1) property taxes; 2) municipality 
fines and rents; and 3) general service fees such as for organizing events in public parks, 
charging for home sales and colleting funds from tourism for a cultural fund (which 
includes sales tax on general goods, rent of equipment and a special hotel tax). Of the 
nearly US$ 33 million dollars generated by tourism in the state annually, nearly 35 
percent, or approximately US$ 12 million dollars, is returned to the local governments.  
In the past, the state managed all collections of funds, but now the city has its own 
system for the management of its tax base. It was estimated that for each $1 peso 
transferred from the state government, 20 percent of that goes to the municipality of 
Guanajuato. Figure 7.1 demonstrates the percentage of own-source revenue with is nearly 
the same as the total collection rates. 
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Figure 7.1 Total Own-source Revenues in Guanajuato (capital) 
 
Source: INEGI 
 
The large spike in the graphic after 1997 is due to revenue decentralization reforms 
at the federal level. The City of Guanajuato thereafter had more funds to allocate to the 
municipal projects. Of the federal transfers, the city receives an estimated 65 percent 
from Ramo 28 and 35 percent from Ramo 33. Ramo 33 has helped to strengthen local 
infrastructure. On the other hand, Ramo 28 can be spent on current expenditures, debt, 
and public projects. However, the municipality cannot pay for expenditures such public 
servants, which cannot be over 16 percent of recurring costs, with these funds. 
From 2004 to 2009 the city increased its revenues by 45 percent, even with 
inflation rates at 4.5 to five percent. Nearly 25 percent of this increase came from fines, 
which increased from nearly $21 million to $33 million dollars over that period. Also the 
increase in local tax collection was helped when the city redefined its cadastre, which 
also systematized property tax payments and created a better auditing system.  
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 Figure 7.2 disaggregates the spending of the city of Guanajuato. Until only 
recently, little had been spent on wage bill and other operational expenditures within the 
municipality. Much of the budget, listed in the graph as transfers, has been returned to the 
state and national government as their part of revenues sharing system.  
Figure 7.2 Disaggregated Spending in Guanajuato (capital) 
 
Source: INEGI 
Social investment funds cannot be more than 17 percent of the total expenditures and are 
typically driven through transfers. These funds must be allocated for improving housing, 
school, and family assistance programs (DIF), which consists of six percent of 
Guanajuato’s budget. Reoccurring expenditures, such as wage bill (public employment), 
operation and goods and services, were as low as 10 percent prior to 2004 and as high as 
60 percent in 2008. The city has nearly 1,500 employees. One way the city manages the 
budget is by eliminating spending on personnel.  
In 2009, the city borrowed US$3 million dollars from the Bank of Bajío at four 
percent annual interest set for ten years (this is the second of such loans beginning in 
2005). The law prohibits long-term debt for current expenditures, but allows financing for 
infrastructure and development. In 2005, the city had a ten-year loan of US$6 million 
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dollars and received matching funds from Banobras.50 The city took advantage of the 
state’s World Bank financing option, in which, it first paid back the other creditors, and 
made a programmatic decision to create improvements in the city for the tourism sector. 
Guanajuato City’s Local Economy 
The economic base of the municipality of Guanajuato includes approximately ten 
percent farming income, 32 percent manufacturing and 53 percent commercial activities. 
Approximately 79,000 people are in the labor market. Of which, 88 percent of the 
population is between 14-47 of age. Table 7.9 describes the trends of employment within 
the city.  
7.5 Guanajuato’s Economically Active Population  (over 12 years of age)  
Sex  Total  Active percent of the populationEmployed Unemployed
 
Inactive percent of 
the population  Not Specified  
Municipality 100,737  48,121  526 51,557 533  
Men 47 975  32,004  397  15,281  293  
Women 52 762  16,117  129  36,276  240  
Source: (INAFED Instituto para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal 2010) 
 
The major sectors of the economy for the municipality of Guanajuato include agriculture, 
mining, and tourism. Tourism is very important for the city, which has an abundant 
amount of rich cultural and artistic heritage, including monuments, buildings, museums, 
plazas, squares, and temples in the downtown. Building dates back to as early as the 
colonial era. Also, the city has a wide range of professional services, mainly for tourists, 
such as banking, culture shops and leisure activities are located there. Table 7.6 
disaggregates the active sectors in the economy.  
 
                                                        
50 Trust funds (fidecomisios) are instruments used by the state and municipalities to finance projects. The 
funds are put into separate accounts and receive national backing by the automatic payments from of Ramo 
28, which are the unconditional transfers from the federal treasury to the state governments. 
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7.6 Guanajuato’s Economically Active Population by Sector  
Sector Economic Census Employed   
Total 3 611 19 000
Fishing n/a 18 
Mining and Extraction Industries  n/ 2366 
Manufacturing 356 1 559 
Construction 87 3 475 
Commercial Operations 1 867 4 352 
Transport and Communication 100 1 328 
Private Services not Financial 1 186 5 902 
Source: (INAFED Instituto para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal 2010) 
 
Arguably, agricultural development is low because of the steep landscape. 
However, the main crops are sorghum, alfalfa, peanuts, and fruit, animal husbandry. 
Typically, farmers raise cattle, goats, and sheep. Mining is the activity that gave rise to 
the city of Guanajuato. Today, gold mining is minimal, but silver, lead, and kaolin have 
taken its place, and are currently being excavated in Guanajuato. 
Guanajuato’s Economic Development Efforts 
Arguably, the city of Guanajuato has two major mechanisms to strengthen its 
economic development for the region. The first is through the leveraging of its public 
finances for project, and secondly, is the traditional establishment of an office of 
economic development. For example, the city’s current economic development plan, 
through the use of these available public finances, is to “improve its urban vision,” which 
consists of a 12 step plan to improve streets, sidewalks, and monuments. According to 
one public official, the principal decision to take out private debt was to restore public 
areas and fix streets, urban stores fronts and pavement. Nearly US$1.5 million dollars of 
the World Bank loan were dedicated to construction projects and the remaining was used 
to pay off past city debts. 
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The city of Guanajuato’s economic development (LED) office provides programs 
to strengthen the local and regional economy. The 2009 local economic development 
budget was approximately $385,000 dollars.51 The total included the contributions of 39 
percent from the state; 43 percent from the municipality; 15 percent from the federal 
government and only three percent from the private sector. The funding helps to support 
various sectors in the economy such as art production (8 percent of the local budget), 
service sector (ten percent), financial development (18 percent), micro-credit (23 percent) 
and tourism-related activities (18 percent). 
The economic development director identified that the city faces three major 
problems in order to improve its economy. These include: 1) the reputation of the 
arduous legal requirements which leads to long set-up times for small businesses; 2) the 
legal framework itself, which does not help attract small businesses; and 3) the lack of 
fiscal incentives to attract new businesses to work within the municipality. 
One public administrator had a very progressive vision of the city’s local economic 
development policies. He focuses more on small business production and providing 
assistance to locally produced industry, rather than attracting new foreign owned business 
into the area. Apparently, in recent years the major American big-box retailer, Wal-Mart 
wanted to establish a store within the city limits. He suggested the following 
contradiction: 
Creating an industrial park is valued, but it generally, generates more questions than 
answers, especially for a place with such high inequality like the State of 
Guanajuato. For example, specifically for the workers in the unions and their 
families, who from the city would be assigned to negotiate with them? Second, in 
understanding the concept of innovation: the public official suggested that when 
there is such a low level of professional development, who from Guanajuato would 
                                                        
51 This is a small percentage in the overall budget of the city. 
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work these jobs? Additionally, concepts such as industrial cleanup could be 
problematic. Finally, and a future possibility could be the production of software 
would be idea for the region, but the LED profession questioned where the 
investors would come from? 
 
The city has major connections with the private sector through organization of chambers 
of commerce and works actively to engage them to produce better public policies. This 
pragmatic view demonstrates the reality that many highly qualified public officials face 
in a territory with a small and underdeveloped private sector. 
Even with these successes to promote economic development and fiscal autonomy, 
one public official suggested that the mayor has a wish list of improvements, which 
included receiving additional transfers from the national government.  Notwithstanding, it 
efforts to be fiscally autonomous, one public official projected the need for up to 30 
percent of the budget to be transferred from the national government for public projects 
such as for water expansion and rubbish collection systems.  
Public officials agreed that outside NGOs can help the social welfare of the 
population, but is not enough. For instance, if an NGO helps 100 people, there are an 
additional one thousand people in the city that need help. In one interview, a public 
administrator suggested that this is why a strong local government is needed, to cover the 
social costs of the society left by the marketplace.  
Another recommendation from a public official in Guanajuato was to make the city 
even more economically developed. He observed that it was during Lopez Portillo’s 
presidency (1976-82) when the role of municipal development started to become 
increasingly important, especially with the use of trust funds for development projects. 
The decentralization process, in this administrator’s perspective, is not complete. 
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According to one public official, “administrative reforms should include either reelection 
of municipal office for two administrations for a total of six years or became mayor for a 
total of four years in order to get everything done.” He added, “in order to have 
successful planning, a mayor needs more time in office.”  
Finally, the level of professional development of the municipal staff is relatively 
high in Guanajuato, which could account for the public projects and sustainable public 
finances. Public finances have to been used as an innovative approach for driving 
economic development. For example, the mayor’s office request to the federal 
archeological agency to transferred management responsibilities, first the state agency, 
and later to the city to be managed rendered increasing the tax base by 40 percent. The 
idea in and of itself, is innovative but also has helped the city to leverage other debt 
finances for additional projects.   
Another example is the use of pension funds for financing project.  Through a 
national law, the retirement accounts (AFORES) can be used for public investments. 
Many cities do not take advantage of these accounts in Mexico, because one wants to 
take the risk to default on the AFORES loans. Higher capacity means more project 
development. For example, the City’s Public Works office (Secretaría de Obra Pública) 
used the city’s AFORES, pension fund, to fund a parking lot and commercial center and 
had recuperated accrued75 percent of the investment by 2009. Overall, the level of 
professional development (e.g. education, training and skills) of public employees 
matters to their technical ability to establish and manage projects. 
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7.4 San Miguel de Allende 
This city is most notable for September 13, 1810, the day when Ignacio Perez 
arrived in town to report that the country had declared independence from Spain. San 
Miguel de Allende (SMA) is a mid-size town within Guanajuato that has a large amount 
of tourism, an artist community, and increasingly, a larger amount of foreign-born 
residents who enjoy both its beauty and the arts community. The cases examines that 
American residents heavily influence on the city and its prospects for economic 
development with additional financial resources. In respect to the fiscal solvency of the 
municipal budget, San Miguel is the case that has increased its wealth by the effect of 
having affluent migrants living in the community. The city also increased its property 
values in order to provide more financial revenues to improve municipal programs. 
It was during the Spanish occupation in the early 16th century that the region 
became known for its renaissance of art and culture. Since then, the town has attracted a 
very large number of foreign retirees, artists, writers, and tourists, which have shifted the 
economy of the area from agriculture and industry to commerce, catering to these outside 
foreign visitors and expatriate residents. Beginning in the 1950s, many Americans stated 
to travel to SMA in pursuit of its artist colony.52 The foreign influence is one of the major 
influencing factors to select and analyze the case of San Miguel de Allende.  
The population San Miguel shows significant population grew significantly from 
1980 to 2000 and more gradual growth thereafter. After this first population boom, the 
                                                        
52 Several famous artists have spent time in San Miguel. For example, “In 1960, Jack Kerouac, the novelist 
who had catapulted to fame three years earlier with the publication of On the Road, went to San Miguel 
with pals Allen Ginsburg and Neal Cassady. Ginsburg read his poetry at the Instituto Allende, while 
Kerouac and Cassady spent most of their time downing tequilas at La Cucaracha, a traditional Mexican 
cantina that remains popular to this day. The trio remained only a few days, but in 1968, Cassady returned 
to San Miguel, where he died at age 41 from the effects of alcohol” (Smithsonian Publication). 
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regional annual average was 2.18 percent after 2000. Many people in San Miguel live in 
rural areas within the municipality. Considering the population over five years, by 1995 
there were a total of 118,769 people born in the municipality of Allende, of which 3.68 
percent had their residency in another state or country. This is an important statistic since 
the state of Guanajuato is number five in the nation for outgoing migration. Many 
foreigners are finding San Miguel de Allende their home. American retirees are not listed 
into the official census data because several live only parts of the year in San Miguel de 
Allende, but are the largest portion of foreigners.  Table 7.7 demonstrates the population 
increases. 
SMA’s Political Environment  
The city of San Miguel de Allende has over 950 small communities of less than 
2,500 people in its surrounding area.53 Ten commissioners (Regidores) are based in the 
municipality of Allende. In 2009, the municipality’s annual budget was approximately 
$35 million dollars, of which it spends most of it on administrative costs. One public 
official estimated that the city spends nearly $10 million dollars a year on salaries alone. 
The conservative PAN national party outweighs the city politics, although there is also 
local representation by the PVEM, PRD, and PRI.54  In the last election in 2009, the 
                                                        
53 Mexico’s major administrative divisions for local governments are municipalities (like US counties). 
Cities may be located within a particular municipality, but are counted by the census as municipalities. 
 
54 Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM) or the Green Party in Mexico was created in 1979 as an 
alternative party to the dominate PRI, but is often described as co-opted by the PRI. The green party aligns 
itself with the anti-abortion debate and other ideas that are not relate to the environment. 
7.7 Population of the Municipality of San Miguel de Allende 
Year  1980 1990 1995 2000  
Total  77,624  110,692  118,769  134,880  
 % of State Pop  2.58  2.78  2.70  2.89  
Source:  INEGI 1981; INEGI 1991; INEGI 1996, INEGI 2000. 
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mayor and commissionaires changed. Under Mayor José Jesús Correa Ramírez (2006-
09), the municipality’s representatives included five PAN, three PRD members, and one 
member each from the PT (workers party) and the PAN. Luz Maria “Lucy” Nunez 
Flores, the city’s first female mayor, was elected and manages a municipal council of 
four PAN, three PRI, two PRD, and one member from the PVEM party. Table 5.8 is a list 
of the previous past municipal presidents in San Miguel de Allende.  
Table 7.8 SMA’s Municipal Presidents 
1980-1982  Pedro Gerez Diez PRI 
1983-1985  Luis Ferro de la Sota PRI 
1986-1988  Ernesto Villagómez PRI 
1989-1991  Manuel Zavala Ramírez PRI 
1992-1994  Salvador García González PAN 
1995-1997  Jaime Michael Fernández Martínez Harris PRI 
1998-2000  Salvador García González PAN 
2000-2003 Oscar Arroyo Delgado PAN 
2003-2006 Luis Alberto Villarreal García  PAN 
2006-2009  José Jesús Correa Ramírez PAN 
2009-2012 Luz Maria Nuñez Flores  Umbrella Party 
Source: (INAFED 2010) 
  
 Unlike most of the country, the local green party has established itself within the 
municipality and has its own flourishing agenda. One council member representing the 
PVEM was previously the city’s ecology director prior to running for public office.55 
During his tenure, this public administrator set up the Fondo Verde, which was a public-
private fund to encourage citizens to pay for municipal ecological services. Since its 
creation in mid-2006, the fund has accumulated over $1 million dollar to promote 
greening practices in municipal laws and legislation. The idea was supported by local 
civil society organizations that composed of many of the foreign born residents, such as 
                                                        
55 This Commissioner stated that he had never imagined becoming a county commissioner, but became 
increasingly engaged in the green agenda after finishing a master’s degree in international law in the United 
States. Shortly after returning home, he worked in the local administration, but after five years, he could not 
continue in that position and had to run as a commissioner in order to continue the work within the 
municipality. 
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the Audubon society, the Lion’s and Rotary clubs. A public committee oversees the fund, 
and it is comprised of both citizens and government officials to approve projects. Local 
projects include improvements in riverbeds, walkways, and trash removal from local 
streets. The idea of the green fund was started in 2005 to help pay for public park 
improvements. The public official suggested that the municipality could add additional 
budget funds, by increasing sales on property or by an increasing two percent tax tourism 
tax. Several states have copied the idea of the Fondo Verde.  
San Miguel’s Municipal Finances 
The municipal budget in San Miguel de Allende is rather small. The annual budget 
is estimated to be around US$30 million dollars, where US$10 million are collected 
locally, US$15 million are transferred from federal funds and US$5 million from the 
State of Guanajuato. Nearly one quarter of the local tax collection comes from property 
taxes. In 2009, the city had taken out public debt of nine years at an interest rate of 1.5 
percent, which was financed through Banobras.  
One public official indicated that cutting excesses within the municipality is done 
by not offering overtime to employees, which is critical to maintain a balanced budget. 
He admitted that the municipality had problems by simply offering too many benefit to 
staff. Benefits are another way that city spends its budget on human resources. Figure 7.3 
disaggregates spending for San Miguel de Allende. In effect, wage bill was as high as 50 
percent in 1998 and decreased to less than 20 percent in 2008. The percentages of these 
expenditures are in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3 Disaggregated Spending in San Miguel de Allende 
 
Source: INEGI 
 
The budget expenses include a large portion for wage bill. The next highest expense 
includes public works and lesser so, goods and services and finally payments from 
national government transfers (Ramo 28). Figure 7.4 describes the total own-source 
revenue (TOSR) verse the total collection (budget) for the city. After the decentralization 
law in 1997, the increase in the total budget increased substantially, yet the TOSR has 
stayed relatively the same even dropping in 2003 and again in 2006. 
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Figure 7.4 Total Own-source Revenues in San Miguel de Allende 
Source: INEGI 
The local budget is posted annually on the Website as the government’s report. 
Generally, estimations of the budget’s expenses include 50 percent for public works 
(which is composed of half local funds, and the rest divided by national and state funds); 
25 percent social programs, where 80 percent comes from the national Social Fund; and 
the remaining 25 percent are used for the municipality’s operations. The municipal staff 
totals 911 employees. 
San Miguel’s Local Economy 
Tourism in SMA is the most significant private industry for the city. Tourists come 
from around the world to see the art and high quality museums and cathedral. The second 
major economic force that has driven the local population of San Miguel de Allende is 
the inward migration of foreigners. Other areas that have strengthened the local economy 
also include agriculture activities, such as forestry, and minimal amounts of industrial and 
trade activities. In the municipality of Allende activities related to the primary sector 
(agriculture) generate 25 percent of all jobs. Moreover, despite being one of the 
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municipalities with a greater number of poultry, egg production represents a low 
percentage compared to the state’s production. Table 7.9 describes the types of business 
that San Miguel de Allende has compared to the State’s activities 
Table 7.9 Division of the business sector in SMA in 1998
 Total SMA State 
Retail  66,895 29,877 37,018 
SMEs 200,513 48,508 152,005 
The numbers include a sum of jobs created by sector. Source: Censo Económico 1999. INEGI 
 
Infrastructure development has played a large role in the development of Rural 
Zones for the area. For example, additional access to areas of the municipality through 
the pavement of roads has improved over the past few years. According to one public 
official, the development of a shopping center, which is located just outside the city 
center of San Miguel de Allende, has created many jobs. New housing construction was 
also going on throughout the early 2000s, until the recent economic downturn in 2008. As 
a result, the San Miguel de Allende is now faced with an influence of large disparities of 
wealth, and thus, security problems for these new properties. 
Another recent change is the improvements in education levels across the San 
Miguel de Allende. The city’s student population is concentrated mainly in the primary 
levels. On the other hand, high school and professional levels students are very low. 
Considering the rate of the population of the municipality with respect to the state (2.9 
percent) the municipality has a shortfall in state averages. Two colleges located in San 
Miguel de Allende, the Universidad del Valle de Mexico and University of Leon campus, 
which both offer four professional degrees.  
Additionally, the society in San Miguel de Allende has accepted the influx of more 
Americans living in the county. One public official has noted that there has been an 
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indirect influence having the Americans living in San Miguel de Allende. According to 
him, it is not that the gringos are helping with more social programs, but they are adding 
to the federation’s efforts to social development, for him, “Just a bit more is all that it 
takes to make the municipality much better.” 
San Miguel de Allende’s Economic Development Efforts 
Another approach to local economic development comes directly from the expat 
community. One local American artist commented that his grandmother migrated to San 
Miguel in the 1920s because she was attracted to the artist colony. His father followed 
her after World War II. He, himself, grew up in the United States, but finally moved 
permanently to San Miguel de Allende, after going back and forth from Cape Cod, Mass 
throughout much of the 80s and 90s. In 2009, the American described a plan to build an 
art school in the area to attract international attention for San Miguel de Allende. The 
idea was to build a school with all its modern conventions, with classrooms and studios 
was to attract quality arts students. He and a group of local artists planned to hire a 
Ricardo Ligaretta, a highly renowned Mexican developer and architecture, to design the 
school.  
The idea for the arts school provides an example for how the foreigners are 
influencing the economic development in San Miguel de Allende. The American 
suggested that the project named the San Miguel Institute would bring a large-scale 
business of Americans to study fine art to Mexico. The business plan aims at providing 
short-term classes for American and European retirees. The construction project was 
estimated to be over $1.2 million dollars in 2009. “That sort of capital to start an arts 
school would be unthinkable for a small municipality with minimal amounts of 
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administrative support and small amounts of direct programming budget for its yearly 
activities” accounted one public official. 
Additional efforts to promote economic development come from the municipal 
office of the environment. The surrounding forests provide much of the economic 
activity. Reforestation is important part of this. In 1992, the city planted more than 
14,000 trees in an area of 14.6 hectares, representing 1.7 percent of the forested areas of 
the state. By 1998 these numbers increased to some 660,000 trees planted in an area of 
294 thousand hectares. In 2000, the city planted 12,500 trees with a reforested area of 
12.5 hectares. In 2009, the environment office had received between 60 and 100 
proposals to improve the local environmental quality, many of which have come from the 
foreigners living in the area.  
One public official suggested that engagement with civil society has been difficult. 
Apparently San Miguel hosts the largest international section of the Audubon Society, 
with some 300 members. According to this public administrator, the members only have 
demands and no solutions to public problems. He stated, “even if they use their 
memberships to plan programs, it would help.” One public official highlighted that the 
local NGOS create demands but do provide support or develop feasible solutions to 
public problems. The city has reached out internationally and has created partnerships 
with Brandies University in Boston and Eco Systems Sciences in Boise Idaho, which 
have helped to contribute to pay for salaries of two local staff members. 
Further civic engagement comes directly from foreigners who have set up their 
causes locally. For example, one American, who has lived in San Miguel for many years 
and is currently the president of the local library, which he runs as an NGO. The library 
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was an American invention after two women in the 1950s started to bring books to San 
Miguel to teach children to read. Finally, they convinced the city of San Miguel de 
Allende to donate a building, which was formally a slaughterhouse for pigs. The library 
has for the past 20 years has operated as an arts and cultural center. Currently, it also has 
a café and English bookshop. In an interview, the director suggested that there have been 
several comments lately from the senior residents complaining about the children running 
in the halls. The library is a public space and welcomes not only American expats but 
also the local Mexican residents from San Miguel. The primary extracurricular activity is 
teaching English, which is the primary language of the library. Singing, poetry, video 
projection, painting, and reading classes are also offered to the city’s youth.  
Another American NGO in San Miguel is a self-defined a pro-Marxist organization. 
This NGO aims to strengthen women’s employment and find alternative ways to fight 
globalization (defined as the negative effects caused by NAFTA to small industries and 
the informal sector employees). The group has been in operation for approximately five 
years and has enlisted interns to work in community development projects around the 
city. The director suggested that they recruit participants from across the world and have 
placements for short-term work and long-term assignments. The NGO encourages 
foreign volunteers to be involved in local community activities. 
With the influx of foreigners, social tensions do exist in San Miguel de Allende. 
Divisions between residents, whether they were foreign born or local Mexicans, do exist. 
Racism creates tension between the two communities. For example, the library has seen 
some violation of its property from the Mexican residents. The Mexican residents also 
feel invaded by the gringos in their local community. Additionally, division among the 
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foreign residents exist as well, between the “do-gooder” Americans trying to help the 
locals and other retirees enjoying the last of their elderly years. Although many residents 
who enjoy having the gringos in their community. Several youth have received 
scholarships to attend school and others have after school jobs from the gringos. There 
are good prospects for these groups to come together. For example in 2009, the Mayor-
Elect Lucy Nunez presented her platform speech in English to the gringo community. 
Even if the American expat community could not vote in the local election, the local 
politician saw the community as an important on with which to engage.  
7.5 The City of Leon 
The city of Leon is known for being the shoe capital of Mexico. Traditionally, it 
has been the center for the creation and design of Mexico’s shoe industry. This derives 
from leather, which comes from the cowherds surrounding the Bajío. The city is one of 
the largest within the state with a total population of 1,134,842 inhabitants.56  It has a 
flourishing local government, from which many state and national leaders have 
originated. The city has engaged in spatial economic development programs, to 
strengthen its local regional corridors. Away from the main plaza and city center, the next 
concentric circle is made-up of low-income residents, but the surrounding areas include 
strip malls, American style shopping centers and easy access to the major highways. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
56 The municipality of León contributes 24.35 percent of the total state population in 2000. Leon ranks first 
in the state of Guanajuato in population. Of that total 48.88% (554.690 inhabitants) are male and 51.12% 
(580.152 inhabitants) remaining women. 
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Table 7.10 Municipal Presidents of Leon 
Harold Gabriel Appelt 1980-1982 PRI 
Rodolfo Padilla Padilla 1982-1984 PRI 
Antonio Torres Gómez 1984-1985 Substitute 
Antonio Hernández Ornelas 1986-1987 PRI 
Arturo Villegas Torres 1987-1988 Substitute 
Carlos Medina Plascencia 1989-1991 PAN 
Facundo Castro Chávez 1991 Substitute 
Eliseo Martínez Pérez 1992-1994 PAN 
Luis M. Quirós Echegaray 1995-1997 PAN 
Jorge Carlos Obregón Serrano 1998-2000 PAN 
Luis Ernesto Ayala Torres 2000-2003 PAN 
Ricardo Alaniz Posada 2003-2006 PAN 
Vicente Guerrero Reynoso 2006-2009 PAN 
Francisco Ricardo Sheffield Padilla  2009-2012 PAN 
Source: (INAFED Instituto para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal 2010) 
 
The municipal government of León is managed by the mayor and has 12 councilpersons, 
of which six are elected by plurality from a list or by large. Of the remaining six, two are 
city union members (sindiadisos) and four are selected by proportional representation. 
Below is a list of municipal presidents from Leon, many of which are PAN members, 
especially after 1992 (one year after Vicente Fox’s contested gubernatorial election).  
Leon’s Municipal finances 
In 2009, the City of Leon managed a budget of US$169 million dollars. The 
previous municipal treasurer was fired and charged with embezzlement in 2010.57 He 
served the city through two administrations from 1992-97 and again from 2006-09. In an 
interview in 2009, prior to his arrest, one public official provided an explanation as to 
                                                        
57 Apparently, the Municipal Treasury and his employees invested 37 million pesos in the Sofom, 
Metrofinanciera for which the company lost its investment shares, and therfore lost the public funds doing 
speclative invesments. He received a 900-day penalty fine equivalent to the amount of 46 000 755 pesos, 
and five years of ineligibility to return to office. (Flores, Lourdes. 2009. "Pierde dinero León al quebrar 
Metrofinanciera." in Milenio. Nevo Leon, Mexico, The City of Leon. 2009. "Inhabilitan a Ex Tesorero." 
vol. 2011. Leon, Mexico.) 
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why the city of Leon is an integral component of economic development and finances for 
the state.  
The product of public investment, the city has increased its economic development. 
Leon was rated from S&P as AAMx and Moody’s as Baa3 for its municipal debt. The 
city has public debt of approximately $125 million pesos (which is approximately US$10 
million dollars) as its local budget from Banco Bajío. The city employee’s trust fund, 
Fidecomicio de Obras de Coparciado (FIDOC), was created with 40 percent state, 20 
percent neighborhoods, and 40 percent municipal financing was used as collateral. Leon 
is one of the largest cities in Mexico. The municipality meets with the G10, which is a 
conglomeration of the largest city governments of Mexico, which was established by 
President Fox. 
The city’s total local budget is described in figure 7.5. Of the total budget, 43 
percent is collected locally compared to the 57 percent received in transfers from the 
national government. Leon’s TOSR has been proportional to its total budget but 
continuously but drastically decreased after the 1997 federal decentralization law. 
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Figure 7.5 shows the percentage of TOSR collected by the municipality of Leon. 
 
Source: INEGI 
 
Figure 7.6 presents the amount of spending for the city of Leon. The city spends nearly 
30 percent on its public employees (wage bill), which is the highest expenditures.  The 
next highest expenditure is funds from transfers, which are typically redistributed for 
social policies. The other areas of expenditures include assets, subsidies, services, public 
works, and a very small amount for public debt. 
Figure 7.6 Leon’s Disaggregated Spending (1993-2008) 
Source: INEGI 
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The city took out its first public loan under the first PAN administration of Mayor 
Carlos Medina Placencia, prior to him becoming Governor. In 1992, the second PAN 
Mayor Eliseo Martinez Perez initiated an increase in urban development activities by 
improving property tax collection. At that time, the city restructured its cadastre, 
reapplying a new property tax structure. This involved hiring small crop airplanes to fly 
over the territory and take photographs of city lots. With airplane scans, the city 
government hired a cartographer to evaluate the land. Shortly thereafter, the city 
government requested that the public pay an estimated tax rate for their property. If a 
citizen did not pay the new rate, the city would charge the new rate plus five years of 
back payments. This encouraged people to pay for their effective value of their property. 
As a result from these measures, according to one public official, the municipality 
increased its tax revenue by 92 percent.58  One municipal administrator admired the party 
leadership of the PAN for improving the tax rolls. 
In 2003, Mayor Luis Ernesto Ayala Torres increased the city’s tax revenue again 
through the creation of a new administrative office. The Offices of the Treasury, 
Cadastre, and Development Planning (IMPLAN for is acronym in Spanish) merged the 
procurement system, land management and tax collect efforts into one office. The 
municipality bought a computer server to evaluate propriety online, which also combined 
with the citizens’ tax bills through Internet-based payments. The state’s planning office 
(IPLANEG for is acronym in Spanish) merged its function, therefore revised property 
taxes schemes were assign for new construction. 
                                                        
58 According to one public official, from 1997 to 2009, levies to property taxes went from $40 million 
pesos to $3,500 million pesos in tax revenue. 
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The city of Leon has a low-interest rate for their public loan is at two percent. The 
city liquidated its 1990s public debt with the new World Bank loan.  Because the loan 
was set in local currency (pesos) instead of U.S. dollars, the city managed a lower 
repayment prate.  This schemed changed after the Tequila Crisis in 1994 when the 
defaults were high due to loans being in U.S. dollars. The loan was $23 million dollars 
that was paid off and a new line of credit was taken out about US$32 million dollars. At 
that time, the World Bank loan used Banobras as an intermediary, which had higher 
interest rates but used the conversion rates of dollars from 2005. 59  With the Banobras 
loan, the state paid back its debt in Mexican pesos in 2007 at a 90 percent rate. In 
November 2008, the city started a new line of credit at two percent interest. According to 
one public official, the World Bank offered higher rates than the private sector. For 
example, the Banco de Bajío has lower rates, but at a short term. With these rates, the 
municipality has to abide by the law of how much it can take out in public loans. The city 
posts their reports on the Website to be transparent.60  
Administrative capacity is high in Leon, so much so that their financiers can 
manipulate data and misplace public money on the capital markets. For example, one 
public administrator remarked, “public debt is not bad—it’s just how you spend the 
money that counts. The problems most municipalities have are the quality and capacity of 
the work. The citizens own the bonds. Leon had three years of miss management by the 
                                                        
59 The Federal social program set up by Salinas distributed the first Ramo 26 in the old transfer system 
before Zedillo transformed the inter-governmental relations in 1997 (which was later developed into the 
Ramo 28 and 33). The funding to Guanajuato went towards the public transportation system. Of the city’s 
budget, $3400 million pesos are spent primarily on public transportation. 
 
60 The city’s Website (www.leon.gob.mx) posts its month budget but does not aggregate the numbers, they 
do not report numbers programmatically and thus cause significant difficultly for researching expenditure 
and revenue generation. Once a new city administration comes on board they typically delete their 
predecessors Web site so there is no historic data to review on how the city has projected its finances over 
time. 
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mayor.” Their public officials often had tradeoffs between the city and the state, and 
therefore, have quality people working at both levels of government.  
Leon’s Local Economy 
The major industries in Leon include agriculture, tourism, and small industrial 
development. The city forms a major urban conglomeration with major center for truism, 
trade and commercial activities. While the city has been historically the country’s largest 
leather and footwear producer, it is now diversifying its local economy. Table 7.11 
describes the depth of the economy by showing the types of industries that Leon has and 
its strength in the general economy. Large manufacturing, commercial, and private 
financial services are major components of the local economy.  
7.11 Leon’s Economically Active Population by Sector
Sector Personal Employed 
Total Gross 
Production 
(million pesos) 
Total input 
(million 
pesos) 
Gross Value Added  
 
Total 241,302 37,203,685.6 20,743,770.4 16,459,915.2 
Fishing 24 207 10 197 
Mining and Extraction Industries 51 5,636.0 3,821.0 1,815.0 
Manufacturing 103,397 19,437,983.0 13,730,825.0 5,707,158.0 
Construction 8,017 1,309,793.0 893,930.0 415,863.0 
Commercial Operations 62,960 8,307,884.0 2,587,155.0 5,720,729.0 
Transport and Communication 15,562 3,162,750.6 1,178,464.4 1,984,286.2 
Private Services not Financial 51,291 4,979,432.0 2,349,565.0 2,629,867.0 
Source: (INAFED Instituto para el Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal 2010) 
 
Economic Development Efforts 
The current mayor has made an effort to promote economic develop within Leon. 
For example, in his 2009, Ricardo Sheffield administration reports his personal promise 
to finance over ten thousand SMEs through a micro-credit fund (Leon 2009). His annual 
report further highlighted that 2,645 citizens received training and 542 has received 
financial assistances for their small business. The city’s program has promoted 956 
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micro-credits for citizens to open new business within the community. The administration 
is trying to improve the speed with which businesses can open and so therefore they have 
created five new offices called Sistema de Apertura Rapida de Empresas (SARE). 
Additionally, city officials are working with the private sector to attract private 
investments. In 2009, the amount of private sector investments totaled US$114,530,000 
dollars and created more than 2,627 direct jobs (Leon 2009). 
 Additional efforts to promote the local economy include:  providing free Internet 
services in nine of the major public plazas; restoring the historic area in time for 
Mexico’s bicentennial celebration (September 16, 2010); the creation of three technology 
parks; creating a university center for research, strengthening the museum; increasing 
tourism to the area by improving attractions, improving the quality of the municipal golf 
course and promotion an international balloon fair. Finally, the city is working in 
conjunction with the state, which was assigned $36,750,000 pesos to a program called 
“Mi Plaza,” which conserved 5,000 jobs to improve the commercialization and 
production of cultural artifacts for the local economy (Leon 2009). 
7.6 Summary Discussion  
Overall, Zedillo’s revenue decentralization policies, through the creation of Ramo 
28 and Ramo 33, have increased the state’s municipal programs. Cities have more 
financial resources allocated through the state government to implement supplementary 
programs, but no one municipality is autonomous. Tax effort has decreased throughout 
the same period. Although nearly every municipal treasurer stated that they have made 
serious efforts to collect more taxes or cut inefficiencies. The intergovernmental transfers 
(the revenue decentralization) have also come with more responsibility and a higher 
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commitment for upward reporting, although not necessarily downward accountability to 
citizens. 
For at least the past 20 years, city officials have been increasingly able to decide 
where their public investments should be made. The local officials within a specific 
municipality do not always decide where large state investments are allocated. State 
officials primarily evaluate the municipalities’ finances and decide where the public 
projects that the national government wants to invest in (for example the highway 
projects around Leon). These decisions are made often times on political costs and not 
based on market decisions. Public investment decisions are more likely to be made from 
political costs, e.g. who will publicly benefitted in the next election cycle, rather than, 
what revenue the project would generate. For example, the investment decisions of 
investing in a Pemex refinery in Celaya under the Calderon government sought more 
political capital then high rates of return.61 As for rural development, the state is 
interested more in larger investment deals then building a producer small-scale economy. 
Many of the local officials seek solutions such as microcredit funds to deal with their 
large-scale problem of rural poverty. The state knows that it must take advantage of the 
rural sector to implement projects. For example, one public official cited that 50 percent 
of municipal highways improvements are made investments from the State. 
The traditional responsibilities for municipalities, granted through the 1917 
Constitution, have increased from trash pickup and improvements of water treatment 
plants to more demanding activities such as ecological programs and economic 
development promotion. Most public officials are involved in promoting LED activities, 
                                                        
61 Celaya, Guanajuato with a current Pemex refinery, was in direct competition with Michoacán, a state 
situated adjacently to Guanajuato and the home state of President Calderon, for infrastructure 
improvements. 
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even if their cities do not have a formal tax or financial incentive program to do so. 
Typically municipalities are open in terms of sharing their financial and programmatic 
data and many leaders are engaged in developing an LED agenda to overall their city’s 
wellbeing. The level of education and commitment to community development by public 
officials are high. Even with corruption taking place, the public official’s knowledge of 
finances was commendable.  
Whether public officials had undergraduate degrees or more advanced degrees 
(Masters, diplomas or other certifications), this research found that most local 
government officials sought to eliminate waste and promote new local programs within 
the constraints of their city budgets. With a few exceptions, local public officials were not 
open to express re-election reforms. The city of Leon is substantially more involved with 
local politicians into state and national leaders than its partners in San Miguel or 
Guanajuato City. This also is because it is the largest city in the state and has more 
population to identify possible new leaders. Of course the PAN influence was an 
influential factor for all policies throughout the State of Guanajuato. San Miguel has had 
more plurality, in terms of opposition parties, in their local council than Leon and 
Guanajuato. 
This research found that civil society groups are active in Guanajuato. The city of 
San Miguel, in particular, sited to have the most active and aggressive demands from its 
local civil society groups. This could be from the increasing American expatriate 
community living there, which has created some animosity. Yet these foreign born 
residents did not seem to increase the municipal budget as substantially as previously 
expected. The increase in property taxes, which would be the most effective way to tax 
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this population, seems to be a small portion of the overall budget. San Miguel had the 
highest amount of intergovernmental transfers than any other Mexican case study, most 
likely because it has the least amount of population and is perhaps more rural.  
Arguably, if forgone property tax revenue systems were collected, this could also 
improve the quality of public services offer by the city. The increase of demand is not 
responded through the increase of supply of public goods. However, unfortunately, with 
the negative incentive to collect more revenue established by the national legal 
framework for municipalities, it is hard to assess the true costs of the property increased 
by the foreigners. According to one academic in Guanajuato:  
Although the new Federal Revenue Sharing within Mexico, managed by the 
National Treasury did allow decision-making and authority of levels of taxes to be 
made at the local level, they lack teeth. Municipalities have the right to levy tax 
fees, business locations and permits, renting, “derechos” or rights, for general 
services such as water and light. They are not allowed the right to change property 
tax bases. The State governments are the last line of decisions for municipalities. 
The best position for a local government official is to lose a national election. In 
that way, they would be selected to be the next director of public works for their 
state team. 
 
As such a new appointee can manipulate the state finances to benefit their political career 
for the next election cycle. This clearly illustrates the poor incentives that the political 
process has created within the intergovernmental system. 
Still other research suggests there are more serious problems with the Mexican 
public administration (Merino Huerta 2008). Mayors are elected to serve three-year 
terms, “the first year is used to learn the system, the second to allocate public funds for 
personal benefit, and the third to discover ways to cover up the embezzlement.” Another 
politician related this type of fraud could be worse, since often times the narcotraffickers 
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often try to extort public officials into protecting the territories where they are producing, 
carrying, and selling illegal drugs.  
Although the debate continues to surround the municipal election process, the 
immediate conclusion finds that reforms are necessary to improve the quality of life for 
Mexican residents.62 This research further finds that forgone local tax revenue from 
property could create larger budgets for cities. The capital city of Guanajuato was the 
only case that made an attempt to increase its revenues, which were used to promote 
economic development activities. The next chapter tests these assumptions and 
reevaluates the case study’s data by using a comparative perspective. 
                                                        
62 As of June 2011, one PAN senator from Tijuana has sponsored a bill that would change election laws for 
Congress to re-elect mayors, senators and federal deputies. Currently the bill has not passed the divided 
Congress (the PRI controlled lower house) but will be reviewed again on the Congressional floor in the fall 
of 2011 before the PAN President Calderon leaves office. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE SIX CASE STUDIES 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks comparatively at the six case studies in order to better 
understand what factors influence a city’s commitment to collect additional local tax 
revenue and promote economic development programs. The chapter focuses on the 
independent variables to determine what shapes cities’ decision-making efforts. It pays 
particular attention to the city’s political ideology, intergovernmental structure, 
geography, mayoral leadership, and the professional development of the staff in order to 
determine city’s tax collection and spending priorities.  
Evidence in this study shows that lack of coordination between a city’s tax 
collection efforts and economic development investments. Even though it was assumed 
that tax collection in Mexico would be lower than in Argentina, because of their varying 
levels of commitments to national decentralization policy reforms, the city governments 
studied were only minimally affected. Additionally, the analysis shows that bigger cities 
do not necessarily collect more taxes and spend more on economic development 
programs. Furthermore, just as revenue collections are based on a complex set of issues, 
so too are expenditure decisions. A city’s administrative capacity has a greater impact on 
these policies than what was originally assumed. In general, the most important external 
factor for city government to make decisions is their political relations with higher-level 
public officials at the state or federal level of government. City governments in this 
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analysis are more reliant on fiscal transfers from political relations of their subnational 
government than any other source. Nevertheless, the data collected in this chapter suggest 
that cities can be the economic development engines for the future if they so choose, and 
as such, Latin American cities can manage sound urban financial policies.  
This chapter is broken down into the following sections. First, an overview of the 
six case study budgets is provided. The chapter provides an analysis of the tax authority 
and revenue trends (measured as tax revenues divided by GDP) for each of the selected 
governments. Next, a brief comparison of the six cities expenditure and revenue 
collection rates is provided. Finally, the chapter concludes by evaluating alternative 
hypothesis (variables evaluate included political ideology, intergovernmental structure, a 
city’s geography, mayoral leadership, and the professional development of the 
municipality’s staff) as a way to better understand the decision making-efforts of cities to 
collect more taxes and fund more economic development programs.  
8.2 Budget Analysis of the Six Cities 
 
 It was found that there is a large variation between each city’s per capita budgets.  
Cities in this study spend annually from US$218 per person in San Miguel de Allende to 
as low as US$80 per person in Santa Fe. This wide range could represent the impact of 
public policies at the local level. Although the six cases consist of large metropolitan 
areas, capital cities and smaller towns, it was found that neither population size, nor 
industrial strength were important factors for determining how much a city per capita. 
This provides a wide range of alternative factors to city’s decision-making. Table 8.1 
provides a synopsis of size and public finances for the six cities.  
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Table 8.1 Cities Population, GDP and Budget Size of the Case Studies in 2005 
City Population  GDP GDP Per capita Total Budget 
Total Budget 
Per Capita* 
León 1,436,480 16,191,394,636 12,668 180,800,000 141  
Guanajuato 171,709 1,493,480,230 9,738 24,982,000 162 
San Miguel de 
Allende 160,383 1,065,245,712 7,647 30,370,000 218 
      
Rosario 1,159,004 n/a n/a 155,000,000 134 
Santa Fe 369,046 n/a n/a 29,470,000 80 
Rafaela 83,642 n/a n/a 15,659,000 187 
All Values are calculated in US$ Dollars (using an exchange rate for 2005). There is no GDP data for 
Argentina at the municipal level. * Calculated by diving the total budget by the total population in 2005. 
 
 Table 8.2 demonstrates each city’s authority to manage its public revenues. 
Ratings were established in chapter III based on the previous descriptions of authority for 
each of the subnational governments. Because of the federalist systems, provinces in 
Argentina and states in Mexico determine the legal authority in which local governments 
operate. In general, Argentine municipalities have more legal authority and discretion to 
tax. Argentina has more control over setting tax rates and debt capacity than their 
Mexican counterparts.  
 
Revenue Analysis        
 As described in chapter V, Argentine cities have more legal authority to 
encourage local taxation over their Mexican counterparts. Figure 8.1 uses data gathered 
Table 8.2 Revenue Generation Levels to Measure Authority* 
 Rosario Rafaela Santa Fe Leon GTO SMA 
Does the municipality have the 
ability to increase taxes? 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Does the municipality have the 
ability to impose new taxes? 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Does the municipality have the 
capacity to issue bonds? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Does the municipality have the 
capacity discretion to use trust 
funds? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Does the municipality have the 
ability to roll over funds? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
* Estimates made from Interviews with Municipal authorities.  
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from each of the case study cities to show trends from 1999-2008. Argentine cities 
Rosario and Rafaela have almost five times more own-source revenues (TOSR) than 
Leon and San Miguel de Allende, which is almost double in Guanajuato. The TOSR is 
measured as the total locally generated revenues, by inputs of local taxes (property, fees, 
and fines), and public debt minus inter-governmental transfers and international and 
philanthropic aid. For the city of Santa Fe, since the data is not always consistent 
overtime, the financial situation is difficult to determine. Accordingly, transfers influence 
the overall total budgets for Mexican cities. The exceptional case is Guanajuato, which 
has a high proportion of transfers and high TOSR, because of its incorporation of the 
museum, for which the city collects entrance fees.  
Figure 8.1 Percentage TOSR for Six Cities in Argentina and Mexico  
Source: INEGI, Mexico; Argentina City Treasuries 
 The data shown in figure 8.1 are consistent with the hypothesis that the cities, for 
different reasons, have varying degrees of autonomy and this either enables them to 
develop alternative sources of revenues or rely more on intergovernmental transfers. For 
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example, the city of Guanajuato incorporated a national museum and charges entrances 
fees to pay for municipal development projects. San Miguel de Allende has a large 
expatriate community, which has a significant amount of outside philanthropic assistance 
which also supports the community. Santa Fe has used municipal bonds to plan and pay 
for its public works. Rosario has used a trust fund authorized by the national government 
in order to borrow funds to use for public works. Rafaela has strong political party ties to 
the national government and has developed a dependency on inter-governmental transfers 
for financing economic development programs. Leon redesigned its cadastre (the official 
register containing the municipalities land ownership information and property values) 
and re-designed its property tax system. 
 Table 8.3 illustrates the revenue compensation for each city. Argentine cities 
collect more local taxes than their Mexican counterparts. The largest Argentine city, 
Rosario has collected the most own-source revenues (TOSR), and to a lesser degree, 
Santa Fe, for where data is available. This is primarily because Rosario is one of the 
wealthiest cities in Argentina and provides tax revenues for the rest of the country. The 
most similar Mexican case is Guanajuato, which has also a high degree of TOSR, but the 
general trend in Mexico is to depend on intergovernmental transfers. This perhaps is due 
to the federal revenue decentralization which began in Mexico in 1997. However, in the 
cases studied here, the Argentine cities have larger TOSR compared with the Mexican 
cities, which is consistent with the different degrees of decentralization policies at the 
national level, particularly as regards to revenue matters.  
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Table 8.3 Revenue Composition of Annual City Budgets (in percent, per items) 
 
 
Expenditure Analysis 
Next, an expenditure composition is analyzed. Argentine cities show a similar 
trend with respect to public employees’ wages (listed as wage bill). They all devote a 
large amount of resources to finance their public employees. Santa Fe, as the capital of 
the province, has the highest amount of expenditure for public employees (wage bill 
average 59 percent). This is followed by Rafaela (37 percent), the smallest city analyzed 
in Argentina, has the lowest expenditures for employee’s wages. Rosario, a big city with 
a strong private sector devotes almost half of its expenditures (48 percent) to pay public 
employees. This number might be explained because smaller cities need smaller 
bureaucracies, and capital cities, with a bigger public sector (for management and 
administration) may need to have a more costly bureaucracies. Cities with a stronger 
private sector spend less in financing public employment (as is the case of Rosario). 
Revenue composition
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Rosario Total
Transfers 0 1 0 1 1 2 3 2 5 2
TOSR 100 99 100 99 99 98 97 98 95 98
Rafaela Total
Transfers 36 33 30 32 33 32 32 31 27 29
TOSR 64 67 70 68 67 68 68 69 73 71
Santa Fe Total
Transfers 46 n/a n/a 50 n/a 0 19 12 5 11
TOSR 54 n/a n/a 50 n/a 100 81 88 95 89
León Total
Transfers 26 65 60 49 50 59 68 50 65 71
TOSR 74 35 40 51 50 41 32 50 35 29
San Miguel de Allende Total
Transfers 61 59 63 51 77 39 53 49 70 75
TOSR 39 41 37 49 23 61 47 51 30 25
Guanajuato Capital Total
Transfers 36 38 7 6 7 6 5 4 4 5
TOSR 64 62 93 94 93 94 95 96 96 95
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Table 8.4. Expenditure composition (in percent, per items) of Annual City Budget 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
Rosario  
Wage Bill 52 53 49 44 44 45 45 48 51 48 
Public Works 12 17 8 12 16 24 20 15 6 16 
Other 36 30 43 44 40 31 36 37 42 36 
Rafaela  
Wage Bill 40 43 43 34 37 34 33 31 34 37 
Public Works 2 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 
Other 58 55 53 62 59 63 64 66 64 60 
Santa Fe 63 
Wage Bill n/a n/a  78 n/a 64 50 52 40 62 59 
Public Works n/a n/a 2 n/a 7 15 11 18 3 9 
Other n/a n/a 19 n/a 30 36 37 42 35 32 
Leon  
Wage Bill 31 27 30 33 38 33 36 38 32 32 
Public Works 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Other 69 73 70 67 62 67 64 62 68 67 
San Miguel 
Wage Bill 20 25 17 23 22 18 18 24 16 20 
Public Works 45 21 44 35 22 50 61 51 39 40 
Other 35 54 39 42 55 32 21 25 45 39 
Guanajuato Capital  
Wage Bill 40 45 37 39 34 37 47 48 45 41 
Public Works 30 13 13 43 43 42 21 14 12 24 
Other 30 42 49 18 23 20 32 38 44 35 
 
The above analysis also holds for the Mexican cities. This may be because in 
Mexico, cities pay lower salaries have few employees or they get more project related 
funding from transfer funds. Guanajuato spends a higher amount of its resources to pay 
public employees’ wages (41 percent). Leon a city with a large private sector spends less 
(32 percent), and finally, San Miguel the smallest city does not allocate many resources 
to finance their public employees (20 percent). While Leon provides almost nothing for 
their public works, San Miguel and Guanajuato spend a higher percentage of their 
resources for public works. The differences between cities in both countries with respect 
to public works might be explained by the presence of the federal government transfers, 
                                                        
63 The full version of these values is in the Annex 5. Santa Fe’s data is not reliable. 
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which invests in bigger cities (Leon) and is less present in medium (Guanajuato) or small 
cities (San Miguel de Allende). 
 Guanajuato’s uniqueness in collecting local revenue might be explained by the 
fact that it is the capital of the state and has strong investments in operating capital 
expenditures. The infrastructure funds (Ramo 33) provided by the federal or state 
governments explain this for the Mexican cases. The federal government, for example, 
also provides funds for education and health. Either the state or federal government can 
finance public works investments. Mexican cities depend considerably more on federal 
grants than their Argentine peers because of differing degrees of national 
decentralization. Additionally, Mexico’s low proportion of wage bill expenditures 
reflects the possible bias towards the receipt of federal funding. Argentine cities might 
devote more resources for wage bill because they rely less on national transfers.  
Figure 8.2 Percentage of Public Works Expenditures in Six Cities in Argentina and 
Mexico  
 
Source: INEGI, Mexico; Argentina City Treasuries 
 
In general, Rafaela, Rosario, and Guanajuato were perceived to have higher 
amounts of local own-source revenues and spend more on public works. As shown by the 
data gathered in figure 8.2, this hypothesis is correct. San Miguel de Allende, Leon, and 
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to some extent Santa Fe, are more dependent on the national government transfers to pay 
for public works in their communities. An increase in local own-source revenues may 
result in higher public works expenditures as in the case of Santa Fe, but this is not the 
true for all of the cases. Leon should be discarded for this analysis due to the fact that 
there could be “hidden” federal investments in public works. For example, the financial 
help from the federal government discourages Leon from investing its own resources into 
public works.  
Rosario is an exceptional case of autonomy from the Argentina’s federal 
government. The city has almost 100 percent TOSR and it also invests a majority of it 
revenues locally.  Rosario is also one of the wealthiest cities in Argentina and contributes 
much of its revenues to other levels of the federation. This means that—as in the Leon 
case—federal investment is not behind such a robust effort as it is also a contributor to 
national policies. Rosario spends less on public works from its local tax collection efforts. 
Rafaela is the average case in Argentina with a sizeable collection of local tax revenues, 
but lower amounts of public works expenditures and high percentage of expenditure 
toward public employees. From this description, federal issues may affect city finance 
more in Mexico than Argentina.  
Finally, figure 8.3 shows the GDP per capita measured in U.S. dollars for each of 
the subnational governments from 1992-2008.64  Data is not available to do this at the 
municipal level. Whereas Guanajuato has a population of almost five million, its 
                                                        
64 The method for the "GDP (USD Dollars)" chart was calculated by using current pesos for each country 
divided by the exchange rate for each year [note that this chart is more "real" in the way that incorporates 
the inflationary effect of the exchange rate problems faced by Mexico from 1994-95. While inflation is low 
in Mexico from 2000 onwards the opposite can be noted in Argentina, where the 2001 crisis had a 100 
percent devaluation of the Argentine peso, again with important consequences for inflation]. The chart 
"GDP per capita Guanajuato (Mexican pesos, base year 1993) was included since the data was already 
calculated by INEGI, yet using 1993 as a base year. 
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economic growth has increased steadily in the past 20 years. In contrast, Santa Fe has a 
population with just over three million people and its GDP has fluctuated from US$7,000 
per person in 1994 to US$2,000 in 2000, only to grow to US$7,000 per person in 2008.  
Figure 8.3 Subnational GDP Compared Guanajuato and Santa Fe 1993-2008 
 
 
Source Guanajuato: INEGI Dirección General de Estadísticas Económicas. Santa Fe: IPEC, Provincia de 
Santa Fe, 1993-2008. 
This figure shows that the national economy has major influences on the 
subnational governments’ budgets and GDP. For example, Mexico experienced a major 
devaluation in its currency after the Tequila Crisis in 1994 and also was hit hard by the 
United States most recent economic slowdown beginning in December 2007. Argentina 
suffered an economic recession beginning in 1998 and ending with the financial crisis of 
2001, when unemployment escalated 25 percent, the peso devalued and the government 
defaulted on its international loans. These larger economic shocks have affected the 
subnational economies a great deal as well as their efforts at local economic 
development. A city’s local investments have little influence on the overall state of their 
macro-level economies, but rather they are more dependent on the national management 
of the economies than originally perceived. 
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Tentative Conclusions  
 After evaluating and comparing the six city budgets, it was found that there were 
large variations between the cities’ per capita expenditures for both countries, even after 
controlling for size and the industrial development of the cities. Since Mexico’s national 
tax collections are a lower percentage of GDP than their Argentine counterparts, it would 
be expected that they also have lower local collection rates. This was found not to always 
be true. Another assumption was that bigger cities collect more taxes per capita because 
they have a larger population to collect from, but they do not. Also, the cities in this 
analysis have differing reasons for why they collect more local own source revenue and 
also for which types of programs they spend these extra funds. Some spend more on 
wage bill, while others on capital improvements and the amount for economic 
development varies a great deal due to the amounts of current development in the region. 
This study finds that the expenditure and revenue decisions for the case study cities are 
not correlated with the degree of decentralization or centralization by the national 
governments. Therefore, the next section looks at other alternative variables, which could 
help explain these differences. 
8.3 Other Independent Variables 
There may be several other factors, which could result in local governments to 
modify their spending and tax collection efforts. Alternative hypotheses for these 
responsibilities may include: political ideology, inter-governmental relations, geography 
(i.e. history and cultural legacy), mayoral leadership, and the professional development 
(i.e. educational levels) of the public employees. Therefore the following section 
describes each of these variables.  
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Inter-governmental relations 
This study finds that inter-governmental relations between members of the same 
party at different levels of the bureaucracy is the most important factor for local 
government officials to increase public finances to their local community and establish 
more successful economic development programs. The variable for inter-governmental 
relations seeks to analyze the relationship between the local political leadership with the 
hierarchy of governmental officials. The inter-governmental relationship variable could 
be for individuals in the same political party or in different political party, but most 
relevant for this study is the relationship of individuals who have government positions in 
higher-level offices. It seeks to not understand the involvement of the local government 
leaders to their national political parties. But rather, it is the involvement that a city 
official has with higher-level government officials and his or her ability to bring 
additional finances back to the local community and establish more successful economic 
development programs. 
In Argentina, the leadership for the city of Rosario is from the same political party 
as the province and has socialist origins. The city of Rafaela’s leadership is from the 
Partido Justicialista (PJ) party, which is the same as President Kirchner. The city of Santa 
Fe currently has a mayor who formed a coalition from the left socialist party and the right 
Union Civicia Radical (UCR) party. Several public officials in Rafaela were concerned 
about the conflict that exists between the PJ and socialist party. City officials felt that 
several public works projects would not be finished or not have sufficient financing to 
accomplish their goals. In particular, the highway projects and the water and sewage 
upgrades within the city were contingent on provincial funds. The mayor has sought 
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assistance from the Federal government for these projects, who are members from his PJ 
party. For Rosario, the city government has the same political leadership as the governor 
(who actually was previously the mayor of Rosario) and therefore shares political 
ideology, finances and municipal personnel. Because of the transfer system of the co-
participation laws in Argentina, Rosario’s economy is one of the biggest generators of 
public resources for the province and therefore is responsible for managing the economy 
as a whole. The shared sense of commitment by the government between the city and the 
governor’s office to the province of Santa Fe can be identified by the policies that each 
has to promote more sustainable development with high investments in human capital 
with its education and healthcare activities. 
In Mexico, the government of the state of Guanajuato has benefited from the 
leadership of Vicente Fox as president and leader of the National Action Party (PAN) 
political party, both at the state level but also at the national level. The cities of 
Guanajuato, Leon, and to some extent, San Miguel de Allende, have a majority PAN 
leadership, which aligns them politically away from the former the PRI and have 
majorities in the state congress and the presidency. The state politics changed after the 
PAN defeated of PRI, which had dominated Mexico’s political life for over 70 years. The 
finances for each of the cities studied have directly benefited from the political leadership 
in the Presidential palace, Los Pinos. These benefits are tangible through the funding of 
public programs and political careers. For which several interviewee had represented the 
city government at some capacity, then the state and later the national government and 
may have returned back to work at the local municipality but at a different job. Several of 
these public administrators had been promoted to higher political offices because of the 
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PAN political party, including President Vicente Fox himself. Therefore this variable of 
inter-government political relations is highly relevant and a major factor of how local 
administrators manage their public programs at the local and state levels.  
Political ideology 
 Although different than the inter-governmental relations, the political ideology 
represents the analysis of whether ideology of the political leadership matters for its 
decision to promote more economic development and collect more tax locally. The 
policies in these case studies suggest that the political ideology does not matter as much 
as the political relationship that the local government has with his hierarchy within the 
same party (i.e. inter-governmental political relations). For example, in Argentina, 
Governor Binner began to promote his socialist agenda of strengthening the local 
environment by promoting more welfare policies of education and health care first in 
Rosario and then for the province. He started small as the mayor of a city and then ran for 
governor. In 2011, he also ran for president against President Kirchner but lost. In 
Mexico, the dominant political force for Guanajuato is the right conservative pro-
business management of the state affairs. The government has promoted the increase of 
manufacturing from foreign entities and has encouraged investments in the private sector.  
Yet, even with these extreme ideological debates on how to run a government, the 
cities in the case studies do not increase their efforts to tax or promote more local 
economic development programs. Rather each of the cities sought to find business niches 
and promote their local economy as the public officials could. The city of Guanajuato, for 
example, generates greater local own-source revenue by managing the national mummy 
museum, which thereby enabled the city to promote beatification programs in order to 
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attract more tourism. Similarly, the city of Leon redeveloped its cadastres in order to 
encourage more local own-source revenue. Leon uses these funds to promote SME 
trainings and capacity programs to create and strengthen local enterprises. The city of 
Rafaela established an industrial park to attract business investments and the city of 
Rosario established a municipal bank to finance micro-credit loans to SMEs. The efforts 
to promote businesses and encourage local economic development are not necessarily 
correlated to the amount of resources collected at the local level, and not necessarily 
related to the political ideology of the current municipal government. 
Geography (i.e. history and cultural legacy) 
 The representatives of the cities in the study devoted much time to explaining the 
cultural and historical references to why their individual locations, people and societies 
were important for the economic development in the region. Whether it was the 
Piemontes in Rafaela or the Sinarquistas in Guanajuato, the cultural legacy of the 
communities unifies and directly affects their own development process. The geography 
was one of the major indicators for the cities in the case studies to promote more 
economic development programs and collect more local own-source revenue. This was a 
positive and significant variable for each of the cities.  
Furthermore, the efforts to development and advertise the cities from where the 
public administrators came from the physical environment to strengthen their cultural 
heritages. For example, the city of Santa Fe is known for the city where most 
constitutions were written and the city of San Miguel de Allende for the birthplace of the 
Mexican revolution against Spain. Additionally, the cultural heritage of each location 
helps strengthen tourism. 
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Mayoral leadership 
For the most part, each city in this study had strong mayoral leaders, which were 
well educated and professional in their decisions-making capacities. Whereas the 
Progressive era that transformed municipalities to be more management focused in the 
United States has not reached Mexico, the Mexican municipal governmental system is 
based upon a strong local leader. The non-reelection rule for the mayors has created a 
difficult for Mexican municipalities to continue their public policies. The budget and the 
decisions to spend and collect revenue are based first and foremost on the previous year’s 
expenditure and collections and highly centralized by the mayor and the municipal 
treasurer. Each year the budget is presented and must be approved by the municipal 
council, which are elected positions. The mayor typically has major authority to authorize 
expenditures and develop municipal plans. Yet, the elected official is highly dependent 
on hierarchy of his party in order to be selected for future positions. 
In Argentina, the mayoral leadership was strongest in Rafaela were Perotti had 
been leader for nearly 20 years. Also the governor Binner began his political career as the 
mayor of Rosario. The role for a strong leader is essential for the continuation of public 
policies. The leadership and education of the mayors in Argentina were higher than 
expected. For example, Binner was a medical doctor before going into politics and Perotti 
a professional accountant. The high levels of education represent a high level of 
accountability and commitment of these politicians to stay local and build their local 
communities. Whereas in Mexico, the mayor of one city might become mayor of another, 
or councilperson and then state representative, the political careers of the mayors in 
Argentina, who stayed more consistently local to their place of origin. 
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Public employee’s professional development 
In general, the qualifications for the public employees were much higher than 
expected. Most public employees had university degrees and some had additional post 
graduate skills. In addition, many taught courses at the local university. Nearly all of the 
treasury officials had studied accounting and were registered accountants. Public officials 
had even completed postgraduate studies in the United States. The rate of education 
matched their professional level of work. Each official allowed sufficient time for 
interviews and brought a new perspective to the questions related to fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth. Many public officials had experience working in 
other large bureaucracies.  
For example in Rosario, the municipal government lost many of its qualified 
public employees when the mayor was elected as governor. They moved to higher 
positions in the provincial government. The city has many students from the local 
university who helped run political campaigns who are public employees. Additionally, 
in Guanajuato, public employees worked in the state and the city governments and were 
very familiar with the work of others within the state government. Contacts were shared 
and relationships between levels of the bureaucracy were left open. This high level of 
spirit de corp exhibited among all of the six cases.  
Finally, the following table describes the importance of the impendent variables 
for city officials to make decisions related to strengthening economic development within 
their municipalities. The variables are evaluated in a likart scale (1-3), which is measured 
as 3 being high to 1 being low. The information is reported on by the various interviews 
and perception given. 
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Table 8.5 Other Factors Affecting Local Development Decisions 
 Rosario Rafaela Santa Fe Leon San Miguel  Guanajuato 
Political 
Ideology 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Inter-
governmental 
Relations 
3 3 3 3 3 3 
Geography 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Mayoral 
Leadership 
2 3 1 2 2 3 
Professional 
Development of 
Employees 
3 3 1 2 2 3 
* Estimates made from Interviews with Municipal authorities.  
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8.4 Summary Discussion 
 This chapter has demonstrated that local governments in Mexico and Argentina 
can manage their local resources, for example they can make complex finance decisions 
about their budgets. The public officials of each municipality know the needs of their 
communities. This study found that each city’s spending decisions are based on very 
different independent variables. Particularly, it was the inter-governmental relations that 
provided to be the most influential factor for how local government officials made 
expenditure and revenue decisions. Other influential variables include the professional 
development, the role of the city mayor or the dependency on inter-governmental 
transfers and grants. This study, however, found that municipal treasurers had higher 
levels of professional development or levels of education) then what was expected. The 
local politics was the most important factor for economic development to occur within a 
municipality. More fundamental than left or right based political ideology, the basic 
political situation and the relationship between the local, state and national government 
seemed to be the most dominate factor in this.  
 Overall, the role of local politics and decisions by politicians is better understood. 
Nevertheless, funding decisions for projects were more often based on inter-
governmental relationships, such as the personal politics of a city mayor within his or her 
party or with the president. For example, if a city has state funding to pave a road, then 
the municipality will hire more personnel to provide other public services. Yet, the most 
influential variable in all the cases are the political exchanges that the city’s 
administrators have with the state level bureaucracies. More information and raw data are 
also needed to validate and comparative best if the total autonomous cities or regions can 
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be agents of growth. Therefore, the next chapter tests these results by using a large data 
set from Mexico. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
 
MEXICO’S LOCAL FISCAL CAPACITY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH:  A 
QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF FISCAL AUTONOMY 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
development is further tested. The results from the qualitative case studies have shown 
that this relationship is tenuous at best. Investments in infrastructure or SME programs 
may be influential to improve a local economy, but they may not be sufficiently 
influential to drive the economic growth for an entire regional area. The qualitative cases 
suggest that a city needs to first have some degree of economic development in order to 
encourage tax collection at the local level. The likelihood of local administrators to first 
collect additional taxes and spend them on economic development programs is more 
likely if they see a positive political outcome first for their community or personal gain 
for themselves professionally. Although, if a local administrator is able to persuade the 
national or state government to finance a project such as building a community road, then 
they will more likely use the forgone expenses to hire more workers or provide other 
local public services that will build more political capital for them at a later point.  
The qualitative research presented here also found that the amount of funds that a 
city devotes to economic development programs is relatively small compared to the total 
budget. A few thousand dollars a year and a handful of dedicated employees may not 
bring millions of dollars into a local economy. Rather, a city’s wealth is more important 
for its ability to collect taxes and to bring business investment into the community. In 
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essence, a city’s wealth is the precursor for local tax collection. Thus, larger local budgets 
generally have more money to spend on local economic development programming. 
This chapter draws upon this knowledge to hypothesize and perform a large-scale 
N regression to test whether more own source revenue (local tax collection) produces 
more economic development actually. First, this chapter provides an overview of the 
writing on Mexico’s intergovernmental transfers system and describes recent research on 
forgone tax collection at the local level. This is an endogeneity problem (which comes 
first) is addressed. It is found that cities’ first need to have some degree of economic 
development before they are able to collect more taxes locally. Next, this chapter uses a 
statistical model to evaluate quantitatively the relation of fiscal capacity to a city’s 
investments in economic development programs. This chapter then explains these 
outcomes and the result of the endogeneity problem. By analyzing Mexico’s municipal 
data, this chapter tests the efforts of innovative public finances on economic 
development.  
9.2 Evaluations of Mexican Fiscal Decentralization 
As a major global federation with a multifaceted history of centralization and 
recent democratization and decentralization starting in 1983, Mexico provides to be good 
case for the statistical analysis of fiscal decentralization (Diaz-Cayeros 2006). Not only 
because of its recent political upheaval and transition from a one party centralized 
controlled government and transformation into a multi-layered democracy where 
competitive elections now take place at the national, state, and local levels. Mexico also 
reformed its legal framework in 1997 to provide subnational financing and borrowing at 
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the state and local level. As a developing country, Mexico provides an interestingly 
example for other countries to follow.  
 Even as Mexico has become more democratized, many academics have 
acknowledged that there are several problems in the intergovernmental system (Cabrero 
2000; Cabrero and Carrera 2002; Hernandez-Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2002; Hernandez-
Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2008; Raich 2002; Tamayo-Flores and Hernández-Trillo 2006). 
For example, research (Moreno 2004; Sour 2004; Sour 2008) has suggested that the 
transfer funds created since 1998 have reduced the incentives of local governments to 
collect taxes, particularly property taxes, as the most important tax revenue source for 
municipal governments. 
In his work, Gamboa (1999) shows how the Mexican revenue–sharing may 
discourage revenue mobilization at the local level by increasing local government’s 
dependency on central government transfers (Ramo 33 and 28). This is because these 
transfers decrease incentives of local jurisdictions to increase local taxes. Gamboa claims 
that, as in other federations, linking local revenues to service delivery costs improves 
governance in countries. This is because when the central government loosens control 
over subnational finances, local governments can enjoy financial autonomy and provide a 
more efficient use of revenues for public services (Gamboa in Fukasaku and de Mello 
1999). This becomes a problem for local revenue collection as it becomes easier to 
request political favors from higher levels of government than for mayors and local 
authorities to raise taxes at the local level, which may be politically unpopular.  
 In her research on Mexico’s federal transfer systems, Sour (2004) found that both 
non-conditional and conditional transfers (Ramos 29 and 33) have negative impact on all 
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local governments tax collection effort. Although Sour states that she is measuring tax 
effort, she is actually measuring municipal tax capacity.65 In her study, she determines 
that there is no difference in fiscal performance by municipal size, but rather the larger 
and smaller municipalities are equally affected by the increase in federal aid received 
each year by the Mexican transfer system.  
 Cabrera Castellanos and Cruz Mora re-evaluate Sour’s work by looking at the tax 
base and other revenues that a municipality can collect (Cabrera Castellanos and Cruz 
Mora 2009). They measure fiscal capacity by dividing municipal income into two 
components: the tax base by property tax, and “other” revenues. Consistent with Sour’s 
work, these authors find that Mexican municipalities have a greater fiscal capacity that is 
currently not being exercised. Municipal governments have a wider tax based, which is 
not currently being utilized. In sum, there are more local resources that could be taxed. 
Also Cabrera Castellanos and Cruz Mora find that municipalities, which have more 
economic activity such as those with tourist destinations, are likely to collect more local 
tax revenues than less developed ones. These authors thereby conclude that industrial 
                                                        
65 “Fiscal capacity” is actual amount of total taxes a local government can collect, while “fiscal effort” is 
the power to raise funds over what is actually collected. Economists typically use the latter, which is an 
estimated value of actually property within an area of the city. Although Sour uses the municipal GDP 
variable, she does not give in detail the amount of funds that is not collected. The equation used by Sour 
(2004) is as follows: 
 ingpop =  part  + transf + E 
------  ---- ----  
pibmuni  imu imu  
Part stands for participaciones (Ramo 26) the required amount automatically transfers from the national 
government to subnational authorities for being part of the Mexican federation. Transf stands for 
transferencias (Ramo 33) which are transfers from the federal government to subnational authorities for 
infrastructure projects. Each of these transfers has restricted and non-restricted portions and each state 
government can divide its funds as it wishes. Although most use a parity of the Federation’s assessment for 
distribution, taking into account the size and economic development of the local community. Pibmuni is the 
GDP for each municipality and ingpop is the income per capita in order to create the level of economic 
development for each individual at the local level. Therefore she is actually using the equation for fiscal 
capacity and not effort. Sour realized this mistake and corrects in for a paper redone in 2008.  
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activities of municipalities do have a bias for increasing the tax base for a local 
government. 
9.3 A New Approach and Data Analysis 
 Most statistical studies use either “tax autonomy,” ”tax capacity” or “tax effort” as 
the dependent variable. Each of these topics is similar but do not have identical 
definitions. For most studies within the United States, both tax capacity and tax efforts 
are often measured with indicators constructed by the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). Tax capacity can be defined as the “capacity of a 
governmental entity to finances its public services” and tax effort can be understood as 
“the extent to which a governmental entity uses its tax capacity to collect more revenue” 
(ACIR 1990:13).  
 Within Latin America, Melo (2007) defined tax effort by calculating “the difference 
between the predicted [tax collection] and actual tax ratio.” His work suggests that 
because Argentina has high per capita income levels—considerably higher than those of 
its counterparts in Latin America—the predicted tax level should be much higher than 
those observed in the last decades in the region, particularly in Brazil, Uruguay, and 
Chile, but he finds the opposite effect. These arguments are substantiated by the data on 
municipal taxation derived from the different sources or items that describe taxation. If 
the dependent variable (taxation) affects these indicators it demonstrates that taxation 
capacity modifies (a) the expenditure composition and it does so by building a more 
“friendly” context for economic outputs, (b) taxation also serves to build other types of 
institutional resources (financial, human, material) that serve to build policies which are 
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friendlier to economic output, or, (c) the correlation helps with better rates of 
socioeconomic welfare.  
 This research diverges from the previous studies done by using as the dependent 
variable municipal GDP. The principal independent variable is total own-source revenue 
(TOSR). This is defined as a percentage of all local tax collection, which is calculated as 
property taxes, fees, fines, user charges and other local income sources minus state and 
national transfers (ramo 28 and 33) and any other philanthropic donations over total 
revenue. The expected result is a positive correlation between municipal government tax 
capacity or local autonomy and GDP.  
9.4 Statistical Techniques and Results 
A formal linear regression is used to test the model. The first test uses indexes 
developed by the INAFED called the Index of Basic Municipal Development (IDMD) or 
Indice de Desarrollo Municipal Basico, in Spanish.66 The database reports on municipal 
social, economic, environmental services and institutional development. Several variables 
are indexed to provide a full picture of municipalities in Mexico. Of importance here are 
the following variables: economic development (eco), institutional development (inst), 
and controls for the social dimension (soc) or the percentage of the population that 
finished primary school and enviormental factors (amb) which include housing with 
access to drainage, water, etc. The model looks like this: 
Model 1. IDB (eco)= (a1+a2 soc + b3 inst + b4 amb)  
                                                        
66 The federal agency, which researches municipal development, the INAFED (Instituto Nacional para el 
Federalismo y el Desarrollo Municipal) contracted Dr. Laura Flamand of the Colegio of Mexico and her 
colleagues at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Sara Martinez Pellegrini and Alberto Hernandez, to develop 
this large database of municipal statistics. 
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The economic development variable includes two dimensions. The first is the value 
added per capita at the municipal level. That is the increase of value that is added to a 
product on the commercial production line. The second includes the level of employment 
at the municipal level. That indicator captures the municipal economy by including 
employment and the amount of production within the municipality. The institutional 
development variable includes tax effort to demonstrate government financial 
performance and participation in elections as a reflection of society involvement in 
municipal affairs. The social dimension includes indicators that represent opportunities to 
acquire basic level of health and educational achievement, respectively: the proportion of 
population aged 15 and older who complete primary education or have post-primary and 
infant mortality.  
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The results show that economic development is positively correlated with institutional 
development (at the 95 percent confidence interval). Better tax effort and more 
participation in local elections will increase economic development and employment 
prospects within a municipality. Municipalities that encourage taxation and citizen 
participation are more likely to be economically developed. Additionally, social 
development is correlated with economic development. Higher education levels, health 
standards, and houses with drainage, are positively correlated with economic 
development. The employment index negatively correlates, which could mean that there 
is autocorrelation or a misspecification in the model. That is because it is assumed that if 
the GDP increases in a locality, so would the number of jobs, but that is not the case with 
this data. Therefore, a new analysis has been performed. 
The second model developed uses the raw data collected from the IDMB in 
addition to data from other sources. The majority of the information was collected from 
Mexico’s National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI) and Mexico’s census 
department (CONAPO). Census data is collected every five years in Mexico and INEGI 
has administered municipal questionnaires since 1990. The public finance data were 
validated by the data published by the Mexican Congress’ National Deputies (CEPF). 
Municipal GDP, the economic development dependent variable, was gathered from 
various sources, including private sector banks and other academic studies.67 This 
variable was developed for this research, as there is not a nationally standardized data 
                                                        
67 A special thanks to Fausto Hernandez-Trillo for his assistances to find this data. 
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point, which is collected by the federal bureaucracy. The years for which the data for 
Municipal GDP was collected includes 1988, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2007.68 
Model 2. Municipal GDP/Per Capita= (a1+a2 %TOSR + b3% Wage Bill + b4% 
Public Works + b5% Other Expenditure + b6 Controls) 
The public finance variables of interest include the amount of Total Own-source 
Revenues (TOSR), which are any property taxes, fines, and fees collected locally minus 
transfers made by the national government. This gives a measure of the fiscal autonomy 
that has been developed by a municipality. Secondly, how municipalities make financing 
decisions is evaluated. This includes expenses towards wage bills (to test the leviathan 
theory), public works (to test the spillover effects) and other expenditures. Each of these 
expenditures was created into a variable as a percentage of TOSR for each city. This last 
variable (other expenditures) was later eliminated from the formal test because it auto 
correlated with the wage bill and public works expenses. Each of these variables was 
created as a percentage over the total municipal expenditures to capture how much of the 
budget was being allocated to each. Table 9.2 defines these variables.  
Table 9.2 Key Public Finance Variables 
 Measurements 
TOSR Revenue –Transfers (Ramo 28+Ramo33)  
% TOSR TOSRp = (TOSR/Total Revenues) *100 
% Wage Bill WAGEp = (Wage/TOSR) *100 
% Public Works PWp = (Public Works/TOS) *100 
Other expenditures Other = Total Expenditures - (PW+Wage) 
% Other expenditures Otherp = (Other/TOSR) *100 
 
                                                        
68 Outcomes from the 1988 are not set as per capita so they are not presented here. The most recent cense 
data to that date is 1990 and will be re-modeled using that years data. Cense data prior to 1990 is not 
available on the CONAPO Web site. 
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The results show positive and significant correlation between TOSR and 
municipal GDP at the 99 percent confidence interval for all years. That is to say that there 
is a link between the economic development of a community and their efforts at raising 
local public revenues. This relationship holds strong for the four years tested.  
Table 9.3 Results of Economic Development on TOSR in Mexico 
 
The expenditures towards wage bill and public works in 2000 also show positive 
correlations. The negative result as regards to the public works variable is puzzling. 
Perhaps this is because unconditional transfers are used to build public works. The 
negative correlation with economic growth suggests that national transfers allocated to 
poor municipalities are used for public works. Because the wage bill is only significant in 
2000, a conclusion cannot be made if the city will pay more for that activity.  
9.5 Summary Discussion 
Results of these regression tests are preliminary, but they do appear to confirm the 
assumptions found in the qualitative analysis. A more economically developed 
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municipality will encourage public officials to collect more local taxes. Local 
governments can promote and increase growth for the country when they collect more 
own source revenue. When local governments have higher levels of economic 
development, city officials are more able to collect taxes, which are used to spur 
economic growth. Even with the high levels of expenditure decentralization that have 
occurred in Mexico since 1997, the correlation remains the same. Further analysis must 
be done to understand Mexico’s efforts at strengthening economic development through 
expenditures for public works.  
The public works results relates to the outcomes of the qualitative analysis, which 
suggest that public authorities would rather seek funds from higher-level government to 
avoid bearing the political costs of raising taxes locally. The next chapter seeks to 
determine if this result is generalizable to additional countries in Latin America. It returns 
to the question of the three types of autonomy (administrative, political, or fiscal) to see 
how mayors and other local authorities see the changes of these effects. The chapter tests 
if political decentralization is relevant for the creation of business development within the 
region. In so doing, it attempts to tie together the qualitative and quantitative sections of 
this research. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF A SURVEY OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN 
LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
10.1 Introduction  
Arguably, recent local economic development (LED) initiatives in Latin America 
are a consequence of the decentralization processes currently underway in the region. 
Specific efforts to promote LED policies, both by national governments and local areas, 
are driven by a complex set of political and economic factors. Some countries, such as 
Mexico, have started to offer incentives as a way to attract foreign investment. Others 
have provided promotional advertisements to retain or draw manufacturing or foreign 
enterprises into their areas. Still others encourage small and medium enterprises to grow 
by creating a positive policy environment with which to work, such as in Argentina. The 
key issue for Latin American countries is to decipher which factors are best to foster local 
economic development. 
In this chapter a survey that serves to evaluate those factors, which influence the 
number of businesses created in a local area is analyzed. It summarizes the assessment of 
mayors, city council members, and executives from 13 countries in Latin America as a 
way to better understand how these local public officials are implementing pro-business 
policies to improve their local areas. A statistical test is executed, which considers fiscal, 
administrative, and political autonomy, and also controls for municipal environmental 
factors. The chapter is organized into the following sections. First, it briefly provides a 
theoretical perspective as to why decentralization is best to promote business friendly 
policies and ultimately economic development for a local area. Next, it describes the 
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research design. Finally, this chapter tests the purposed theoretical perspective and 
provides tentative conclusions. 
10.2 Theoretical Perspective 
Local governments might be better equipped to provide favorable policy 
environments to promote economic development. For example, municipal governments 
could provide more precisely tailored financial programs and incentives for business to 
develop in a local area. Such programs include offering tax incentive programs. This 
includes organizing enterprise zones programs to create incentives for business 
development, as in the United States and Brittan. It may also include issuing municipal 
bonds to finance necessary infrastructure and providing education and training programs 
that can help create a competitive workforce. The current assumption is that stronger and 
more effective decentralization will inspire communities to manage their local resources 
better, create improved fiscal controls, encourage the elaboration of valuable economic 
development plans and promote effective and efficient spending for social policies. In 
turn, this will raise the per-capita income of residents for future economic development. 
Recently much attention has been placed on these bottom-up mechanisms to 
promote growth in a particular location within the global economy (Friedman 2005; 
Porter 2005; Florida 2007). Scholars are evaluating whether local economies can grow by 
providing policy recommendations to encourage development in a particular locality. 
Methods such as providing tax incentives, issuing bonds, collecting property taxes and 
ultimately, effectively managing national governments appropriations may encourage 
local development (Delahite 2005; Feiock 2007). Therefore, this chapter directly tests of 
the theories of Peterson (1996), Oates (1995) and Tiebout (1956) utilizing measures of 
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business-friendly policies as the dependent variable, while using the concept of 
decentralization as the key independent variable.  
The question stimulating this part of the research effort is whether fiscal, political 
or administrative decentralization and/or the existence of business-friendly policies have 
an effect on the number of businesses reported by a local authority. By using a multi-
linear regression, this chapter tests if a mayor or local authority reports having a high 
number of businesses within communities they will also report being a more autonomous 
local government. This research seeks to determine if local government officials (mayors) 
report having increased the number of public programs to promote business-friendly 
policies within their communities, thus creating more SMEs, and, ultimately, increasing 
the number of entrepreneurs in their communities. The expected outcome is that if the 
local authority indicates a high level of fiscal, political or administrative decentralization, 
they will be more likely to promote business-friendly policies within their communities. 
This assumption puts business-friendly policies as the dependent variable. 
10.3 Research Design 
  The unit of analysis of this section of the research is the opinions and perceptions of 
mayors and local authorities towards decentralization policies. The data come from the 
Inter-American Conference of Mayors and Local Authorities, an event organized 
annually by the Miami-Dade County government and Florida International University. 
For nearly two decades, the event has brought an average of 500 mayors and local 
officials to Miami, Florida from all over Latin America to discuss municipal level 
problems and provide some tentative solutions. The first event, co-sponsored by the 
United States Agency for International Development, the Inter-American Development 
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Bank, the World Bank, and the Organization of American States, was held in 
Washington, D.C. in 1996 and approximately 100 local officials attended. The second 
conference was held in Miami and almost 200 individuals participated. Since that time, 
the event has grown and is considered one of the primary gatherings of local leaders 
throughout the hemisphere to occur each year. 
Beginning in 2005, the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), a United States 
government agency that promotes economic development by providing grants to 
community-based groups, sponsored a survey of participants. The IAF desired to 
understand the current climate for their grant making at the local level as well as the 
perceptions and challenges the mayors of the hemisphere faced. Each year, they have 
implemented different surveys related to the various themes of the conference. For 
example, the 2007 conference theme was Building the Competitive Municipality: 
Promoting Collaboration for Development, which yielded valuable responses to 
understanding mayors’ perceptions of growth and economic development policies. The 
survey conducted in 2007 provides a convenient sample of mayors, city council member 
and executives from 13 countries in Latin America. The number of attendants who 
received the questionnaire was 512 and 315 responded the survey. Table 10.1 provides 
the information regarding the sample, including the countries of origin, the job the 
respondents and the size of their towns, cities, or metropolitan areas. 
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Table 10.1 Sample Frequencies of the Survey Statistics 
Country of Respondent Percentage   Job Type by Gender Male Female 
Argentina 1%  Mayor 87% 13% 
Bolivia 7% City Council Member 63% 37% 
Chile 2% Private Sector Executive 64% 36% 
Colombia 9% Total 75% 25% 
Dominican Republic 8%  
Ecuador 16% Job Type (Total) 
Honduras 16% Mayor 50% 
Nicaragua 12% City Council Member 37% 
Panama 2% Private Sector Executive 13% 
Paraguay 6% Total 100% 
Peru 9%  
El Salvador  12% 
Total 100% 
Size of Place of Origin Municipal Size 
 Number Percentage  Number Percent 
National Capital  13 4% Less than 20K 110 35% 
State Capital 50 16% Between 20K-50K  97 31% 
City 136 44% Between 50K – 100K 54 17% 
Town 113 36% Between 100K-1 Million 45 14% 
Total 312 100% More than 1.000.000 9 3% 
   Total 315 100% 
 
 
 
The answers to all questions reflect the perception of the responding local officials. There 
are no controls to determine the accuracy of the responses. Nevertheless, the individual 
respondents as local public officials are highly knowledgeable of the development in their 
communities. Since this is a random sample, there is no verification of data by 
respondents. City identifications are in the dataset but there is no secondary source, 
which can be used with either GDP, number of SMEs or controls at the municipal level 
across the 13 countries. Therefore, the data represents the best perceptions of local public 
officials from throughout Latin America and should be interpreted as such. 
Within this chapter, several models are created to test the various hypotheses. The 
first test used the number of business cited to have been established within the 
municipality as the dependent variable, and the second test used the number of new 
businesses the municipality increased over the previous year. These variables 
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demonstrate the relative strength of the local economy (see table 10.2 for the description 
of the variables). They are count variables, which estimate the number of businesses (as a 
proxy for measuring entrepreneurship). However, these variables do not disaggregate for 
the size of the firms.  
Table 10.2 Variable Description 
Variable Type Description 
Strength of Local Economy Count Measured by the # of businesses in municipalities 
Increasing Strength of Local 
Economy 
Count Measured by the # of new registered businesses in 
municipalities over the last year  
Budget Autonomy Ordinal Defined budget, creating and calculating taxes and expenses 
% of Budget Autonomy  
(aka Autonomy) 
Interval Measures of the budget by inputs of local taxes (property, 
fees and fines), and public loans/debt minus inter-
governmental transfers and international or philanthropic aid 
Political Autonomy Ordinal Level of decision making authority, originating internally  
Administrative Autonomy Ordinal Level of capacity to define municipal authorities, processes, 
and purchases. 
Business Friendliness Count Composite of Question #13 which asked what a series of 
questions to determine what pro-business policies the 
municipality has implemented in the past year. 
Control Variables 
Total Budget Interval Estimated in US dollars, measured in thousands 
Population of Municipality Interval Ranges between Less than 20k to More than 1 million 
Administrative Territory Interval Respondent from National Capital, State/Provincial Capital, 
City, Town 
Poverty in Municipality Interval Measured in 25% increments 
*Italics are dependent variables  
 
The last test uses the number of business friendly policies that the local 
government has developed within the municipality as the dependent variable and was 
regressed on the various degrees of decentralization (political, administrative, and fiscal) 
that each respondent provided. The business friendly policy variable is an index of 
questions asking respondents to indicate yes or no if the authority had implemented pro-
business type policies in their municipalities (see table 10.3 for a list of the questions 
asked). They include setting up local economic development promotional offices; 
advertising local products in fairs and events; registering commercial plants and 
productivity activities; organizing business connections with the local business 
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community; developing support programs for new small businesses. These responses 
were summed to create an ordinal variable.  
Table 10. 3 Business Friendliness Questions  
Please indicate the interest in the following: Yes, we 
have 
1. The municipality has a local economic development promotional office  
2. The municipality organizes annual fairs and carnivals to advertise local products  
3. There are prizes and annual acknowledgement of best business and entrepreneurs  
4. The municipality has up-to-date maps and locations of local businesses  
5. The local government is open to free access of information to open businesses: access, roads, 
and productive infrastructure, among other things? 
 
6. The local government has one-window to set up business activities, commercial and 
industrial licensing? 
 
7. The municipality has formal connections to the local business community  
8. The municipality has developed support programs for new small business leaders?  
9. The municipality has an updated plan of registered commercial plants and productivity 
activities in your area? 
 
10. The municipality receives of international cooperation?  
11. The municipality has partnerships with local organizations: city sisters, with local 
universities, international cooperation agencies 
 
12. The municipality is a member of an inter- municipal association for economic development  
13. The municipality administers a micro-credit plan for small and medium size businesses  
14. Other (specify)  
 
Key independent variables include the decentralization indicators. First, budget 
autonomy was measured as an ordinal variable and is the amount of perceived fiscal 
decentralization possessed by each local authority. This is defined as the perceived 
autonomy to create, approve and manage taxes and expenditures in the local budget. This 
was similar to administrative and political autonomy, which are also ordinary values 
measured as the level of capacity to define municipal authorities, processes, and 
purchases, and second, the level of decision making authority, originating internally 
within the municipality. Finally, an additional indicator for budget autonomy was created. 
It was a percentage of the local revenues (property, fees and fines) and public debt minus 
inter-governmental transfers and international or philanthropic aid. Respondents filled in 
this question using a percentage of budget inputs, whereas each budget input, i.e. taxes 
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(property, fees and fines), public debt, inter-governmental transfers and international 
philanthropic aid, had a line and together were required to total 100. Thus, there were two 
measures for fiscal decentralization: 1) the respondent’s perception of budget autonomy 
measured as a 1-3 ordinal value; and, 2) as the percentage of budget autonomy measured 
as own-source revenue collected at the local level. 
Control variables included in the data set evaluate the types of municipalities. 
Questions ranged from the country of origin to typical socio-economic qualifiers such as 
total municipal budget, administrative territory (whether the respondent works in a capital 
city government or local municipality) and the perception of poverty level. Control 
variables include: the total budget of the municipality (estimated in US dollars, measured 
in thousands); the population of municipality measured in ranges between less than 20k 
to more than one million; type of administrative territory (for which the respondent 
characterized their city as the national capital, state/provincial capital, city, or town) and 
the level of perceived poverty in the municipality, which was measured in 25 percent 
increments.  
This last variable is the respondents’ perception of poverty in the municipality 
relative to other areas and is measured an ordinal value. This is particularly interesting 
because participants, and people in general, often believe they are relatively “poorer” 
than their neighbor and therefore need more national assistance. As noted above, the 
decentralization literature suggests that a municipality with a higher perception of 
poverty may be more likely to request transfers from the national government and be less 
reliant on the local economy. Thus, they may be less likely to cite job creation by SMEs 
within their areas. 
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10.4 Statistical Techniques and Results 
The major dependent variables used to test for the first hypothesis are the number 
of business and new businesses developed within a municipality. But because of the large 
dispersion between respondents’ selection of the number of businesses created in their 
municipality and the number of new businesses model specification errors occurred. 
Table 10.4 illustrates the descriptive statistics for this test. Since many of the mayors 
estimated responses, some suggested that there were 100 new businesses created the first 
year and 5,000 created in the subsequent year.  
Table 10.4 Descriptive Statistics of Variables (obs=321) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Strength of Local Economy 
(Numbiz) 
891.01 4082.934 0 50000 
Increasing Strength of Local 
Economy (Newbiz) 
171.7 588.0923 0 4800 
Business Friendliness 5.38 3.030404 0 13 
Political Autonomy 2.03 .7548189 0 3 
Administrative Autonomy 2.03 .6934238 0 3 
Budget Autonomy 1.899 .763812 0 3 
% of Budget Autonomy  41.46 36.19737 0 100 
Control Variables 
Total Budget 1.67e+09 1.72e+10 793 1.83e+11 
Population of Municipality 2.42 .6311043 1 3 
Administrative Territory 2.19 1.14439 1 5 
Poverty in Municipality 3.40 1.177602 1 5 
*Italics are dependent variables 
  
Because of the model specification errors, a new logit model was purposed over a 
standard OLS model.69 After creating a log to correct for the dispersion of the dependent 
                                                        
69 Tests to evaluate multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and model misspecification found a potential for 
serious errors in the preliminary results. First, a pair-wise and VIF tests (VIF=1.16) found a low problem 
with mulitcollinearity. Subsequently, a Breusch-Pagan and the Cook-Weisberg were carried out to test for 
heteroskedasticity, the results indicated chi2 of 103.87 and the probability of the chi2 to be less than 0.00 
respectively. Since the chi2 is less than .05 there is a heterskedasticity problem. This suggests that there is a 
problem with the standard error and the T and F test may report statistical significance, even if they are not. 
Additional tests of model specification confirmed that there are serious errors in the results. For example, 
the Reset Ramsey test using powers of the fitted value of new businesses outputted F (3, 165) = 8.09 
resulting in the model that cannot reject the null hypotheses (Ho: model has no omitted variables).  
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variable, the outcome of the linear regression (BLUE) resulted in the positive outcome of 
political autonomy and the control variable administrative territory reported to correlate. 
The Negative Binominal model was suggested and found to be statistically sound and the 
best fit for the data, with the R squares of over .05 for the first model and over .06 for the 
second one.  
By using this Negative Binomial model, the results show that the likelihood of 
respondents to report a higher number of new businesses added last year leads to a more 
likely (positive) assessment of having business friendly policies implemented in their 
municipality and greater the likelihood of having higher amounts of political autonomy in 
terms of making their own decisions (see table 10.5). This confirmed the first hypotheses 
that stated that when local government officials (mayors) reported being more 
decentralized (politically was more often significant than administrative or fiscally) they 
were also more likely to support techniques of local economic development such as 
business friendliness policies within their communities.  
The number of businesses and additional new businesses resulted in statistically 
significant results for business development in terms of the number of business friendly 
policies, political, administrative, and percent budget autonomy (see tables 10.5 and 
10.6). To have a vibrant economy, municipalities must also have a highly developed 
government as well as local industry to engage in pro-growth policies. Governmental 
structure does matter when reporting job creation. The higher the numbers of businesses 
reported showed a strong positive correlation with political and administrative autonomy. 
 
 
250 
 
 
Table 10.5 Statistical Analysis Results Hypothesis #1 
Results of Regression of Business Development on the use of business friendly policies and 
decentralization variables Using Mayors and Authorities opinions. OLS Model 
Dependent Variable: Strength (Model 1 &2) and Increasing (Model 3 &4) of Local Economy (measure 
of small business creation) using a log for number of businesses and new business created. 
Regressor (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Business Friendliness (X1) .074 
(.072) 
.058 
(.072) 
.107 
(.067) 
.090 
(.066) 
Political Autonomy  (X2) .611** 
(.283) 
.630** 
(.281) 
.666** 
(.280) 
.685** 
(.281) 
Administrative Autonomy (X3) .467  
(.396) 
.270 
(.346) 
.038 
(.403) 
-.218 
(.367) 
Budget Autonomy (X4) -.220 
(.310) 
---------- -.300 
(.288) 
--------- 
% of Budget Autonomy (X5) ---------- .006 
(.006) 
---------- .006 
(.005) 
Intercept -.171 
 (1.563) 
-.290 
(1.543) 
1.645 
(1.490) 
 
Summary Statistics 
R2 0.3231 0.3328 0.2694 0.2719 
N 118 119 109 109 
The regressions were estimated using data on mayors and local authorities from 13 countries in Latin 
America. Standard errors are given parenthesis under coefficients. The individual coefficient is statistically 
significance at ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1 levels using a two sided test. 
Table 10.6 Statistical Analysis Results Hypothesis #1  
Results of Negative Binomial of Business Development on the use of business friendly policies and 
decentralization variables Using LAC Mayors and Authorities opinions.  
Dependent Variable: Strength (1&2) and Increasing Strength (3&4) of Local Economy (measure of 
small business creation) 
Regressor (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Business Friendliness (X1) .118 
(.076) 
.139* 
(.077) 
.268*** 
(.076) 
.256*** 
(.075) 
Political Autonomy  (X2) .560* 
(.300) 
.316 
(.300) 
.791** 
(.380) 
.794** 
(.386) 
Administrative Autonomy (X3) .293 
(.475) 
.661* 
(.375) 
-.213 
(.462) 
-.279 
(.418) 
Budget Autonomy (X4) .366 
(.360) 
---------- -.500 
(.368) 
--------- 
% of Budget Autonomy (X5) ---------- .018** 
(.008) 
---------- .013 
(.008) 
Intercept -1.522 -1.520 -1.330 -1.424 
Summary Statistics 
R2 0521 0553 .0669 .0693 
N 122 123 118 119 
The regressions were estimated using data on mayors and local authorities from 13 countries in Latin 
America. Standard errors are given parenthesis under coefficients. The individual coefficient is statistically 
significance at ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1 levels using a two sided test. 
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 Next the second and the third hypothesis were tested using the mayors’ report of 
business friendliness policies as the dependent variable. This is used to analyze the effect 
of these policies on the responses of the local authorities’ opinion on decentralization and 
the importance of governmental structure (hypothesis 2). More specifically, for the last 
test (hypothesis 3), which measured the amount of fiscal decentralization in terms of 
budget autonomy (measured also as the ratio of own-source revenues over inter-
governmental transfers) as the principal independent variable. As Table 10.7 indicates 
that the variables are not significant. Moreover, even with positive Ramsey reset tests for 
both models the data fits, which the outcomes for hypothesis test two and test three find 
few significant variables of importance.70  
 Only the first test finds a significant positive correlation with budget autonomy (at 
the 90 percentage confidence level). It is likely that when respondents report that they 
implement more business friendliness programs they also report that they have more 
budget autonomy. This confirms the third hypothesis. Significant variables include the 
total annual budget reported to operate in the city, the territorial size of the city (the larger 
the size of the city the more significant) and the higher the perceptions of it being in 
poverty. These correlate with the greater the likelihood that the mayors will administer 
business friendliness policies in their jurisdictions.  
 
 
 
                                                        
70 The Ramsey reset test for the second model (1a+b) using powers of the fitted values of business 
Friendliness Policies present F (3, 182) = 0.56 and the probability of the F is equal to 0.6453. Suggesting 
that Ho: model has no omitted variables. And event with the addition of the dummy variables third and 
final model (1a+b) also are fitted with the F(3, 172) =  0.89 the probability of the F is equal to 0.4480. 
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Table 10.7 Statistical Analysis Results Hypothesis #2 and #3 
Results of Regression of business friendly policies on the level of decentralization using Mayors and 
Authorities opinions. (OLS model) 
Dependent Variable: business friendliness policies on decentralization 
Regressor (1a) (1b) (2a)  
+ Dummies 
(2b)  
+ Dummies 
Political Autonomy  (X2) .144 
(.299) 
.254 
(.296) 
-.021 
(.306) 
.035 
(.301) 
Administrative Autonomy (X3) -.596 
(.383) 
-.334 
 (.336) 
-.622 
(.381) 
-.431 
(.337) 
Budget Autonomy (X4) .583* 
(.339) 
--------- .468 
(.343) 
--------- 
% of Budget Autonomy (X4*) ---------- .010 
(.006) 
---------  
Total Budget  3.17e-11* 
1.15e-11 
3.40e-11** 
(1.15e-11) 
2.74e-11** 
(1.16e-11) 
2.84e-11**  
(1.15e-11) 
Population .037   
(.324) 
-.127 
(.324) 
1.075 
(1.060) 
 -.187 
(.846) 
Administrative Territory .221    
(.186) 
.202 
(.188) 
.339* 
(.189) 
.308 
(.190) 
Poverty -.470** 
 (.190) 
-.417** 
(.192) 
-.510** 
(.200) 
--.459** 
(.198) 
Paraguay --------- --------- -4.80* 
(2.19) 
-2.80* 
(1.683) 
Intercept 6.400 6.552 5.128 6.486 
Summary Statistics 
R2 0.114 0.117 0.213 0.223 
Adjusted R2 .0796 0.083 0.135 0.147 
N 191 193 191 193 
The regressions were estimated using data on mayors and local authorities from 13 countries in Latin 
America. Standard errors are given parenthesis under coefficients. The individual coefficient is statistically 
significance at ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1 levels using a two sided test. 
 
The third model, and final test in this study, added dummy variables for each of 
the countries. Not only did this increase R squared but also the robustness of the models 
(see models 2a and 2b). Unfortunately, only the respondents from Paraguay appeared to 
have significant results from having implemented more business friendliness policies. 
The results show they cannot agreed or disagreed that when the respondents from 
particular country stated that they had an increase the number of business friendliness 
policies within their communities, they created more SMEs or the number entrepreneurs 
in their communities, agreed to have more decentralization or the budget autonomy (local 
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tax revenue over transfers from their national governments). The outcomes of these tests 
are too tenuous and additional research is need for a stronger outcome. 
10.5 Summary Discussion 
While the results are rather provisional, there were several problems identified 
with the use of the data set. Although the number of responses fell to just over 100 for 
each test in the first model and around 200 for the second and third models, they are still 
statistically reliable. This drop in the sample size is due to the fact that several 
respondents simply left responses blank and therefore were dropped in the Stata computer 
program. Other reasons for not responding to this question could be a matter of 
corruption or some personal or family involvement in a major local business. Regardless, 
the response merited additional attention. Further tests are needed to regress opinion data 
on factually accurate secondary sources, which include better indicators of 
decentralization, job creation and promotion of business friendliness policies. Since the 
respondents attended the event in 2007 and are random, the type of necessary fact check 
to see if they are reporting accurately their impressions is virtually impossible. These 
responses represent what local government officials are thinking in terms of job creation 
and establishing business friendliness policies.  
Despite these issues, the results also show that political autonomy and the 
implementation of business friendly policies at the local level are important for attracting 
new businesses to a municipality (model 1). Although, fiscal and administrative 
autonomy are less influential, the political autonomy is important for public 
administrators, which is also important for economic development polices to emerge 
from local governments. Municipal leaders know that their political autonomy is 
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important to make decisions on policies for the communities. These decisions may not be 
related to the political official or party in office (at the state or national level). The 
mayors know that they need to establish policies to attracted new businesses in their 
municipality to encourage growth and development and this decision may not be 
independent from other political influence.  
Specifically, government structure does matter when analyzing effort by a mayor 
or local official to promote economic development within their municipality. This study 
shows that the decentralization process is important for mayors to increase the promotion 
of economic growth and will help support the enabling environment to set-up, finance, 
market and support the establishment of SMEs in their physical localities. The study 
confirms the hypothesis that more autonomous municipalities (measured as the higher 
percentage of government revenue is generated at the local level) promotes more SMEs 
and pro-business type governments programs, which ultimately induces economic 
development. Even though fiscal and administrative autonomy is less statically strong 
(model 1 a+b), it does indicate that local authorities are not as knowledge about their 
fiscal and administrative needs to develop new businesses in their communities. 
Ultimately, this chapter suggests that for local economic development to take 
place, mayors, and local officials need to begin to realize that they are major players in 
their economies. These political actors also can be helpful for the development of their 
countries. Local elites often complain that they lack the necessary administrative and 
fiscal resources to produce the necessary policies in their cities. This may help push for 
further decentralization reforms into the future. 
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CHAPTER XI 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
This dissertation examined local governments’ efforts to collect taxes and 
promote economic development in Latin America. It used a mixed methodology to 
explore how cities make decisions to innovate, develop, and finance economic 
development programs. First, this research used a comparative analysis of 
intergovernmental relation in two federalist countries—Argentina and Mexico—to 
describe how decentralization has taken into effect within the region. Then six cities were 
compared—Santa Fe, Rosario, Rafaela, Leon, Guanajuato, and San Miguel de Allende—
to better describe the fiscal constraints and economic development initiatives undertaken 
by each city. Finally, the research used statistical regressions to test data gathered from 
Mexico and Latin American municipal governments to test whether autonomous cities 
are better equipped at establishing economic development programs.  
Decentralization reforms perform in a dynamic process, which may change at any 
time. Argentina’s recent re-centralization has created political conflict and overall 
institutional weakness throughout its subnational governments, causing the national 
government serious strains on meeting basic public policy goals. In contrast, Mexican 
decentralization policy, especially after the fiscal coordination law of 1997, has 
strengthened subnational governments. Although, it can be argued that, municipalities 
still need to demand a more prominent role in the policy making process. In both 
countries, the decentralization process has empowered state governments. However 
municipalities still lack incentives to increase revenues. Even though municipalities have 
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limited abilities to levy charges, fines fees and property, they have shown a positive 
correlation between local own-source revenue and economic growth.  
This dissertation found that decentralization policies are difficult to decipher from 
other political and economic reforms. The rationale for a national government to fiscally 
decentralize may involve a variety of reasons—including such as macroeconomic 
stability, economic growth and/or politicians seeking re-election. The policy sequencing 
(fiscal, administrative, or political decentralization) is somewhat irrelevant since each 
subnational government faces various constraints at quite different times in its history for 
different reasons. The effects of the most recent decentralization and centralization 
policies have influenced the SNG (states in Mexico and provinces in Argentina) financial 
budgets more directly than they have the local level. Economic development for the cities 
is much more dependent on national government’s macroeconomic policies than micro or 
local level initiatives. Although LED programs can help local politicians to strengthen 
their local economies, higher levels of government make political decisions for large 
infrastructure and public works to be developed. This may have additional implications 
because financial data are still not available for the local governments. This further 
exacerbates investment decisions because economic data (such as costs and payments for 
services) is not used for these decisions. The next section describes these conclusions 
with more detail and provides implications for the field of public administration. 
11.2 Discussion of Results  
The results of this study also show that economic development is a precursor for 
collecting more taxes at the local level. With more financial resources, local governments 
can promote more programs, whether they are funding public works, infrastructure or 
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promoting local economic development programs. This study explains how cities are 
funding their economic development programs. This research examined how cities fiscal 
capacity, to describe how the municipalities are creating further autonomy (through the 
collection of own-source revenue). Capacity should be measured in three variables: legal 
or institutional, human resources/development and mayoral leadership. All of the 
municipal governments studied were shown to have relative high amounts of human 
resources capacity to manage public resources, leverage new taxes and administer 
programs such as cadastre revisions. This suggests that levels of education are rising and 
higher than expected. Furthermore public officials are clearly able to collect, administer, 
and manage public resources.  
More problematic are the legal or institutional arrangements through which 
municipal governments function and run. A clear example of this is Mexico with its no-
reelection rule, the inability to set tax rates and bases and the continuation of its 
expenditure decentralization policies. Regional control over local elections is also 
problematic in terms of the ability of Mexican municipalities to collect taxes. Even with 
these institutional problems, public administrators are seeking independent ways to 
collect more revenues. Guanajuato’s mummy museum is a case in point, but this is more 
of an exception than the rule. On the whole, public administrators in Latin America are 
politicians and seek higher positions in the administration. They therefore are more loyal 
to parties than they are to local constituencies, thus rent-seeking behavior is inherent 
without clear incentive structures created by the state.  
Overall, Chapter IV used a comparative historical approach to federalism to argue 
that Mexico, even though it was a centralized federation for much of the 20th century, 
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began to decentralize when opposition party members came into power in 1980. 
Argentina has always been a loose decentralized federation of caudillos but has recently 
become more centralized order to manage its macro-economic instability by collecting 
more national level taxes (mostly recently retenciones tax on agricultural exports). 
Mexico’s decentralization has concentrated on administrative and political reforms. 
Fiscal policy for redistribution of federally funded grants is based on a formula and 
ultimately has decentralized expenditures (but revenues and the budget process as a 
whole is totally centralized by the executive).  
Chapter V evaluated the abilities of cities to take out public debt as a source of 
independent revenue for internal decision-making. This research found Argentina has 
more legal authority to take out loans than their Mexican counterparts, but has recently 
been more restricted and must have the federal treasury to approve these types of loans. 
Mexico has always had a very centralized to make decisions to collect and manage loans 
based on the federal treasury, but has recently opened up to allow two rating and 
collateral by the promise of inter-governmental transfers. This is the only place that 
“second generation reforms” are in place and where market-based pricing comes into 
effect to decide if a city deserves a loan or not. Financial decisions to borrow are based 
not only on the markets but also on inter-governmental politics since the loans must have 
approval by either state Congresses or their national finance ministries. Both Mexico and 
Argentina have had recent fiscal reforms passed by Congresses to approve some debt 
capacity for local governments. Mexican municipalities take advantage of this benefit and 
do take out debt—but the cites that do so are the ones that are wealthier and have better 
balance sheets to cover larger loans. 
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Chapter VI and VII employed a comparative case study approach to analyze the 
subnational governments. These chapters provide a path dependency argument and 
implement a bottom up approach to see how the federal decentralization reforms were 
transforming the local government budgets in their countries. This research suggests that 
the decentralization reforms have not changed the subnational governments’ finances a 
great deal. Individual city budgets change more when local administrations change office 
than by changes in federal policy.  
Federal policies of decentralization or centralization have had minimal effects on 
the overall budget capacity of these cities. Local politics and decisions made by 
politicians take precedence over budgets. This study found that the level of professional 
development (or the levels of education of public employees) is sufficient to manage 
funds, which is contrary to what was stated in the previous academic literature. Second, 
this study finds that projects or personnel funding decisions are most heavily weighted on 
inter-governmental relationships or personal politics that a city mayor does within his 
party or the state legislature, or directly with the president. The most fundamental 
variable is the political structure, whether at the local, state or national level, and the 
inter-governmental relations that a politician has with other levels of government. 
In general, the preceding chapters offer specific lessons learned. Chapter VIII 
used a comparative public finance approach to understand the six cases. It evaluated size, 
capacity and legal framework of local budgets and how the decentralization reforms 
effected the local budgeting of the six cities and the two subnational governments. First 
there was a comparative analysis of legal structure of the two countries. It was identified 
that Argentina’s cities have more authority to tax, set rates and bases, make budget 
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decisions than in Mexico. Mexico’s municipalities are extremely limited and subjected to 
the state governments’ final authority for decision-making. But with a comparison of the 
city budgets, there are few changes in actual budget between the Argentine and Mexican 
cases. One assumption was that local tax collections should be lower in Mexico than for 
their Argentine counterparts, but evidence here found that not to be the case. Another 
assumption was that bigger cities collect more in taxes and spend more per capita, but 
evidence also found that not true. The expenditure and revenue decisions for the cases 
presented here are fairly complex, which included assumptions such as smaller cities 
might spend more on wage bill or larger cities would spend more on public works. This 
study found that the internal city politics of the mayor and his staff, which often are 
dependent on the politics of the next higher-level administration (state level in Mexico 
and provincial level in Argentina) is more important than any other independent variable.  
Chapter IX and X then therefore uses that knowledge to perform a large-scale N 
regression to test whether more own source revenue (local tax collection) helps economic 
development. The statistical models find a positive correlation between economic 
development (measured in increased GDP) and local own source revenue collection. 
Chapter IX using data from Mexico finds a positive correlation. Chapter X validates this 
outcome by using survey data and a regression model to test whether mayors and local 
authorities see decentralization (political, administrative or fiscal) as essential for job 
creation in their communities. The outcome shows that mayors see more political and 
administrative decentralization over fiscal decentralization to increase jobs within their 
communities. They report relying on their political contacts to make financial decisions 
over their budgets than collecting taxes themselves. The survey data found that local 
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politicians would rather rent-seek higher levels of government to pay for public goods 
than raise local revenue. This validates the case studies in which the most significant 
independent variable was inter-governmental political relations.  
11.3 Relationship of Results to Theory  
 This dissertation has analyzed six cities efforts to collect tax revenues and promote 
economic development policies. For many developing countries, decentralization policies 
have come along with the rise of democratization. While this is true, it is difficult to 
determine the types of economic policies and political decisions have created the spread 
of decentralization. What is clear is that decentralization has encouraged cities to become 
actors in their local economies to spur growth. Mayors and local authorities’ actions, 
whether by increasing public debt, opening offices of economic development, or 
managing their budget effectively, are actively promoting growth type activities within 
their communities. 
 This study has evaluated decentralization through the following approaches: 1) 
public choice theory; 2) public finance theory; 3) comparative federalism and 4) inter-
governmental politics. In public administration, decentralization is used as a theme within 
comparative administrative systems. Many scholars utilize decentralization as a theory 
but also have a hard time measuring it conceptually. The public finance literature has 
measures for decentralization, such as the total own source revenue collection over 
transfers and the authority to collect local taxes. By using a comparative federalist 
approach, this research found understanding the relationship between levels of 
government and encouraging the promotion of economic development activities to be a 
highly complex matter with many more variables and possible outcomes not used in this 
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analysis. When evaluating the tax bases and seeing how to formulate national incentives 
for the local level, there may be a disconnect of federal policy to local action. Under an 
institutionalist approach, it is often much more difficult to understand how to apply 
incentives from the national level to encourage local level tax collection. This goes 
beyond the capacity question and treats the issue of policy effectiveness to promote the 
correct incentives from the national government down to the local governments. This is 
not referring to the education level (professional development) of the local public official. 
The bigger question relates to the institutional rules of the game and the level of legal 
authority that cities respond to, for which influence the way subnational leaders react.  
 This also goes beyond what the public choice scholars call “second generation 
federalism,” which suggests that national governments use market based approaches to 
find the right fiscal incentives for local governments to foster economic development. 
Whereas market based approaches are essential to foster economic development, they are 
relevant for example in rating agencies for municipal bonds, yet most other incentives are 
not market based but rather political. This suggests a need for a better understanding of 
institutional relationships between city government officials to higher-level governments, 
such as a mayor’s actions within the inter-governmental process.  A better understanding 
of these relationships can help policy makers propose the correct incentives to expected 
outcomes. Incentives may be market-based solutions, for example where raters set the 
bond prices for individual city’s borrowing rates, but for the most part the incentives are 
political in nature. For example, Mexico’s “no-reelection rule” creates a disincentive for 
city officials to encourage more local tax collection and promote revenue 
“decentralization” (following the 1997 expenditure decentralization efforts). Argentina’s 
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recent increase in taxes to farmers’ commodities—through a centralized tax collection 
effort—leaves cities like Rosario with less revenue to collect locally and thereby may 
enhance national government to rent-seeking activities.  
 The overall idea of path dependency, that “history matters,” is important for 
understanding which nonfinancial incentives helped to create the current policy structure. 
It also helps to indicate what governments are authorized to do and why they make their 
decisions. For example, without history it is hard to understand the budget authority and 
spending decisions of the case studies described in chapter V. It is not just the economic 
endowments of one city over another, which makes a difference in their development 
paths, but also where they fit into the inter-governmental system.  What a city mayor 
does to take advantage of their place within the system, such as rent-seeking activities 
like solicitation of grants or contracts to higher-level governments, or campaigning for 
other politicians, can also make a difference in the local budget outcome. 
 Not surprisingly, Tiebout's theory may not be as applicable for developing 
countries. Local governments in general collect such little amounts of taxes, and citizens 
are so poor that they are unable to move to where cheaper public services are being 
offered. Rather in developing countries, citizens are moving to the capital city to get a 
job. Mid-size cities within the developing world do not compete with one another. More 
likely is the mega cities effect—capital cities increase population and have to provide 
more public sources to help all these internal migrants—which generates more 
centralization because the national government and their relations with their capital cities 
may be politicized and highly complex. Better public services could be offered by 
providing transfers that are directly tied to subsidies for economic development, just as 
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done with education and health care programs. Ending or minimizing the role of the 
revenue sharing systems would help many local governments to focus on collecting local 
revenues instead of relying on transfers. 
 If wealth is the precursor for economic development (and more decentralization) 
then developing countries might need to centralize first around larger cities and focus on 
their development. Thus, larger regional cities could take advantage of IFIs and other 
private or foreign investments into their regional economies in order to provide the 
regional spillovers to poorer areas. Therefore, wealthier states may not have as high 
revenue sharing to the national government, which only later decentralize revenues with 
others states. Poor states may be able to take advantage of the regional gains and 
therefore not fall so far behind. By working with mid-size cities to create regional 
development, this avoids trying to create the correct ratio of revenue sharing and the 
prefect level of fiscal federalism. This is Rondinelli’s idea of developing secondary cities 
to provide spillover of economic benefits to their regional areas (Cheema and Rondinelli 
2007; Rondinelli and Shabbir Cheema 1981; Rondinelli and Cheema 2003). The IADB 
identified the importance of mid-size cities in order to confront other major problems in a 
report published in 2001. For them: 
Most of the 13,000 local governments in Latin America and the Caribbean are 
small and medium sized cities, although varying widely in size, geo-graphical 
location and setting. In general, these cities are increasingly experiencing a whole 
set of environmental problems, be it due to urbanization, industrial development, 
land use change or other issues (de Vries, Schuster, Procee, and Mengers 2001)p1. 
 
The issue of economic development is only one factor to resolve additional looming 
problems expected to occur in developing countries such as in Latin America. The IADB 
also published “Making Decentralization Work in Latin America and the Caribbean” in 
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2001 which suggested that institutional capacities of these subnational governments were 
too weak to undertake important steps towards fiscal autonomy (Inter-American 
Development Bank 2001).  
 This study found that not to be true, that cities in Latin America have various 
capacities to raise their own revenues and develop their own public policies whether 
towards economic development, protecting the environment or promoting tourism in their 
regional areas. The agglomeration of economies around their relative industrial 
strengthen establish urban centers and cities, which create the fundamental administrative 
level for which local governments operate. City administrators understand their role to 
strengthen their local areas and provide good public services, even if the appropriate 
incentive structure is weak or does not exist. 
 Finally, what is fundamental in the decentralization process, and for the practice of 
public administration, is the need for national governments to establish the correct 
institutional arrangements and incentives for local officials to perform better. Whether 
this is done through technical equations (as in the Mexican case) or through political 
rhetoric (the Argentine case using the fiscal pacts) both increases the political decision-
making of the national government. Allowing central governments to have the authority 
to make decisions on local economic development activities, such as public works 
financing, is inefficient. Mexico’s no re-election laws and lack of tax authority 
counteracts cities efforts to collect taxes. Argentina’s multiple changes in the past years 
make it difficult for cities to manage the transferred resources. The national governments 
must acknowledge that their policies do affect local residents and their incentives to pay 
taxes, which later affects the way city administrators can improve local public policies. 
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11.4 Implications for Further Research  
More research in this area could be done for answers. Future research could 
analyze whether the local government are indeed playing a role to improve 
macroeconomic outcomes. Future research should include evaluations of the flypaper 
effect, hard and soft budget constraints as well as political institutional rules such as no-
reelection in Mexico, which perhaps could make the difference as to how local 
governments behave.  
Additional factors could also be important for why local governments make a 
particular decision.  While past literature suggested that capacity is often cited as one of 
regions biggest problems as to why local governments have not lead to more 
development. Capacity needs to be better defined, as it could be professional 
development of public officials or the more technical skills involved in managing a 
municipality. The concept of capacity should be disaggregated to the size of the location. 
For example, the population, the territorial size, and the number of residents will 
determine what types of capacities are needed to run a local government. The outcome of 
this research has determined that municipal capacity is not the level of education or 
mayor’s leadership abilities; rather it is the institutional framework under which the inter-
governmental relations operate that matters for local tax collection and economic 
development performance.  
More research is needed to better understand the impact of legal frameworks, 
political incentives and financial incentives on and within a municipality's operating 
environment. Do governments in developing countries need to have better/different 
institutional arrangements? What and how are cities with larger institutional capacities 
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and roles within the inter-governmental system determining how to help other cities (i.e. 
with economic cooperation or strengthening economic growth for their national 
governments)? How can public administrators be encouraged to collect more tax 
revenues? Why are some cities not collecting taxes and spending more, for example, on 
wage bill, while others are spending on public works? How can national governments 
strengthen local tax bases while working with local governments to provide more revenue 
sharing for less economically developed communities? These are several topics in which 
research could focus on in the future. 
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Guía de Entrevista para Autoridades Municipales 
Questionnaire for Interviews of Municipal Officials 
N.B. Esta encuesta se aplicará en una entrevista semi-estructurada, es decir, las preguntas 
se harán por medio de una conversación, asegurando que se incluya cada pregunta. 
Esperamos recibir respuestas generales mas que datos precisos. 
Note: This questionnaire will be applied as a semi-guided interview, that is, the questions will be asked in the 
context of a conversation, making sure to include each of these questions. We expect to receive open-ended 
answers rather than specific data. 
1. ¿Cuáles han sido los mayores retos del muncipio en su área durante su gestión? 
¿En cuáles problemas municipales ha enfocado sus mayores esfuerzos? 
What are (were) the greatest challenges the municipal government during your period? In what areas have you 
(did you) focus most of your efforts? 
2. ¿Cómo han evolucionado las finanzas del municipio durante su gestión? 
How have (did) the finances of the municipal government evolve during your period? 
3. ¿Qué tipo de programas de desarrollo local han sido implementados o discutidos en los 
últimos diez años? 
In the past 10 years, what types of development programs have (been) implemented or discusses for the 
municipality? 
4. Explique/Describa cuál es su percepción sobre cómo se ha desarrollado (o cómo ha 
sido el crecimiento del municipio) el municipio en los últimos diez años. 
Describe your perceptions of how the municipality has development in the past ten years. 
5. ¿Podría decirnos como evalúa el nivel de autonomía de su municipio en términos de 
autonomía administrativa, política y fiscal? 
Describe your perceptions of municipal autonomy in regards to administrative, political and fiscal control. 
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Electronic Survey For the Latin American Municipal Associations 
English Version 
 
1. Please evaluate the level of autonomy your municipality has (mark an X appropriately)? 
 High Significant Insignificant Don’t 
know/or 
not related 
1. Political Autonomy 
(Level of decision making, originating internally)  
    
2. Administrative Autonomy 
(Capacity to define municipal authorities, processes, 
and purchases) 
    
3. Budget Autonomy  
(Defined budget, creating and calculating taxes and 
expenses) 
    
 
2. Can you specify the number of the following agents of Local Economic Development?  
 Number (approx.) 
1. Registered Small Business and operations in your municipality (industry, 
commerce, and service activities) 
 
2. Number of Registered small business in the last year  
3. Number of civil society organizations, micro-businesses, associations, groups that 
are in your municipality 
 
 
3. Could you please indicate the time that it takes to set up a business? 
Time (estimated in days) ________________ 
 
4. Please explain the composition of total inputs to your municipal budget. (Note in approx. 
percentage that totals 100). 
Source Percentage % 
1.Resources: LOCAL TAXES 
(Municipal tax on industry, commerce, motor vehicles, property taxes) 
 
2.Own Resources: RIGHTS and  
(Right to commercialize, access to addressees and other services) 
 
3. Own Resources: FINES, CAPTIAL PAYMENTS  
4. Central Government Transfers and Intergovernmental payments  
5. International Cooperation Donations  
6. Public loans from financial institutions  
TOTAL 100% 
 
5. Can you indicate how much was your public budget in 2007? (Approximate in US$) 
 
6. In respect to your municipal finances, please indicate which applies: 
 Yes, this exists 
1. The capacity to become in debt, that the bank will loan directly or through the 
emission of municipal bond. 
 
2. We have the possibility to define tax rates, schedules and plans that will be applied to 
the municipality (property taxes, licenses and commercial fees) 
 
3. We have active financial rigors and systems and use bank savings accounts  
 
7. Please indicate the interest in the following: 
 Yes, we have 
1. The municipality has a local economic development promotional office  
2. The municipality organizes annual fairs and carnivals to advertise local products  
3. There are prizes and annual acknowledgement of best business and entrepreneurs  
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4. The municipality has up-to-date maps and locations of local businesses  
5. The local government is open to free access of information to open businesses: 
access, roads, and productive infrastructure, among other things? 
 
6. The local government has one-window to set up business activities, commercial 
and industrial licensing? 
 
7. The municipality has formal connections to the local business community  
8. The municipality has developed support programs for new small business leaders?  
9. The municipality has an updated plan of registered commercial plants and 
productivity activities in your area? 
 
10. The municipality receives of international cooperation?  
11. The municipality has partnerships with local organizations: city sisters, with local 
universities, international cooperation agencies 
 
12. The municipality is a member of an inter- municipal association for economic 
development 
 
13. The municipality administers a micro-credit plan for small and medium size 
businesses 
 
14. Other (specify)  
 
8. What are the following instruments that are disposable in your municipality 
 Yes, we 
have it 
Elaborated 
This year 
Elaborated last year 
Local Development Plan    
Fiscal Investment Plan    
Urban Planning and Regulations    
Education, Health and Social Plans     
Municipal Budget    
Rules, Manuals and Policy Procedures    
Personal Capacity Plan    
Municipal taxes and collection system    
Other (Specify)    
 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (please put an X where it applies) 
9. Your country __________________ 
 
10. The population of your municipality 
1. Less than 20,000 habitants  
2. Between 20,000 to 50,000  
3. Between 50,000 to 100,000  
4. Between 100,000 and 1,000,000  
5. More than 1,000,000 habitants  
 
11. The Administrative Territory__________ 
a. National Capital 
b. State, provincial or Regional Capital__________ 
c. City__________ 
d. Town __________ 
12. The level of poverty in your municipality 
 Less than 10% are poor__________ 
 Between 10-25% are poor __________ 
 Between 25-50% are poor __________ 
 Between 50-75% are poor __________ 
 More than 75% are poor __________ 
13. The job you hold 
  Mayor, president of the municipal council__________ 
 Councilor, other elected official__________ 
299 
 Executive or profession in the municipal government__________ 
 Other (specify) __________ 
14. The number of years you have had held it? ______________ 
15. Your gender ________Man _________Women 
16. Your age __________ 
17. Your level of education 
a. Primary school completed__________ 
b. Secondary school completed__________ 
c. University studies (incomplete) __________ 
d. University studies completed__________ 
e. Post-Graduate studies__________ 
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Shares of Local Own-source Revenues (in percentages) 
Country Own taxes and 
fees as % of local 
revenues 
Local own taxes 
as fees as % of 
GDP 
Argentina 49.8% 1.2% 
Mexico 15.6% 2.4% 
Source: UCLG data Collection  
 
Authority to Borrow by Local Governments 
Country Access to Financial 
Markets 
Municipal Bank Limitations 
Argentina Yes Yes Yes 
Mexico Yes No Yes 
Source: UCLG data Collection 
 
Public Finance Indicators 
Country Total 
Expendit
ure in 
General 
Govt 
(Mill 
USD) 
Total 
Expendit
ure in 
General 
Govt (% 
of GDP) 
Local 
Expendit
ure (Mill 
USD) 
Local 
Expend
iture 
(% of 
GDP) 
 Local 
Expendi
ture % 
of 
General 
Govt 
Local 
Revenue
s (Mill 
USD) 
Local 
Govt 
Revenues 
as % of 
GDP 
Local 
Govt 
Revenues 
as % of 
General 
Govt 
Argentina 
(2006) 
$70,468 32.9% $6,204 2.9% 8.8% $5,277 2.5% 7.3% 
Mexico 
(2007) 
$339,502 31.2% $21,969 2.0% 6.5% $23,007 2.1% 7.4% 
Source: IMF, Ministries of Finance of Argentina (UCLG data Collection) 
 
Revenues and Expenditures by Government Level (%) 
 Revenues (% total) Expenditures (% total) 
Country Federal/Central Regional Local Federal/Central Regional Local 
Argentina (2006) 55 38 7 58 33 9 
Mexico (2007) 68 25 7 69 25 6 
Source: UCLG data Collection 
  
Budget Expenditures by Economic Classification of Local Governments 
Country (most recent 
year) 
Wages and Salaries/ 
Pension funds (% of total) 
Current Expenditure 
other than wages and 
salaries (% of total) 
Capital Expenditure/ 
Debt / Equipment (% of 
total) 
Argentina (2006) 47.40 29.27 23.33 
Mexico (2007) 82.83 12.29 4.88 
Source: UCLG data Collection 
  
 
 
 
302 
Origin of Revenues of Local Governments (Millions US$) 
 (% of total) (of GDP) 
Country 
(most 
recent 
year) 
Own 
taxes 
and 
fees   
Shared 
Revenu
es  
Conditi
onal 
Transfe
rs  
Uncond
itional 
transfer
s/ Aid  
Own 
taxes and 
fees  
 
Shared 
Revenu
es  
 
Conditional 
Transfers  
 
Uncondition
al Transfers/ 
Aid  
 
Argentina 
(2006) 
49.80 42.40 0.00 7.80 1.22 1.04 0.00 0.19 
Mexico 
(2007) 
15.60 45.30 0.00 39.20 2.38 6.91 0.00 5.98 
Source: UCLG data Collection   
 
  
303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 – Six Cities Public Finances Reported 1999-2008
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Rosario (UD 
Dollars) 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 
Revenue 269,366,567 100 253,340,305 100 79,376,981 100 107,476,999 100 136,799,608 100 162,252,278 100 190,647,857 100 238,577,006 100 285,369,132 100 
Transfers 2,150,664 1 1,226,884 0 572,859 1 671,968 1 2,513,277 2 4,467,819 3 4,267,634 2 12,575,965 5 5,090,256 2 
TOSR 267,215,903 99 252,113,421 100 78,804,122 99 106,805,031 99 134,286,331 98 157,784,459 97 186,380,222 98 226,001,040 95 280,278,876 98 
Expenditures 238,891,154 100 246,949,958 100 77,915,642 100 101,478,277 100 122,121,465 100 155,070,068 100 192,884,079 100 244,866,406 100 309,596,137 100 
Wage Bill 123,984,835 52 130,802,574 53 38,183,030 49 45,112,010 44 53,165,259 44 69,857,484 45 86,019,961 45 117,838,815 48 159,309,547 51 
Public Works 29,712,982 12 43,190,194 17 6,132,417 8 11,831,912 12 19,777,841 16 37,514,967 24 38,093,114 20 36,945,643 15 19,866,976 6 
Other 85,193,337 36 72,957,189 30 33,600,195 43 44,534,355 44 49,178,364 40 47,697,617 31 68,771,003 36 90,081,947 37 130,419,614 42 
                   
Rafaela (US 
Dollars) 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 
Revenue 24,072,251 100 22,746,825 100 7,277,612 100 9,552,539 100 12,743,710 100 15,763,158 100 20,402,978 100 28,363,975 100 33,364,824 100 
Transfers 7,970,208 33 6,898,377 30 2,359,590 32 3,109,842 33 4,119,140 32 5,061,547 32 6,254,673 31 7,770,262 27 9,739,130 29 
TOSR 16,102,042 67 15,848,449 70 4,918,022 68 6,442,698 67 8,624,570 68 10,701,611 68 14,148,305 69 20,593,712 73 23,625,693 71 
Expenditures 23,782,473 100 22,510,526 100 6,630,522 100 9,805,935 100 10,595,757 100 15,659,929 100 19,929,470 100 27,876,174 100 33,287,002 100 
Wage Bill 9,502,393 40 9,668,623 43 2,863,777 43 3,321,566 34 3,939,440 37 5,358,015 34 6,589,546 33 8,699,176 31 11,288,194 34 
Public Works 474,449 2 467,327 2 237,772 4 371,988 4 413,973 4 488,272 3 602,764 3 778,082 3 793,481 2 
Other 13,805,631 58 12,374,576 55 3,528,974 53 6,112,381 62 6,242,345 59 9,813,642 63 12,737,160 64 18,398,917 66 21,205,327 64 
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Santa Fe in 
US Dollars 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 
Revenue n/a n/a n/a n/a 24,148,126 100 n/a n/a 1,016,291 100 1,536,551 100 2,163,639 100 6,453,005 100 1,100,426 100 
Transfers n/a n/a n/a n/a 11,977,582 50 n/a n/a 0 0 297,509 19 255,251 12 352,658 5 118,044 11 
TOSR n/a n/a n/a n/a 12,170,544 50 n/a n/a 1,016,291 100 1,239,042 81 1,908,388 88 6,100,346 95 982,382 89 
Expenditures n/a n/a n/a n/a 24,435,797 100 n/a n/a 39,061,005 100 59,407,330 100 63,880,732 100 109,420,944 100 91,955,249 100 
Wage Bill n/a n/a n/a n/a 19,157,682 78 n/a n/a 24,805,138 64 29,476,616 50 33,477,975 52 43,625,937 40 56,795,796 62 
Public Workds n/a n/a n/a n/a 514,868 2 n/a n/a 2,579,695 7 8,758,596 15 7,053,335 11 19,780,996 18 3,039,213 3 
Other n/a n/a n/a n/a 4,763,246 19 n/a n/a 11,676,172 30 21,172,118 36 23,349,422 37 46,014,012 42 32,120,241 35 
                   
León (US 
Dollars) 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 
Revenue 108,593,095 100 146,166,546 100 151,157,991 100 141,069,739 100 136,102,509 100 180,842,346 100 205,577,417 100 199,222,169 100 206,588,748 100 
Transfers 70,057,976 65 87,252,333 60 73,992,805 49 70,758,040 50 80,548,609 59 123,677,854 68 102,909,627 50 129,103,884 65 146,274,699 71 
TOSR 38,535,118 35 58,914,213 40 77,165,186 51 70,311,699 50 55,553,899 41 57,164,493 32 102,667,790 50 70,118,285 35 60,314,048 29 
Expenditures 108,593,095 100 146,166,546 100 151,157,991 100 141,069,739 100 136,102,509 100 180,842,346 100 205,577,417 100 199,222,169 100 206,588,748 100 
Wage Bill 33,788,604 31 39,110,690 27 44,807,429 30 46,633,269 33 52,244,293 38 60,353,100 33 74,354,420 36 74,812,724 38 65,963,364 32 
Public Works 56,741 0 0 0 70,333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 74,747,749 69 107,055,856 73 106,280,228 70 94,436,470 67 83,858,216 62 120,489,246 67 131,222,997 64 124,409,445 62 140,625,384 68 
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San Miguel de 
Allende (US 
Dollars) 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 
Revenue 15,677,426 100 16,331,195 100 22,887,082 100 15,903,796 100 20,982,027 100 30,370,852 100 30,694,486 100 28,894,531 100 31,332,180 100 
Transfers 9,232,063 59 10,327,664 63 11,754,254 51 12,191,901 77 8,167,816 39 16,093,942 53 15,041,226 49 20,189,211 70 23,426,563 75 
TOSR 6,445,364 41 6,003,531 37 11,132,828 49 3,711,894 23 12,814,210 61 14,276,910 47 15,653,260 51 8,705,320 30 7,905,617 25 
Expenditures 15,677,426 100 16,331,195 100 22,887,082 100 15,903,796 100 20,982,027 100 30,370,852 100 30,694,486 100 28,894,531 100 31,332,180 100 
Wage Bill 3,085,234 20 4,005,728 25 3,822,417 17 3,690,664 23 4,657,263 22 5,448,154 18 5,645,168 18 6,794,911 24 5,126,923 16 
Public Works 7,044,150 45 3,478,684 21 10,098,125 44 5,585,883 35 4,718,906 22 15,171,977 50 18,701,538 61 14,828,998 51 12,178,086 39 
Other 5,548,043 35 8,846,783 54 8,966,540 39 6,627,248 42 11,605,858 55 9,750,722 32 6,347,780 21 7,270,622 25 14,027,170 45 
                   
Guanajuato 
Capital (US 
Dolars) 2000 % 2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 
Revenue 15,802,259 100 16,953,217 100 18,728,504 100 16,873,440 100 20,771,172 100 24,982,954 100 25,126,586 100 25,618,461 100 23,924,838 100 
Transfers 5,944,363 38 1,102,011 7 1,125,086 6 1,223,516 7 1,247,961 6 1,170,605 5 996,304 4 1,086,233 4 1,162,204 5 
TOSR 9,857,896 62 15,851,206 93 17,603,419 94 15,649,924 93 19,523,211 94 23,812,349 95 24,130,282 96 24,532,228 96 22,762,634 95 
Expenditures 15,802,259 100 16,953,217 100 18,728,504 100 16,873,440 100 20,771,172 100 24,982,954 100 25,126,586 100 25,618,461 100 23,924,838 100 
Wage Bill 6,385,146 40 7,652,615 45 6,966,477 37 6,581,644 39 7,052,613 34 9,363,344 37 11,831,159 47 12,338,358 48 10,647,145 45 
Public Works 4,696,757 30 2,221,386 13 2,518,573 13 7,332,960 43 8,984,826 43 10,515,082 42 5,152,108 21 3,585,351 14 2,857,290 12 
Other 4,720,357 30 7,079,216 42 9,243,454 49 2,958,836 18 4,733,733 23 5,104,528 20 8,143,319 32 9,694,752 38 10,420,403 44 
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